IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 1155

International Court of Justice

H1155 - 0002

RIBBENTROP - DOCUMENTS.

Exhibit No.	Doc. No.	Doc. Book	Transcript Page	Description	Date
US.5	2829 PS		253	Affidavit von Ribbentrop	Nov.1945
	1337 PS			Hitler's decree, electing Ribbentrop member of Secret Cabinet Council	4 Feb.1938
	D.472			Ribbentrop's actions as Foreign Minister. See Archiv dur publizistische Arbeit page 6005	22 April 1943
	D.636			Extract from "Examination of Record of S.S. Leaders"	
A. AUSTRIA.					
	2461 PS	N	554	German Communique	12/16/18 Feb. 1938
US.72	1780 PS	N	587	Jodl's diary	11/12 Feb.1938
US.76	2949 PS	N	1157	Telephone- Goering to Ribbentrop	13 March 1938
	2307 PS RGB.1938 I No.21 Page 237				13 March 1938
B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA.					
US.93	3060 PS		784	Prague to F.O.Berlin	16 March 1938
US.94	2789 PS		786	Henlein to Ribbentrop	17 March 1938
US.95	2788 PS		786/7	Conference with Henlein	29 March 1938
US.96	3059 PS		789	Memo on stirring up of Sudeten Germans	29 March 1938
	2360 PS		742	Voelkischer Boebachter	13 January 1939
US.85	2800 PS		753	Ribbentrop/Attolico	18 July 1938
US.86	2791 PS		754	" "	23 Aug. 1938
US.87	2792 PS		754	" "	27 Aug. 1938
US.88	2796 PS		755	Conversation Hitler/Ribbentrop/Imredi	23 Aug. 1938
US.89	2797 PS		758	Conversation Ribbentrop/Kanya	29 Aug. 1938
US.81	2786 PS		740	Ribbentrop/Keitel	4 Mar. 1938

H1155-0003

Exhibit No.	Doc. No.	Doc. Book	Transcript Page	Description	Date.
US.97	2858 PS	0	791, 895	Telegram German F.O.to Prague	19 Sept.1938
US.98	2855 PS	0	792	ditto	16 Sept.1938
US.99	2854 PS	0	792	ditto	17 Sept.1938
US.100	2853 PS	0	792	ditto	24 Sept.1938
US.101	2856 PS	0	792	ditto	24 Sept.1938
GB.23	TC.23	1	964	Munich Agreement	29 Sept.1938
US.90	C.2	0	766	Anticipated breaches of International law in attacking Czechoslovakia	1 Oct. 1938
US.116	2815 PS	0	907	Telegram Ribbentrop to Prague	13 March 1939
US.117	2802 PS	0	908	Conference Hitler"Tiso	13 March 1939
US.110	2790 PS		898	Meeting Hitler,Ribbentrop with pro-Nazi Slovak Tuca	12 Feb. 1939
US.118	2798 PS	0	911/ 917	German F.O.Minutes of meeting Hitler/Hacha	15 March 1939
US.126	3061 PS		931	Czechoslovakian Gov. report	
	1439 PS			Treaty of Protection	23 March 1939
C. LITHUANIA.					
GB.4	TC.53A	1	943	Incorporation of Memel	3 April 1939
	2953 PS			Letter to Ribbentrop	29 June 1939
	2952 PS			Report	19 July 1939
D. POLAND.					
GB.30	2357 PS	2	977	Hitler's Reichstag Speech	20 Feb. 1938
	TC.73-37			Extracts from Hitler's Reichstag speech	20 Feb. 1938
GB.31	TC.76	2	980	German F.O.Secret Memo "It will be the general impression that the Poles will be next"	26 Aug. 1938

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Exhibit No.	Doc. No.	Doc. Book	Transcript Page	Description	Date.
D. POLAND (continued)					
	TC.73 -40			Conversation Lipski/ Ribbentrop	10 Sept.1938
	TC.73 -42			Hitler at Sportz Palast "No more territorial problems in Europe".	26 Sept.1938
GB.27	TC.73 -44	2	985 986	Ribbentrop/Lipski - general & peaceful settlement of Danzig Issue	25 Oct.1938
GB.28	TC.73 -45	2	986	Polish reply suggesting bilateral agreement but unacceptable that D.should return to Reich	31 Oct.1938
GB.33	C.137	2	988	Preparations to be made to occupy Danzig by surprise	21 Oct.1938
GB.34	TC.73 -48	2	988 989	Beck/Hitler (Ribbentrop present) "some new formkorperschaft.Minister could be quite at ease"	5 Jan.1939
GB.35	TC.73 -49	2	990	Ribbentrop/Beck "No violent solution of Danzig... a further building up of friendly relations".	6 Jan.1939
GB.36	2530 PS	2	990	Ribbentrop's speech in Warsaw "Continued progress and consolidation of friendly relations"	25 Jan.1939
GB.37	TC.73 -57	2	991	Hitler's Reichstag speech	30 Jan.1939
US.27	L.79	L	359,408 930	Hitler's meeting at Reichschancellery	23 May 1939
US.30	1014 PS	L	371	Hitler's Obersalzburg speech	22 Aug.1939
US.166	2987 PS	Q	1257	Ciano's diary	
GB.41	C.120	2	997	Fall Weiss for operation against Poland	3 & 11 Apl. 1939
GB.38	TC.73-61	2	991	Letter Lipski to Beck	21 Mar.1939
	D. 490		992	Interrogation Ribbentrop	20 Sept 1945
	TC.73-147			Lipski's final report	10 Oct.1939
			(N.B. TC.73 is Polish White Book)		

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Exhibit No.	Doc. No.	Doc. Book	Transcript page	Description	Date.
E. NORWAY & DENMARK.					
GB.77	TC.24	3	1061	Danish German non-aggression Pact	31 May 1939
	957 PS			Rosenberg's letter to Ribbentrop	24 Feb.1940
	004 PS			Rosenberg's report to the Führer with enclosure No.3	17 June 1940
	D.629			Letter Keitel/Ribbentrop	3 April 1940
F. GREECE & YUGOSLAVIA.					
	1871 PS			Report on Hitler/Ciano meeting	12 Aug.1939
	1842 PS			Meeting Mussolini/ Ribbentrop	19 Sept.1940
GB.119	C.134	5	1137	Letter from Jodl	21 Jan.1941
US.166	2987PS	Q	1257	Ciano's diary	20/21 Jan.41
GB.129	1834 PS	P	1161	Ribbentrop/Oshima	13 Feb.1941
GB.123	2450 PS	5	1140	Assurance Ribbentrop/ Cvetkovitch	25 March 1941
GB.120	1746 PS	5	1138 1143	Minutes	27 March 1941
H. RUSSIA.					
	1195 PS			Partition of Yugoslavia	12 April 1941
	TC.25			German/Soviet Non-Aggression Pact	23 Aug.1939
GB.129	1834 PS	P	1161 1250	Ribbentrop/Oshima	13 Feb.1941
US.146	1039 PS	P	1204	Rosenberg's file	28 June 1941
	C.77			G.F.O. Treatise on Barbarossa	18 May 1941
US.167	3054 PS	Film	1262	Ribbentrop's announced attack on USSR as seen in film 11.12.45	22 June 1941

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Exhibit No.	Doc. No.	Doc. Book	Transcript Page	Description	Date.
I. U.S.A. (JAPAN & AGGRESSION AGAINST U.S.A.)					
	2508 PS	Q	1218	Anti-Comintern Pact	25 Nov.1936
US.149	2643 PS	Q	1219	Tripartite Pact	27 Sept.1940
GB.119	1834 PS	P	1161 1250	Ribbentrop/Oshima	13 Feb.1941
US.33	1881 PS	L	387 1251	Hitler/Matsuoka	4 April 1941
US. 153	1882 PS			Ribbentrop/Matsuoka	5 " "
US.155	2896 PS	Q	1239	Ribbentrop to Ott	10 July 1941
US.156	2897 PS	Q	1240	Telegram Ott to Ribbentrop	14 July 1941
	D.656			Extract from"Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by Japanese Gov.between 1 July and 8 Dec.1941	29 Nov.1941
	D.657			ditto	8 Dec.1941
US.157	2911 PS	Q	1241	Ribbentrop/Oshima	9 July 1942
	2954 PS			Ribbentrop/Oshima	6 March 1943
US.159	2929 PS			F.O.File J.62 Ribbentrop/Oshima	18 April 1943
	735 PS			Report of conference on killing of Allied airmen	6 June 1944
	728 PS			Letter of Foreign Office	20 June 1944
	740 PS			Letter dated 30.6.44	30 June 1944
GB.8	TC.51			Decree covering Protectorate Bohemia & Moravia	16 March 1939
	D.639			RGB.1940 I p.778	18 May 1940
	2921 PS			General Order of Seyss-Inquart	4 July 1940
	1520 PS			Memo of conference Hitler/ Rosenberg/Lammers/Bormann on 8 May 1942	13 May 1942
	L.205			Telegram Kennedy to Department of State	8 Dec.1938
	3358 PS			German F.O.Memo	31 Jan.1939
	1752 PS			Preparation for International Anti-Jewish Congress	15 June 1944

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DOCUMENT NO. 2829-PS
OFFICE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

POSITIONS HELD BY JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP

1. Member of NSDAP (Nazi Party) 1932-1945
2. Reichstag member 1933-1945
3. Foreign Policy Advisor to the Fuehrer 1933-1945
4. Representative of NSDAP (Nazi Party) on Foreign Policy 1933-1945
5. Special Delegate for Disarmament Questions 1934-1937
6. Ambassador at Large 1935-1938
7. Ambassador in London 1936-1938
8. Organizer and Chief of the Ribbentrop Bureau (Dienststelle Ribbentrop) in the Reichsministry for Foreign Affairs.
9. Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs 1938-1945
10. Member of the Secret Cabinet Council 1938-1945.
11. Member of the Fuehrer's political staff at General Headquarters 1942-1945.
12. General of the SS (Obergruppenführer) 1938-1945

I certify that the above and foregoing correctly lists positions I held from 1938 to 1945.

Done at Nurnberg, Germany, 5 November 1945.

/s/ J. v. Ribbentrop
JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP

Witness to Signature:

/s/ Dr. Sauter, R.A.

Exhibit USA 179
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

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1337-PS

Extract from Reichsgesetzblatt. 1938.
Part I. Page 112.

Decree setting up Secret Cabinet Council 4 February 1938.

For my guidance in the conduct of Foreign Policy, I am creating a Secret Cabinet Council.

I nominate as President of the Secret Cabinet Council:

Reichsminister Freiherr von Neurath.

I appoint as members of the Secret Cabinet;

The Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop,

The President of Prussia, Minister for Air and the Air Force, Field Marshal Herman Göring,

The Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf Hess,

The Minister for Enlightment and Propaganda, Dr. Joesph Goebbels.

The Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellory, Dr. Hans Heinrich Lammers,

The Supreme Commander of the Army, Col.Gen. Walther v Brauchitsch,

The Supreme Commander of the Navy, Admiral Dr.L.C.Erich Raeder,

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, General of the Artillery, Wilhelm Keitel,

The Reichsminister and Head of the Reichschancellory will conduct the current business of the Secret Cabinet Council.

Berlin, 4th February 1938.

Führer and Reichchancellor,
ADOLF HITLER.

Reichsminister and Head of Reichschancellory
DR. LAMMERS.

H1155 - 0009

M.E. Ri

Exhibit U.S.A. 130
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

22.4.1943.

D. 472
60054
(1A)

From the Archives for publication purposes
(Intern.Biograph. Archives)

JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP

Minister for Foreign Affairs, S.S. Obergruppaufführer.

1. Joachim von Ribbentrop who adopted in 1925 the particle "von" as a title was born on 30 April 1893 and was the son of a retired Lt. Colonel Richard Ribbentrop who died in Berlin on 1.1.1941 and his wife whose maiden name was Rittwitz and Caffron. Ribbentrop's family came originally from Lipperland.

Ribbentrop spent his childhood and his school years mainly in Metz where his father's garrison was stationed for a time. Between the ages of 15 and 17 he lived in Switzerland, then he spent a year with a family of a professor in England. At the age of 18 he went to Canada where he had to earn his living. He obtained work on the construction of the great Quebec bridge, across the river of St. Lawrence and was engaged for two years on building caissons and railway trucks. With the outbreak of the 1914 war he made his way throught to Germany on a Dutch ship. He entered, as a volunteer, the 12th. Hussar Regiment where he received a commission in 1915. After being wounded, he was made, in the spring 1918, Adjutant to the Plenipotentiary of the War Ministry in Turkey; at the end of the war he worked at the War Ministry and was later appointed Adjutant of the peace delegation. He retired as a first lieutenant.

Ribbentrop turned now into a tradesman and started an import and export business, limiting himself mainly to dealings in wines. These activities led to his marriage on 5.7.1920, to Anna Henkell, the daughter of the owner of the well-known German champagne vaults. Up to the present there are five children of this marriage, Having already made connections abroad he now established fresk links with England and France. He succeeded in extending these to political circles, having joined in 1930 the service of N.S.D.A.P.

At the time of the final struggle for power in the Reich, Ribbentrop played an important, if not strikingly obvious part in the bringing about of the decisive meetings between the representatives of the president of the Reich and the heads of the N.S.D.A.P., who had prepared the entry of Nazis into power on 30.1.1933. Those meetings as well as those between Hitler abd von Papen took place in Ribbentrop's house in Berlin Dahlen.

After the 30.1. too Ribbentrop remained something of a confidential deputy of the Fuehrer in his discussions with forwign statesmen and politicians until in April 1934 he was appointed by the president of the Reich, von Hindenburg, Special Commissioner on the question of disarmament. In this capacity he undertook, in May 1934, journeys to London and Rome, where he established contact with Mussolini; in June he was received by Barthou and Doumergue in Paris, in December by Laval. In September 1933 he was the guest of the Leader of the French Ex-Servicemen's Association Coy, with whom he had in common the desire to bring about closer co-operation between France and Germany through the activities of the ex-servicemen's organisations of the two countries. But in particular he prepared in this capacity diplomatic achievement of the equality of Germany in political and military matters which became a reality with the declaration of her sovereign rights to re-arm on 16.3.1935.

On 31.5.1935. Ribbentrop was appointed ambassador of a special mission and on 21.5.1935 charged with securing a Naval treaty with England on the basis of 35 to 100, the signature of which followed on 18.6.1953. After the re-occupation of the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland on 7.3.1936, Ribbentrop represented the Reich at the extraordinary session of the League of Nations in London as a special envoy and explained before that assembly the reasons for Germany's attitude. Soon after this Council meeting Ribbentrop handed over to the British Government the Great Peace Plan which had been developed by the Fuehrer and Reichchancellor in Reichstag on 29.3.1936.

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On 11.8.1936 the Führer and Reichchancellor appointed Ribbentrop as ambassador in London. At this difficult post Ribbentrop strove to achieve an understanding with England. During his activities in London Ribbentrop was at the same German representative at the non-intervention conference, which was expected to localise the Spanish Civil War. In his capacity as the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador, Ribbentrop led in Autumn 1936 the discussions in Berlin with Muschakoji, the Japanese Ambassador at that time, on the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, which was signed on 25.11.1936. On 6.11.1937 Italy too entered this pact.

On 4.2.1939 the Fuehrer and Reichchancellor appointed Ribbentrop to the post of the Foreign Minister in succession to Baron von Neurath, who in his turn was appointed President of the Secret State Council. In that capacity Ribbentrop took part, as early as 12.2.1938, in the conversations of the Fuehrer in Obersalzberg with Dr von Schuschnig, then Austrian Reichschancellor. The Anschluss of Austria on 13.3.1938 must be marked as the hour on which the Great German Reich (Grossdeutschen) was born. On 14.3. Ribbentrop took over also the work of the Austrian Foreign Ministry. Between the 2. and 9.4 he remained in attendance with Hitler during his seven days' state visit in Italy.

After a summer full of crises, including the threat of war, the question of the Sudeten-Germans was cleared up at the conference of the "Four Great Men" (Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, Deladier) in Munich(29-30.9.1938), when the purely German parts of Czecho-Slovakia were awarded to the Reich. On the following day, the tension which was felt throughout the world was eased by the declaration made jointly by Hitler and Chamberlain on the German-British relations. A German-Italian Court of Arbitration called by the Governments of Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia and presided over by Ribbentrop settled, on 2.11.1938., territorial disputes between these two countries. Still under the retrospect influence of the Munich discussions, the Reich's Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, who had travelled specially to Paris, and the French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, issued on 6.12.1938., as a result of their deliberations, a declaration, similar to the British-German one of Munich, on the mutual relations of their respective countries. As the relations between the Reich and Poland (5.1.39, Beck was in Munich, 26-27.1.-Ribbentrop in Warsaw) as well as with other European countries could at that time still be regarded as friendly, the Fuehrer felt himself justified in stating, in his Reichstag declaration of 30.1.39., that, during the historic year of 1938, "Ribbentrop's correct and bold judgment, and sometimes excellent ways of dealing with all problems of foreign policy, meant to him extraordinary help in carrying out his policy". In May 1939 in order to ensure the policy of the Reich, the pact of alliance with Italy was concluded. Soon, however, the animosity between the Slovaks and the Czechs degenerated into a threat to the peace of Central Europe. Thanks to the foresight of the President of the Czech Protectorate, Dr. Hacha and his Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky, also this crisis would be solved without fight. On the 14th. March 1939, Dr Hacha, in view of the invasion by German troops, laid the fate of the Czech people and country into the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich. (16th March institution of the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia). At the same time Slovakia announced her autonomy and asked for the protection of the Reich. After previous negotiations between Ribbentrop and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Urbsys also the Memel-land could return into the Reich on 22nd March 1939.

Although it had been possible, to regain without conflagrations all the territories, cut off the Reich by the Dictat of Versailles, all endeavours to settle with Warsaw the questions of Danzig and the Corridor were frustrated through the interference of England. An English promise of guarantee stiffened Polands attitude to such an extent, that in the course of the summer the crisis, which had existed since the spring 1939 increased to a danger of war, although the Fuehrer had offered a guarantee of the Polish frontiers in return for the return of Danzig into the Reich and a very magnanimous solution of the Corridor question. When the Western Entente already thought the ring round the Reich closed, the German Foreign Policy succeeded in coming to an agreement of consultation and non-aggression with Russia which was signed by Ribbentrop in Moscow on 23rd. August 1939. On the 28th and 29th September, when Ribbentrop was in Moscow for the second time, the negotiations on a frontier - and friendly agreement and German - Russian economic planning were ended.

H1155 - 0011

Polish frontier violation released on the 1st September 1939 the 18 days' victorious campaign through Poland. All previous negotiations between Ribbentrop and the British and French Ambassadors and an offer of mediation by Mussolini proved unsuccessful; on the 3rd. September first the British and three hours later the French Ambassador handed their Governments' declarations of war to Ribbentrop. In spite of that on the 5th October 1939 the Fuehrer in the Reichstag addressed another peace appeal to Britain and France, but again in vain.

During the lull in the winter of 1939/40 President Roosevelt tried to use his influence on European events. On the 1st. February 1940 his emissary, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sumner Wells, had talks with the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister.

With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on 9th April 1940, only a few hours before the landing of British troops in these territories, the battle began against the Western Powers. Simultaneously with the marching of the German Armies into Holland and Belgium, on the 10th May von Ribbentrop disclosed, in front of representatives of the foreign press, the English-French intentions which had been made known in Berlin, to invade the Ruhr district via Belgian and Dutch territory. After Marshal Petain had asked for an Armistice on 17th June 1940, shortly after Italy's entry into the war, the Fuehrer in the presence of the high generality and the Reich Foreign Minister, received in the word of Compiegne on 20th June the French Delegation, which had come to accept the terms of armistice.

After the victory in the West, the Fuehrer turned to the realisation of his plans for a United Europe. In agreement with allied Italy, shown clearly by the repeated meetings of the Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, and Count Ciano, and by decisions of importance in talks between Hitler and Mussolini themselves, began at first an economic infiltration of the South Eastern States and the building up of mutual conditions of confidence. The latter induced the Hungarian and Rumanian Government in their negotiations on territorial reconciliation to ask for an arbitrator's decision by the Axis, which took place under the chairmanship of von Ribbentrop on the 30th August 1940 in Vienna. After that, at first Hungary, which since February 1939 adhered to the Anticomintern Pact, joined on November 1940 the Tripartite Pact, which had been signed between Germany, Italy and Japan on the 27th September 1940. The necessity to transform the Anticomintern Pact into a security pact with a possibility of other countries to join, had resulted from the attitude of the U.S.A. becoming more and more threatening towards Japan and the Axis and from the increasing help being given to Britain, which culminated in the U.S.A. law for help to Britain in March 1941. Rumania, under her new Head of State, General Antonescu followed the example of Hungary. General Antonescu himself performed the signing of Rumania's declaration of adherence to the Tripartite Pact in Berlin.

On the 12th November 1940 the Chairman of the Committee of the People's Commissar, the Foreign Commissar Molotov, returned in Berlin the Reichsforeign-minister's visit of autumn 1939.

The year 1941 brought Bulgaria into the Three Power Pact on 1/3. Later, on 25/3 Jugoslavia also joined the Three Power Pact. However, a few days after the signing of the Pact in Vienna, a revolution took place in Belgrade, brought about by London and Moscow and resulted in a German invasion of Jugoslavia on 6/4. On the same day, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop issued a declaration of the Reich Government's resolution concerning Jugoslavia and Greece. The conclusion of the German-Turkish Pact of friendship (18.6.41) was regarded as a German diplomatic victory over England.

The Foreign Office communique issued the morning of 22.6. contained extraordinary significant information regarding the treacherous activities of the Soviet Government since the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact of Friendship, at the same time the German invasion armies crossed the Russian frontier.

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On 25.11.1941., a State Government meeting was held in the Ambassador's Hall of the new German Chancellery was signed by the representatives of the signatories of the Anticomintern Pact, prolonging the Agreement, and the representatives of the Governments of Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Croatia, Rumania and Slovakia joyfully acclaimed the participation of their respective countries in this Pact.

Rules were laid down for mutual operations against the Anglo-American enemy and after the entry of Japan and U.S.A. in the war, a military convention was signed in Berlin on 18.1.1942 between Germany, Italy and Japan.

H1155 – 0013

Exhibit G/B 131
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

D. 636

Examination of descent of SS-Leaders.

Carried out in the SS bureau for problems of descent.

SS No. 63083
gazette No.

Person making the application: von Ribbentrop Joachim

Fiancee/Wife

Name : v. Ribbentrop

Christian Name : Joachim

Occupation : Foreign Minister

Rank : SS Gruppenführer (Lieutenant General)

SS Unit : R.F. SS

SS No. : 63083

Reason for missing particulars and remarks :

To No. 1 : J. v. R. was adopted by Gertrud von Ribbentrop on the 15.5.1925 and thereby received the (civil) name "von Ribbentrop". (Gertrud von Ribbentrop - born Berlin 19.5.1863., spinster, lives in Naumburg on Saale, Sedanstrasse 28. She is the daughter of Karl Berthold Sigismund von Ribbentrop, knighted on the 3.6.1884., Lt. Gen. in the Royal Prussian Army.

Exhibit USA 132
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2461-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1938
Vol. 6, part 1, 1939
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Page 124, no. 21a.

Official German Statement of the meeting of the Führer and Reich Chancellor with the Austrian Bund Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden(on 12 February) from 12 to 15 February 1938.

The Austrian Bund chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg in company of the Austrian state secretary for foreign affairs Dr. GUIDO SCHMIDT and the German ambassador VON PAPEN paid today a visit to the Führer and Reich Chancellor at OBERSALZBERG at his invitation in presence of the foreign Reich minister VON RIBBENTROP. This unofficial meeting originated from the mutual desire to discuss all questions pertaining to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria.

* * * * * * * * * ** *

At the conference which took place between the Führer and Reich chancellor and the Bund chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg at the OBERSALZBERG at BERCHTESGADEN on 12 February. All questions of relationship between the German Reich and Austria were discussed in detail. Purpose of this discussion was to eliminate difficulties due to the execution of the agreement of 11 July 1936.

It was agreed that both parties are resolved to stick to the principles of this agreement and consider same a basis for a satisfactory development of the relationship between the two countries.

In this sense both parties, after the discussion of 12 February 1938, have agreed to the immediate execution of measures to guarantee to effect such close and friendly relationship between both nations as it is proper for the history and total interest of the German nation. Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the peaceful development of the European situation.

The Austrian government issued a similar communication.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2461-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2461-PS.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738

H1155 - 0014

H1155 - 0015

Translation of Excerpts from Jodl Diary

1937

4 February:

Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.

Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders previously placed with them.

The sentence "Money is an unimportant factor" has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the raw materials.

Bad harvest and (illegible), especially bread grain (Brotgetreide), demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the people.

31 March:

Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear (on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as "Armed Forces Maneuvers" (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war, i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented.

5 November:

Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) (des Chef WA (R Kr. Min)) and by Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).

Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the services (C-in-C, Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization instructions.

1938

11 February:

In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

13 February:

In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

14 February:

[redacted] 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the different measures.

The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.

15 February:

In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.

16 February:

Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.

22 February:

At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about the planned advances (vorstosse).

3 March:

The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.

10 March:

By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (Gauleiter) Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.
"Prepare case Otto."

1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.

Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.

1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.

Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets. In addition, one Pursuit Squadron (Jagdgruppe), 3 bomber groups (Kampfgeschwader) and two companies as airborne troops with transport planes are held ready at civilian airports (Friedensflugplatze) in Bavaria.

Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt General Goering.

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11 March:

Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.

The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V.T.) by regiments, 40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second wave.

1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.

1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any case and will be mixed with the troops.

1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.

Decision: yes.

2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.

Later undated entry.

After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.

The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it.

Because of Germany's self restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for "green" on 30 May.

22 May:

Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see enclosure).

23 May:

Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)

30 May:

The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions

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of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.

10 August:

The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams (die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt) that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole army would not be good for anything. "I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years." The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately is widely held very widely within the Army [illegible] various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the Generals' opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that (?) the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.

[illegible]-26 August:

Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsverweser). Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz (?).

They arrive with the idea, that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude.

6 September:

Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

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Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer - especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.

8 September:

General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the overall meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).

General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved.

I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.

In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl) (x-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, x-1 day, 7 o'clock). The "Y time" has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.

10 September:

General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command, as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would be taken by two other divisions (3 words illegible).

11 September:

In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.

The joint preparations for refutation (wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.

15 September:

In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.

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16 September:

General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.

With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.

In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 23 September.

17 September:

Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.

19 September:

Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.

20 September:

England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.

Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.

21 September:

The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.

1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by Captain Eberhardt). "The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally."

1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to continue preparation for "Green", but nevertheless to get ready with everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; General Stumpf to be informed.

22 September:

1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General von Stulpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be ascertained (D-Day)(x- Tag); continue preparations according to plan. In case "Green" occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs sooner, it will probably be improvised.

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25 September:

By order of the Fuehrer, two Death Head (Totenkopf) SS battalions have moved into the Panhandle territory near Asch (Ascher Zipfel) to the rear of the Free Corps.

26 September:

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.

In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.

Question by department "Foreign Countries" whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.

1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's opinion. In no case will x day be before the 30th.

It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.

A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.

The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is to have priority.

The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.

2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportpalast..

27 September:

1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.

28 September:

Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7 years, and we will win it.

1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Fuehrer has decided on a conference with Chamberlain, the Duce and Daladier in Munich.

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29 September:

The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.

1939

23 August:

Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA).

1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been announced for 0430 hours.

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1780-PS.

22 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of excerpts in Document No. 1780-PS.

Ludwig Hartman
T/4
37446052

H1155-0022

Telephone Conversation between
Goering and Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop
13 March 1938, London
9:15 - 9:55

G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (Führung der Regierungsgeschäfte). And therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio.

R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn't it?

G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political things. Well, this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist ministers and the representatives of the people (Volksreferenkn) have presented theultimatum. Later on, more and more prominent people of the Movement Party participated, and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be completely beaten up again and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under no circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg's direct order, or without-sent the Communists and the Reds had been armed, and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed with "Heil Moscu" and so on, naturally, all these facts caused some danger for Sher-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Fatherlandish Front (Vaterlandische Front) would fight to its last man, one could not know that they would calculate like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who already had taken over the government asked us to march in immediately. Before we had already marched up to the frontier since we could not know whether there would be a civil war or not. These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents. This way the people may..... The following is interesting: The absolute complete enthusiasm for the National Socialism which is surprising even to us. And the reason for that is: About 80% among the members of the Fatherlandish Front were National Socialists, but these people had to join the Fatherlandish Front, otherwise they were subjected to terror, mainly economically, in that everybody who did not belong to the Fatherlandish Front lost his job so the Fatherlandish Front really seemed to be something. But actually, these were all our people which is just being discovered now, and that explains the whole situation, which did even surpass all our expectations. At least we thought..... but with the one exception of the Jews and a part of those deep black ones, there is no one against us.

R: So it seems that all Austria is on our side.

G: Well, let me tell you, if there were an election tomorrow, - I already told S-I he should invite the representatives of the democratic powers - they could convince themselves that this was really an election carried through on a democratic basis - and we shall have 90% votes in our favour. Absolutely! Only now one gets the reports how these people have been mistreated; I believe it is absolutely necessary that serious people from England and France should be asked to come over here and to watch what is actually going on. The biggest trick which ever had been played was done here.

R: I believe that this conviction will grow here. During these last days I had a few conversations not to forget the one I had the day before yesterday. Things are like that: at the moment they had their big surprise were.....later on I shall tell you more but generally

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people act very sensibly. The day before yesterday I told Halifax - who was with me quite a long time - that the whole English public opinion knows exactly what is going on in Austria.

G: There is something else I started to say: We cannot afford to have any elections as long as our troops are stationed there, they should be back first. Besides, during the next few days our troops will return. No one could stop that, any military man knows that, when such a thing is running, when the order is given to start the matter takes its course, till the troops have reached their destination, and till they are ready to be shipped away and returned. As I was informed yesterday, one figures with 5 - 6 days. This is now nothing but a friendship march. Nothing has happened, not one shot was fired. Still we have to take over Vienna and Wiener-Neustadt. But I am convinced that will be an easy job - as it was all over. But no one could have expected that. Just remember the speeches of those people. They always shouted these were fanatics, determined... to fight for Austria, for her independence, and soon, that there was nothing behind it, no one could suspect. Officials, for instance, reported and the higher ups just as well as the smaller ones and the ones in the ranks in between, they all told the same story: "You cannot imagine if we only once had mentioned that we were sympathizing with you we would have been put ruthlessly into the streets with our families." It was such a brutal system! They only could fool the world by covering all their deeds with the word "christianity", they were so slimy. But they were the most brutal days that ever did exist. I have to say I take my hat off to those

in Russia, at least they are honest. On top of it, these people here were infamous. There they did not behead people - well, some of them they did behead - but here they killed them economically, they ruined them. One thing I want to say: it is claimed that we overpowered the Austrian people, and took away their independence, then one should admit at least that just one little part of it was put under pressure - not by us - and that was the government which existed on such a small basis. The Austrian people have only been freed by now. I would just suggest to Halifax or to some real serious people whom he trusts to just send them over, so they may have a picture of what is going on here. They shall travel through the country, then they will see everything. Besides I also want to point out, yesterday, you know, if there..... they were saying the most serious things, war, and so on, it made me laugh because where would one find such an unscrupulous statesman who would send again millions of people to death only because 2 German brother-nations - - - -

R. Yes, this is absolutely ridiculous; one realizes that over here; I do think one knows pretty well over here what is going on.

G. Mr. Ribbentrop, I would call attention to one fact particularly: What state in the whole world will get hurt by our union? Do we take away anything from any other state? If the states say: well, that is against our interests! What kind of interest did these states have? They only could have one interest, to create hostile feelings against Germany. The percentage of minorities does not exceed more than 0.1% over all Austria. All the people are German, all the people speak German. Well, not one single state is involved in it. And the states which as the only ones might have an interest. You may say that, Italy and Yugoslavia and Hungary because a few hundred thousand Germans are living there - these who could say that they might feel etc. ... they actually do not feel that they are threatened. Therefore, it is ridiculous, if France.... Besides I do want to point out that the Czechoslovakian Minister came to see me yesterday and he explained, that the rumor Czechoslovakia had mobilized was taken out of the thin air and they would be satisfied with one word from me that I would not undertake the slightest thing against Czechoslovakia.

R. Of this the embassy was already informed the day before yesterday. He himself called here yesterday and told Woermann so.

G. There upon I said the following: The German troops are supposed to stay away 15-20 Km from the border, on their march through Austria, and north of the Danube in the whole sector only one dissolved battalion was to march merely so that these villages can share in the joy and pleasure. Today the advance does no more take place according to military principles but all over the roads smaller columns are marching because every village wants to see a German soldier.

R. Now let me tell you this: Later on I want to take a plane. I paid my farewell visit to everyone already the day before yesterday. The embassy takes care of all business. I do not have any more authority.

G. But the Fuehrer thought because you are just there that you could inform the people what is really going on. Above all, that it is absolutely wrong to think Germany had given an ultimatum.

R. I have already spoken very openly with Halifax and Chamberlain. There is no doubt about it. Only the fact that the newspapers --- people start to ask questions and it does not seem to be right if I still remain here, it would look strange, somehow.

G. No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke already to these people. I want that you once more, - but no, - not at all once more, - but generally speaking - tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, -

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Gleise-Horstenau and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but it also was given by the others and as far as I know just a military-attache came along, asked by S-I, because of a technical question; he was supposed to ask whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore I want to state that S-I asked us expressively - by phone as by telegram to send troops because he did not know about the situation in Wiener- Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherlandish front might react since they always had had such a big mouth.

R. Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna, is everything settled yet?

G. Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some companies, in order to secure the airfield and they were received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17. division marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also I want to point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw but that they got together and fraternized immediately with the German troops, wherever they were stationed.

R. That had to be expected.

G. The marching-in took place, then, according to this wish. Now we also recognize that further invasion is no more necessary. The whole affair is rolling as it is supposed to roll and it has crystallized into a march of joy; if you want to call it like that, as soon as it will stop, - which will be either tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, - the transport back shall start. The Austrian Government

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has informed us that it will then hold a free and secret election, on the basis of democratic principles, so that every Austrian will be able to give his real free vote in a free and secret election. And therefore they want to ask people from abroad so that afterwards no reproach of falsification can be made - like Schuschnigg did - so that they will see that this is a real and secret election. It is also in our interest because we are absolutely convinced that we shall get an overwhelming majority. Therefore it is also in our interest that this election will be handled absolutely correctly. After the election then we shall see the decision the people made and we shall see what is going to happen. But above one thing you must not leave any doubt: We will respect the decision, Austria will make in any respect. And, in case she decides for union - of which we have no doubt - then no power on earth will be able to separate us. It may be that a world-league of all states may overpower Germany, but it won't be possible that we will tolerate to be separated again if Austria decides to go together with Germany. And this is no threat for any state whatsoever, I want to make that clear. In no respect are we threatening the CSR but the CSR has now the possibility to come to a friendly and reasonable agreement with us. They say (the CSR) : " We did not mobilize any soldiers in the West. Nothing has been changed in the present situation." Everything under the condition that France remains sensible and does not take any steps. Naturally, if France organizes now a big mobilization close to the boarder, then it'll not be funny.

R: I believe that they will behave all right.

G: We have a clear conscience and that is the decisive factor. Before world history we have a free conscience. Never has it happened in the world that anyone did interfere if two brother-nations united. That would be against the sovereign rights of people. That would be absolutely ridiculous.

R: I had a long intensive conversation with Halifax, and I told him our basic conception also in respect to the German-English understanding.....

G: That I wanted to say, you know yourself, Ribbentrop, that I always was in favour of a German-English understanding. Noone else would be more glad than I, if the English really wanted it seriously, and if they also recognized that we are also a proud and free nation. After all, we also do represent 2 brother-nations.

R: I can tell you one thing, Mr. Goering. The other day I spoke to Chamberlain after that breakfast, and I got a very good impression of him, and he gave me a message, some news for the Fuehrer, which I shall deliver personally to the Fuehrer. Will you be in Berlin this afternoon?

G; Yes, I will. We celebrate the "Memorial Day" (Heldengedenktag) but let me tell you this, you'll have to stay in Berlin. The Fuehrer himself gave me the order that every minister..... You know, otherwise we would have a great migration ..... Yesterday not one single minister and official was at home. I would have needed 1000 planes. Naturally, they all want to enjoy this ecstasy of joy. Therefore I had to keep the gentlemen back by using draconic measures.

R: I cannot tell you that over the phone. But it is better for me to take off today.

G: Yes, I leave it entirely to you.

R: Otherwise, it will not make sense. My conversations are concluded, and if I sit around it might give a funny impression. But I had an excellent impression of Chamberlain.

G: I am glad to hear that.

R: The other day I spoke quite a while with him. I do not want to speak about it over the phone, but I have the impression that Chamberlain also is very serious about an understanding. I told him in this conversation that after the Austrian problem had been settled, the understanding between Germany and England will be so much less complicated than before. I believe, he realized that.

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G: - Look, since the whole problem has been settled down there and no more danger of excitement and disturbance exists - and this was a source of real danger - the people should be thankful for our having eliminated this source of crisis.

R: I told them that, too and also pointed out that we got rid of a situation, which caused always many troubles. Even if there was some excitement at this moment, the great line for the German-English understanding could only be strengthened by it. I also said to Halifax at the end of our conversation that we honestly do want to come to an understanding and he replied that his only worry was the CSR.

G: No,no, that is out of the question.

R: I told him then that we were not interested and we did not intend to do anything there. On the contrary , if our Fellow-Germans were

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treated in a sensible way, then we should come to an agreement there, too.

G: Yes, I am also convinced that Halifax is an absolutly reasonable man.

R: I got the best impression of Halifax as well as of Chamberlain. He thought it would a little difficult with our (engl) public opinion, because here it looks like force etc. I have the feeling that the normal Englishman, the man in the street will say, why should England bother with Austria. And therefore I believe that if the English Government will tell Chamberlain today him as the leader - after all he is the leader; he himself said so during the last few weeks if he really does interfere in this case and if he gives an explanation in the sense in which we worked it out together (3 words unintelligible) that at home, our Fuehrer, as far as he could see that it is proved by the public English opinion which after a few days or weeks on a great problem of world history in the sense of a German-English understanding like we all desire it (extremely unintelligible).

G: This is absolutly clear. (The following unintelligible). There are matters which do concern people, and there are matters which do not concern them at all.

R: I have to say thru my last conversation with Halifax I have the impression that he did not react to the arguments I gave him, but at last he said I could be convinced that he also did favour a German-English understanding.

G: More or less everything is in wonderful peace. Two peoples embrace each other and are overjoyed and express their happiness.

R: All the people over here think .....

G: Another people which other ..... the other state bears the whole responsibility if such misery overcomes the people. Besides I must say, Mussolini behaved wonderfully.

R: Yes, I heard already about it.

G: Wonderful.

R: Very good, indeed. We always thought so !

G: Marvellous ! He (M) said Schuschnigg asked him about the the election. So he answered Schuschnigg: you cannot do that, you cannot do it, such a kind of an election has never happened before; now we have the material which shows how Schuschnigg wanted to carry out these elections. (Some words unintelligible). Everysingle vote we found was a yes-vote. Only votes which did indicate neither yes nor no were considered as no-votes and on these slips was written: "I say no Hermann Goering, Innsbruck ?Strasse 2".

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R: Unbelievable. Anyone of the small people would never have dared to do that.

G: Listen; if someone took a yes-vote and crossed it out with a pencil and then wrote over it "no", then this was considered as "yes". If you took a yes-vote and you tore it in 2 pieces and you threw both parts in, then is was not considered as one vote, but it counted for 2 yes-votes since it was torn into pieces.

R: Really ?

G: As true as I am here ! These are the secret matters which we shall still publish.

R: By God, you should publish it immediately, this is unbelievable.

G: Well, every torn vote was considered as yes-vote; so if several were torn, one did not put them together, but every single torn piece was a yes-vote.

R: This is quite unbelievable

G: Now - but how did one vote !

R: Do we have any material which gives us any clue ?

G: Yes, yes, this is how it happened: Well, you went into the voting-place and said: I am Mr. Meier ! "Yes, Mr.Meier, give me your vote". Now they said that the registry of all the inhabitants was

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delivered. Well, let's say, this Mr. Meier had this list and he marked it. Then he went into the next voting place in Innsbruck; they had the same lists, every voting had these lists (words unintelligible.) Mr. Meier said: "I want to vote" "Please, Mr. Meier". It is being marked again. Now he goes into the third voting-place, where again one has the same list, because every voting-place always had the same list.

R: It is unbelievable

G: Now, he gives his vote for the third time. The only fear these people had was the following: That one might find more yes-votes than there were people entitled to vote. But even that would not have bothered them, they would just have subtracted them.

R: They just would have subtracted them.

G: S.-I believes - and so do I, - that he may still find out thru interrogation of the employees that they already had fixed beforehand the numbers of the yes and no-votes and also the amount of people who had not given their vote at all.

R: unintelligible

G: That was the most brazen election which would ever have taken place.

R: Immediately when I was informed first I expressed myself very strongly against this election as a pure swindle a few days ago in my conversation with Halifax.

G: Listen: Another swindle was enacted. Inspite of the fact that them then is a new minister for foreign affairs, the an Hassa-
*also doors - I believe the one in London, Frankenstein, (ot.) went and they have responsibility (unintelligible) toward their old government -- they were made to come, changed opinions of the new ministers according to their convictions. This is being investigated. S-I in formed me about it yesterday. He said, he found out, that there still exist connections between the embassies and underground forces, that is unauthorized people of the old government and that these ambassadors represent requests of the old government on behalf of the new one. Do you understand?

R: Yes.

G: And this is supposed to have happened in London.

R: Yes, yes. Frankenstein himself .... We have a few people, I know, they are very unfriendly.

G: How is Frankenstein?

R: Well, toward us -- I do not know how he really feels, you see, - they borrowed swastika flag for today -

G: That is fine

R: Yes, that is ok. But I believe he always showed himself loyal and decent toward me, I cannot say differently; I cannot say how he really feels though. But, as you know, we have a few people here who are most disagreeable.

G: But tell Frankenstein he has to represent the present government.

R: Yes, that is understood.

G: Well, any way, S-I told me yesterday, I do not know if it was the Austrian Minister in England or in Paris, I believe in Paris, who asked? , is it correct that the Austrian government asked for the German troops. So he was told by the new foreign office: Yes, that is correct. Well, we said that the new ministry for foreign affair did say the government had not asked for them. This matter is being investigated.

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R: There are a far more fellows there who just try to mingle in; well, thank you so much, Mr. Goering.

G: Come over here, it is beautiful over here.

R: Well, I shall come this afternoon. Generally speaking, I do believe it is a wonderful thing.

G: I want to tell you, I am happy beyond any description. You do not know how much I suffered under the Austrian question. That was what always made me suffer so immensely as a German. I never could understand, that 4 foreign powers were against us, - when just Germans were yearning for Germans. Always this penetrated me to my marrow.

R: I have also, you know, in a very short time - I do not think I am wrong - one will say here - by God, it is good that finally a problem has been settled in such a peaceful way - isn't it fantastic,-

G: Now listen, I do not ask for anything but that the world will respect the election in Austria as we do. If this will happen then I believe that in the next future unintelligible

R: And then I believe, we may - -

G: Ribbentrop, then you have to mention another thing, if you have a chance to, - it is very important. The Austria people is ruined economically. There are many many unemployed people, a terrific misery. In case Austria will make her decision in favor of Germany, we will be able to help these people with our great economic program. We can continue the Autobahn immediately, we can build more highways, we may buy again timber, also some cattle, and imagine, Austria always has lived from tourists. Imagine, if now Austria will make her decision for Germany, then - I am sure - there will not exist a German who will not go to Austria next summer.

R: Well, I believe the unemployment problem will no more exist there, within a short time. I guarantee you, I personally -

G: I believe-within the next 6 weeks - there will be no more one unemployed in Austria - but everybody will be working, and they will be put to work in Austria herself.

R: I want to tell you one more thing: I have not left any doubt what so ever, - that in case of a threat, or if any thing would happen - the Fuehrer and the whole nation will stand behind it - 100 percent.

G: Let me tell you the following, confidentially: The Fuehrer who is usually well controlled, - is too much involved in this respect with his heart since it concerns his homeland. I believe if he receives any threat in the Austrian question he will never give in, and I have to make it clear, neither will the 2 nations. That would be a fanatic matter, in Germany as well as in Austria.

R: That is clear.

G: There is no doubt. Who ever threatens us now, will strike at both peoples, and both shall put up a fanatic resistance.

R: I believe there is no doubt about that any where.

G: Yes, if anyone insists on it, all right-. But I always say if there is any states man in the world unscrupulous enough- because 2 German people want to get united - ready to threaten with war, or who ever is ready to send millions of people to the battle-field,- let him come. I rather want my people to be eliminated than that they may give in to this.

R. I never left any doubt about that. But I may say, that I am of the opinion that one is rather reasonable, I do believe.

G. In that,- I have to say,- I'd not see anything reasonable, that would be the most absurd thing. Then the world must have become an insane - asylum. It might be different if there was a people over there which might resist with all its force against a German invasion and ask the whole world for help. Then I might understand that. This is just ridiculous.

R. Yes, Mr. Goering-

G. Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.

R. I shall see you this afternoon.

G. The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony,- all covered with blankets- in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must is wonderful over there.

R. That is marvellous.

G. I do envy all those, who could be there yesterday. I have to sit here and have to keep the key - position.

R. Just a whole ago we also listened in.

G. It is interesting, did you hear the Fuehrer's speech from Linz?

R. No, unfortunately not.

G. To me it was the most interesting one- it was very short,- the most interesting speech I ever heard from the Fuehrer. This man who masters the language as hardly any one- this man could hardly speak. It was not much that he said, but he was deeply moved. Then later he phoned me and said: "Goering, you cannot imagine, how beautiful my homeland is-I had forgotten it." Today, he is visiting the grave of his parents where he will deposit a wreath. Linz, imagine, for many years it has been the first time that he is in the city, at the grave of his parents,--- how crazy and grotesque circumstances have been. Imagine, shortly befor the Berchtesgadener agreement,- when the house of my sister was searched, she is married to the present secretary of Justice,- the pictures of the Fuehrer and the one of myself - of her own brother- were taken away. (Next sentence annot be understood)
Nothing was written about that.

R. Was the Fuehrer very much shocked?

G. Yes, very much so. I believe, that he goes through dark days. Scenes are supposed to happen... Besides, Ward Price is with him.

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H1155 - 0034

R. Yes, I already have read the article by Karl Price, this morning.

G. From Linz?

R. By Karl Price, very good.

G. Yes, I mean, concerning Linz?

R. Yes, about Linz, wonderful/

G. Well, this does interest me, because, he is supposed to ---

R. I do know: The Fuehrer asked for him and wanted his opinion, if he did consider that, what he did see here, as force?

G. What does W P write about it?

R. Well, he writes,--- it looks like it must have been overwhelming.

G. Imagine, this small town of 36.000 inhabitants, almost half a million people are supposed to have gathered here. - Well, do come!

R. Good bye, and Heil Hitler.

G. Heil Hitler.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2949-PS, Part W

23rd November, 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33 812 169; hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document 2949-PS, Part W.

GOETZ MAYER

T/5 33 812 169.

Exhibit GB 133
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

H1155 - 0035

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2307-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 237

Law concerning the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 13, 1938

Gesetz über die Wiedervereinigung Oesterreichs mit dem Deutschen Reich.

The Reich Government has ordained the following law, which is hereby proclaimed:

ARTICLE I. The Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938, ordained by the Austrian Federal Government, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, hereby becomes a law of the German Reich. It has the following text:

By virture of Article 3, Section 2, of the Federal Constitutional Law concerning extraordinary measures in the constitutional field (B.G.BLATT, I, No.255, 1934), the Federal Government has ordained:

Article 1. Austria is a province of the German Reich.

Article 2. On Sunday, April 10, 1938, a free and secret plebiscite shall be held for German men and women of Austria over twenty years of age on the question of reunion with the German Reich.

Article 3. In the plebiscite the majority of the votes cast shall decide the issue.

Article 4. The necessary regulations for the implementation and supplementing of this Federal Constitutional Law shall be provided by decree.

Article 5. This Federal Constitutional Law shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

The Federal Government is entrusted with the execution of this Federal Constitutional Law.

Vienna, March 13, 1938.

ARTICLE II. The laws at present in force in Austria shall remain in force until further notice. The introduction of Reich law into Austria will be effecte by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor or by the Reich Minister to whom he may delegate this power.

ARTICLE III. The Reich Minister of the Interior, in consultation with the other Reich Ministers concerned, is empowered to issue the legal and administrative regulations necessary for the implementation and supplementing of this law.

ARTICLE IV. This law shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

Linz, March 13, 1938.

ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor; GOERING, General Field Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; FRICK, Reich Minister of the Interior; VON RIBBENTROP, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R.HESS, Deputy Fuehrer.

H1155 - 0036

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2307-PS

17 November 1945.

I, FELIX EDWARD SHARTON, 046312, hereby certify that I am thorough conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2307-PS.

FELIX EDWARD SHARTON,
046312

H1155 - 0037

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3060-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Prague, 16 March 1938

Foreign (Office), Berlin
Cipher Cable (Secret Proced.)
No. 57 of 16 Mar.
With reference to cable order No. 30 of 14 March.

Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with Frank separately and received following promises:

1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied with implicitly.

2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly with my approval. The editorial staff of "Zeit" (Time) is to be improved.

3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests. The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and "territorial autonomy" are no longer to be stressed.

4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or desired before Henlein issues important statements on his program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the Mission.

5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.

6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will come to Prague at any time if requested.

I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) and request them to support this uniform direction of the Sudeten German Party.

(Initial illegible),

(Five names and initials omitted)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3060-PS

26 November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 3060-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

H1155 - 0038

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2789-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

KONRAD HENLEIN

Hof i. B., 17th of March, 1938

Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:

In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our Fuehrer.

I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans herewith.

We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.

The new situation requires a re-examination of the Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk.

In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for 4 weeks.

I would appreciate if the Ambassador, Dr. Eisenlohr, and two of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the requested talks.

Heil Hitler.

Loyally yours,

/s/ Konrad Henlein.

To the
Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop,
Berlin.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2789-PS

10 November 1945

I, S/Sgt. CHARLES E. BIDWELL, 13146034, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2789-PS.

CHARLES E. BIDWELL
S/Sgt., 13146034

H1155 - 0039

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2788-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET
(Instructions for
handling omitted)

TOP SECRET
POL I 789 g (N)

SECRET

Notes
on the Conference on 29 March 1938, 1200 hours,
in the Foreign Office
on Sudeten German Questions.

In this conference the gentlemen enumerated in the enclosed list participated.

The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret; he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday afternoon that there were two questions which were of outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten German Party:

1. The Sudeten Germans must realize that they are backed up by a nation of 15 million which will not tolerate a continued suppression of the Sudeten Germans by the Czechoslovak Government.

2. It is the task of the Sudeten German Party to formulate such demands from the Czechoslovak Government as it deems necessary in order to obtain the privileges desired by it.

The Foreign Minister explained in this connection that it could not be the task of the Reich Government to give Konrad Henlein, whose position as the leader of the Sudeten Germans has been expressly acknowledged and again confirmed by the Fuehrer, detailed suggestions about what to demand from the Czechoslovak Government. It is essential to propose a maximum program, which as its final aim grants full freedom to the Sudeten Germans. It appears dangerous to be satisfied prematurely with the consent of the Czechoslovakian Government; this on the one hand would give the impression abroad that a solution has been found, and on the other hand would only partially satisfy the Sudeten Germans. In any case, caution is the proper thing, because one cannot have any confidence in the assurances at BENES and HODZA according to past experiences. The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten German party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extention and gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich cabinet (REICHSREGIERUNG). The Reich cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the Government in Prag or toward London and Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the Sudeten Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, would maintain quiet and discipline, and would avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in this connection were satisfactory.

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Following these general explanations of the Reich Minister the demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak Government as contained in the enclosure were discussed and approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the Reichminister and the Head of the Central Office for Racial Germans (mit dem Leiter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle), as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German Minister in Prague would be to support the demands of the Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians without exerting any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party.

In conclusion there was a discussion whether it would be useful if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear appropriate.

Berlin, 29 March 1938.

R (Initial)

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2788-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

List of those present in the conference on
Sudeten German Questions
on Tuesday, 29 March 1938 1200 hours

Present:

Reichsminister von Ribbentrop	)	
State Secretary von Mackensen	)	
Ministerial Director Weissaecker	)	
Ambassador Eisenlohr - Prag	)	
Ambassador Stiehe	)	
Vortr. Legationsrat von Twardowski	:	FOREIGN
Legationsrat Altenburg	)	OFFICE
Legationsrat Kordt	)	
SS Obergruppenfuhrer Lorenz	)	
Prof. Haushofer	)	Central Office for Racial Germans (VOLKSDEUTSCHE MITTELSTELLE)
Konrad Henlein	)	
Karl Hermann Frank	)	
Dr. Kuenzel	:	SUDETEN GERMAN PARTY.
Dr. Kreissl		

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2788-PS

11 November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, ASN 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. 2788-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, ASN 37446052

H1155 - 0042

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3059-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of a monthly payment of 15000 Marks; 12000 Marks of this are transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement, and 3000 Marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the party (Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially because due to the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including the financing of travels of Sudeten German deputies and agents) have grown considerably heavier. Under these conditions the Bureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of 3000 Marks if it is to do everything required. Therefore, Mr. Buerger has applied to this office for an increase of this amount, from 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly. In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the Foreign Office, this desire deserves the strongest support.

Herewith submitted to the Dept: Pers(onnel) with a request for approval. It is requested to increase the payments with retroactive effect from 1 August.*

Berlin, 19 August 1938

/s/ WOERMANN

*Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept. (handwritten marginal note).

(2 letters illegible). Mr. Schmidt, V(olks)D(eutsche) M(ittel) St(elle), has been informed by me today on the current payments of the Foreign Office to the Sudeten German Party. (Initial illegible) 24 Aug. (Handwritten note).

DECISION

1. The payments to the Bureau Buerger will be increased to 5500 Marks monthly until further notice, effective 1 August of this year.

2. Mr. A. R. Herold, for information and further action.

3. Herewith returned to
Section Politics IV
Berlin, 23 August 1938
/s/ DRUCKMANN (?)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3059-PS

26 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 3059-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2360-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit # B 134
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

"FREEDOM AND BREAD"

Munich Edition

Edition 31, Vol. 52

Munich Edition
Munich, Thursday 31 Jan. 1939

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER

FIGHTING ORGAN OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
OF GREATER GERMANY

The Fuehrer before the first Reichstag of Greater Germany.

We are fighting a tremendous battle - we will win this battle altogether!

Adolf Hitler: The German Reich today is stronger than ever.

Page 1, columns 5 and 6 bottom (excerpt):

On the basis of this unbearable provocation which was still further emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and terrorizing of our Germans there I have now decided to solve the Sudeten-German question in a final and radical manner. On 28 May I gave:

1. The order for the preparation of military steps against this state, to be concluded by 2 October.

2. I ordered the forceful and speedy completion of our defensive front in the west.

I, Goetz Mayer, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2360-PS

Goetz Mayer,
T/5,
33812169

H1155 - 0043

H1155 - 0044

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2800-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

BERLIN, 18th July, 1938.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Italian Ambassador today wanted to know what the British Ambassador had talked to me about on 15th July, 1938. I repeated to Attolico the contents of our talk.

Attolico remarked after my talk that it was quite possible that his fellow-countrymen General Russo, General Pariani and others who were here a short time ago may be of the opinion that France would not intervene in a German-Czech conflict. He, Attolico did not know what his government thought of it but personally he is convinced that his fellow-countrymen already mentioned were mistaken. In such an eventuality France had only the choice between her intervention on her complete abdication as a great power. The latter would not happen.

For the Reichminister only (Handwritten note)

Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take perhaps a two months' holiday now which he could not do later on.

Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments Attolico mentioned that the Roumanian government had refused to grant application for leave to its Berlin Minister.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2800-PS

24 November 1945.

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2800-PS

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 2791-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

On the voyage of the "PATRIA" Ambassador ATTOLICO explained to me, that he had instructions to request the notification of a contemplated time for German action against Czechoslvakia from the German government. (Originally reads!! that Mussolini had authorized him to request... but has been changed to read as above.

In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in six months or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise him, that the German government, in case of an increasing gravity of the situation or as soon as the Führer made his decision, would notify the Italian Chief of government as rapidly as possible. In any case, the Italian government will be the first one who will receive such a notification.

23 Aug 1938

R (initial)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2791-PS

10 November 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 2791-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

H1155 - 0045

H1155 - 0046

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2792-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Confidential.

Berlin, 18 July 1938

Today the Italian Ambassador asked me to tell him what the British Ambassador had said to me on the 15th of this month. I restated to Attolico the contents of the conversation.

Attolico added to my communication that his compatriots who visited here a short time ago, such as General Russo, General Pariani and others, possibly were of the opinion that France would not intervene militarily in a German-Czech conflict. He, Attolico, did not know what his own government thought about it, but he himself was of the opinion that these compatriots mentioned by him were mistaken, because France in the assumed case would have only the choice between intervention and complete resignation as a great power. The latter would not take place, however.

To the Reich Minister
To the Undersecretary of State
To the Dg. Pol.
To the Director Recht

(The following is a handwritten note)

Only for the Reich Minister:

Attolico further remarked that we had indeed revealed to the Italians our intentions against the Czechs unmistakably. Also as to the date he had information so far that he might go on leave maybe for two months, but certainly not later than that.

As an indication of the attitude of other governments Attolico pointed out that the Rumanian Government had refused to its ambassador in Berlin the leave he applied for.

R.M. 251.

Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o'clock to communicate the following:

He had received another written instruction from Mussolini asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order "to be able to take in due time the necessary measures on the French frontier."

Berlin, 27 August 1938

R

N.N. I replied to ambassador Attolico just as on his former demarche, that I could not impart any date to him, that, however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of any decision.

Berlin, 2 September 1938

H1155 - 0047

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2796-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Office R.M. (Dr. Hewdt)
Unter Staats Sekretar Woerman-personally
M. D. Gaus-personally

Aboard the "Patria" 23 August 1938 Pras. G. K.

SECRET

While in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Fuehrer and the Regent (Reichverweser) of Hungary were engaged in a political discussion, the Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya were in conference with Mr. von Ribbentrop; Mr. von Weizsaecker also attended the conference.

Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: point 1) the negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente and 2) the Czechoslovakian problem.

The comments of Kanya in regard to point 1): Negotiations with the Little Entente were mostly of a historical nature and offered really nothing new. In any case they were inadequate to explain sufficiently a communique submitted by Kanya at the end. This communique is to be issued today by the conference of the Little Entente. It would seem that Baron Aper in Budapest and Ambassidor Besseny in Belgrade have agreed to it. Thus the question whether it would be opportune was really outdated. Nevertheless, it had to be discussed thoroughly in order to develop the German point of view. Von Ribbentrop described how in his opinion the renunciation of the use of force, which is to be proclaimed again would not have the desired political effect, namely, a protection of Hungary against Yugoslavia especially in the event of a Hungarian-Czech crisis. On the contrary, Hungary would block the road for her intervention in Czechoslovakia and make it more difficult for the Yugoslavs to abandon their Czech confederates. The impartial reader would reason that Hungary was detaching herself from German Czech politics and was waiving here claims for revision for whoever did not participate would return with empty hands.

The counter arguments of Kanya were little convincing. They led into a discussion of Point 2): namely, the attitude of Hungary in case of a German-Czech conflict.

Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary's attitude would be if the Fuehrer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech provication by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured if Hungary marches toward the North and perhaps the East. Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and 1 to 2 more years' time for its development should be allowed.

Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone would therefore not move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England would not recklessly risk her Empire. She knew our newly acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted since it would depend on Czech provication. Von Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate.

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The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one. Upon the question of von Ribbentrop, what purpose the desired General Staff Conferences were to have, not much more was brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory of military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict. The clear political basis for such a conference - the time of Hungarian intervention - was not obtained.

In the meantime, more positive language was used by Von Horthy in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not to hide his doubts with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put Hungary's intention to participate on record. The Hungarian Ministers were and remained, even later, more skeptical since they felt more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary with its unprotected flanks.

When Von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the afternoon, he was very relieved when the Fuehrer explained to him, that, in regard to the situation in question, he demanded nothing of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs, he would have no objections.

The Hungarian position may be summed up today as follows:

a) Hungary is glad not to have to expect any inquiries of final character.

b) Hungary probably believes that she cannot intervene sooner than two weeks after the start of the conflict.

Signed Weizsaecker

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2796-PS

30 December, 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2796-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4,
37446052

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2797 - PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berlin 29. August 1938

The Reichsminister to-day had a new talk with von KANYA upon the latter's request: The Reichsminister confronted von KANYA with the rejoicin of the Czech, French and English Press over the Bled Communique and repeated that abroad this event, especially at this time, was considered as a rupture of German - Hungarian friendship and a renunciation of Hungarian revisionist claims. Mr. von KANYA mentioned the already Known aspects of the legal situation and the fact that the socalled preliminary discussions between Hungary and the Little Entente were of problematic value. Von KANYA wanted to prove again that the excessive Hungarian demands for protection of its minority in Czechoslovakia would prevent the agreement from becoming effective. But even if it became effective, it would never, according to von KANYA, be observed by the other party and thus Hungary would be freed from observing the provisions renouncing the use of force. Von KANYA expects still more precise information from Budapest to what extent the agreement has actually been formulated and the Reichsminister will be informed on that matter. The Reichsminister and von KANYA agreed that much depended upon how the Bled Communique was treated in the Hungarian Press during the coming week.

Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of a German - Czech conflict von KANYA mentioned several days ago that his country would need a period of one to two years in order to develope adequately the armed strenth of Hungary.
During to-day', conversation von KANYA corrected this remark and said that Hungary' military situation was much better. His country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in the conflict by October 1st of this year.

signed
(illegible)

To the Reichsminister
Under secretary of State
Mr. Dg. Pol.
Mr. Dir. Recht.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2797 - PS

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12 November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, T/SGT. 35 775 426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages ; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. 2797 - PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN

T/SGT 35 775 426.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2786-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS - RIBBENTROP - KEITEL

Letter from General of Artillery KEITEL to VON RIBBENTROP
dated Berlin, 7 March 1938

- Not Translated -

Letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel

Berlin, 4 March 1938

(illegible ink notes)

My honored General:

Enclosed I forward to you the minutes of a conference with the local Hungarian Ambassador for your confidential cognizance. As you can judge from it, Mr. SZTOJAY suggested that possible war aims against Czechoslovakia be discussed between the German and Hungarian armies.

I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed about this.

I would greatly appreciate it, if you notify me briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect.

With best regards and Heil Hitler

Yours very obediently

(No signature)

To the Chief of the Wehrmachtamt
General of Artillery KEITEL

Berlin W 35
Tirpitzufer 72/76

Enclosure of Minutes of Conversation with Sztojay at Berlin, 4 March 1938, signed R (Ribbentrop) is not translated.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION (PARTIAL) FROM DOCUMENT NO. 2786-PS

Nov. 13, 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly cohversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document no. 2786-PS

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

H1155 - 0050

H1155 - 0051

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2858-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Page No. 2773. Decoding.

From: Foreign Office, 19. 9. 38

To: Embassy, 19.9.38, 2330 hrs.

Nr. 244 of the 19.9.38

21 hrs, 36 min.

Secret code method

Decoding office 1000 hrs.

Please inform deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein's request, to get into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their demands for autonomy tomorrow.

(Signed) ALTENBURG

19 026

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17 November 1945.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2858-PS

I, L. A. Hill, M.C., 217840, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2858-PS.

L. A. Hill, M.C.,
Major, British Army,
217840

H1155 - 0052

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2855-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

Decipherment

From Foreign Office	16 Sept. 38	1845 hours.
To Embassy	16 Sept. 38	Secret Cipher page No. 2760

No. 232 of 16 Sept. 38

Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of Sudeten Germans since the Fuehrer's speech of 12 September. I request you to ascertain the number of Sudeten-Germans arrested since 12 September as extensively as possible. The number of those arrested there is estimated conservatively at 400 by the Gestapo. Cable report.

Woermann

(Handwritten note follows)

Impossible for me to ascertain these facts as already communicated to the proper agent (Gesch. Träger)

17/9

(signature illegible).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2855-PS

15 Nov. 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) U.S.N.R. 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2855-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
LT (jg) U.S.N.R.
391590

H1155 - 0053

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2854-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DECIPHERED MESSAGE

Dispatched from the
Foreign Office 17 Sept. 15 o'clock 20 min.

Received by the
Legation 17 Sept. Secret Cipher.
(2763-65)

No. 234 of 17

Most Urgent

I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the following:

The Reich Government has decided that:

(a) immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent, Czech speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as Sudeten Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning of the week.

(b) If any Sudeten Germans should be executed pursuant to a death sentence on the basis of martial law, an equal number of Czechs will be shot in Germany.

* * * * * * * *

(Signed) WOERMANN

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2854-PS

24 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2854-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2853-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DE-CYPHER

From Foreign Office Berlin 24.9 1905

To Embassy Prague 24.9 2000

Secret Cypher
Bl 2101/2102

Telegram No. 268. Foreign Office, Berlin to German Embassy, Prague on 24.9.1938

According to information received here Czechs have arrested 2 German frontier-policemen, seven customs-officials and 30 railway-officials. As countermeasure all the Czech staff in Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please approach Government there and wire result.

(signed) WOERMANN

HMB/HLB 18 996

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2853-PS

I, Evelyn E.F. Glazier, P.O., WRNS, 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2853-PS.

EVELYN E.F. GLAZIER
P.O., WRNS, 37371

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2856-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Decipherment

From Foreign Office Berlin 24 September 1556 hours
To Embassy Prague 24 September 1800 hours.

Secret Cipher
pages 2795 and 2797

No. 263 of 24 September 1938

To telegrams No. 432 and 435.

Embassy authorized to agree to mutual arrangements for the possible necessary removal from there of 500-600 Reich Germans by special train.

At discretion to agree with the government there the rail-line frontier-place and time of transfer of the people to be returned. Cable report.

Confidential:

Yielding of the Czech hostages arrested here for the prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by military courts against Sudeten-Germans is, of course, out of question.

Woermann

16 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2856-PS

I, Willard E. Skidmore, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2856-PS

Willard E. Skidmore
Lt (jg), USNR, 391590

H1155 - 0056

No. 3.

Extract from Statement made by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons on September 28 announcing the Reichschancellor's reply to the Message which he had sent to him that morning.

"I have something further to say to the House yet. I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he invites me to meet him at Munich tomorrow morning. He has also invited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier. Signor Mussolini has accepted, and I have no doubt M. Daladier will also accept. I need not say what my answer will be."

No. 4.

AGREEMENT CONCLUDED AT MUNICH ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1938.

Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure fulfilment:-

1. The evacuation will begin on the 1st October.

2. The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.

3. The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.

4. The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map (1) will be occupied by German troops in the following order: the territory marked No. 1 on the 1st and 2nd of October, the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October, the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October, the territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of predominantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

5. The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

6. The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. This commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

(1) See sketch map based on the original. The sketch map illustrating the Reichschancellor's memorandum of September 23 (see Cmd. 5847), is also reproduced.

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7. There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

8. The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.

ADOLF HITLER.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
EDOUARD DALADIER.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich,
September, 29, 1938.

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Annex to the Agreement.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September, (1) relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

ADOLF HITLER.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
EDOUARD DELADIER.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich,
September 29, 1938.

(1) See Cmd. 5847.

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TC.23.

Declaration.

The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.

ADOLF HITLER.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
EDOUARD DALADIER.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich,
September 29, 1938.

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Supplementary Declaration.

All questions which may arise out of the transfer of the territory shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference to the international commission.

ADOLF HITLER.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
EDOUARD DALADIER.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich,
September 29, 1938.

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Composition of the International Commission.

The four Heads of Government here present agree that the international commission provided for in the agreement signed by them to-day, shall consist of the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, the British, French and Italian Ambassadors accredited in Berlin, and a representative to be nominated by the Government of Czechoslovakia.

ADOLF HITLER.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
EDOUARD DALADIER.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich,
September, 29, 1938.

(1244)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 1[illegible].38 Most Secret Ausl. VI.

1.10.38

7 Copies
7th Copy

To:

OKH (Section 6. Army General Staff)
OKM (Naval War Staff, 1st Division for the attention of Min. Rat. Dv. Eckhardt)
Reich Minister for Air and Civ C. Air Force (AirForce General Staff for the attention of Reg. Rat. Dr. Mueller)
Foreign Office via the Foreign Office Representative (VAA)

Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the violations of international law which may be expected on the part of fighting troops.

Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, colums C 1 and C 2 had to be filled in directly here for the time being.

The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to send in an opinion here so that a final version may be drawn up.

The same is requested of the Foreign Office.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

By Order

sgd. Burkner

3 Enclosures:

H1155 - 0059

MOST SECRET

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INCIDENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROPAGANDA HANDLING

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law (Gruppe Voelkenvecht)		(d) Explanation by propaganda minister
		(1) Judgement by international law	(2) Justification by the laws of warfare	
(1) Bombing or shelling attacks on localities where there are no military installations.		I) Art. 25 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare of 1907 forbids attacks and firing on undefended towns, villiages, dwellings and buildings by whatever means. Bombing by aircraft is to be included in the special qualification "by whatever means		
1a) Bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas	1a) In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed	Giving the supposit ion that no orders for the bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas will be given by us under any circumstances, the actionin the case in question would have been carried out by mistake	An accident of this kind can best be explained publicly by the fact that the British Embassy is in the immediate vicinity of military installations, the bombing of which was an indispensible military necessity. If, therefore the British Embassy was hitby mistake, it is to be described as a regretable accident,	

H1155-0060

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incident	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Explanation by propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
			such as are unfortunately unavoidable in war. The German Government will pay compensation for the damage.	
2) Injuring or killing of subject os neutral states outside the actual war zone.	Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed.	Since it must be assumed that the deaths or injuries were caused unintentionally by our troops, there is no question of a violation of international law.	the deaths and injuries caused unintentionally are to be excused as being unavoidable accidents which the events of war can cause even to non-belligerents. Compensation is to be guaranteed.	
3) Bombingand shelling attacks on hospitals, military hospitals, churches, and cultral monuments.	3) The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.	Art. 17 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare lays down that during seiges and bombardments all necessary steps mustbe taken to spare, as much as possible, any building dedicated to religious services, art, science, welfare, also historical monuments, hospitals and centers for sick and wounded provided that they are not at the same time being used for	It seems appropriate, in this case, to make a public announcement with the corresponding justification after the attack.	

H1155-0061

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incident	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of International Law Group	(d) Explanation by propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war
		military purposes. The elucidation of the last named reservation above is always very difficult and lengthy. Unless such a case is undisputably established, it cannot be judged by international law. Deliberate firing on protected buildings which are above suspicion is contrary to International Law in any case. Under the supposition that the Prague Hradschin, as the seat of government, is used for military purposes which include, among other things, the maintenance of the military power of the Czech people, air attacks upon it are justified.	
4) Use of war weapons which can be employed under certain conditions or of new types of war weapons such as gas, flame throwers chemical warfare agents and bacteriological substances.	5) On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.	According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40 states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poisonous gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances is expressly forbidden. Quite a number of states made the reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas warfare.	If the assertion, that the opponent - in this case the Czechs - used a prohibited gas in warfare, is to be believed by the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible, the

H1155 - 0062

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group	(d) Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	Justification by the laws of war
		that they consider themselves exempt from the prohibition should the opponent use gas. Therefore, the burning question of who violated the prohibition first will always arise when the decision is made. Whether this can be established is doubtful.	firing of gas projectiles is justified and it must be given out in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the first to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly important to furnish the proof. If the assertion is unfounded or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the same way did the Italians in the Abyssinian War. In this case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must also be proved.
5) Retaliatory measures against enemy civilians who take part in combat or are guilty of	5) Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of	If the inhabitants of an enemy territory under our occupation commit hostile acts against us or our allies, they are guilty of war treason,	If Czech civilians, who are not recognizable as soldiers, are seized, while committing the acts

H1155-0063

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
espionage. (Passing of intelligence)	important bridges, destruction of food stuffs and fodder are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.	which must be judged by German law (Armed Forces Penal Gazette). The right to punish enemy civilians for committing hostile acts against the occupying power derives from Art. 43 of the Hague Rules for Land and Warfare which allows the occupying power to carry out public administration and expressly assigns to it the responsibility for the maintenance of public order and public life.	and crimes mentioned in the case 5b, and shot out of hand, this of retaliatory measure is justifiable and permissible under International Law only if the lives of our own troops were endangered. If offenders of this kind are taken prisoner, they may not simply be put against a wall, butmust be tried according to the decrees relating to the case. This procedure can take place briefly and summarily in the field. The experiences of the World War have taught us that this procedure offers, the enemy no opportunity of attack, whereas executions without trial are the best foundations for the enemy's propaganda. Encroachments actually made on our part will have to be explained either as the necessity for our	

H1155-0064

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES (a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Explanation t the propaganda mi
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
6) Forcing of prisoners and civilians into employment in war work (road construction, digging trenches, production of munitions, employment in the transport service etc)	6) Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions.	Art. 31 of the agreement signed on 27 July 1929, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, forbids the directing of prisoners of war into work which is directly connected with war measures. Enforcement to do such work is, in any case, contrary to international law. Prisoners of war and civilians may be employed in road building but not in the production of munitions	troops to defend themselves or by the assertion that the Czechs attempted to escape. The use of such measures can be justified as a necessity of war, or with the assertion that the enemy acted in the same way first.	
7) Measures against the population connected with the requisitioning of billets, supplies of food stuffs, fodder and live-stock etc.	7) For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, food stuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want.	Art. 52 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare allows the occupying powers to claim payment in kind and service from the communities and inhabitants of an occupied territory. These payments must be in relation to the resources of the country. Harsh oppression of the civil population is justified only if the occupying power is itself in need and must live. Oppression and the enforced delivery of goods unless they are a due military neccisty are not only contrary	Necessity is the only reason justifying excessive requisitioning of toilets and the deliveries of food stuffs and fodder. Mention that the troops are suffering from the same shortage would be appropriate. Moreover it must be added that women, children, and invalids will be provided for as far as possible.	

H1155 - 0065

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

(a) Incidents	(b) Example-	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	Justification by the laws of war	
		to international law, they are also unworthy.		
8) Compulsory evacuation of the population from their homes.	8) Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.	According to Art. 43 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare and if military necessity urgently requires it. The removal of inhabitants to the rear of the operational zone is authorized by international law.	The most advisable justification is that the inhabitants must be protected against bombardment.	
9) Measures which affect religious and church life	9) Churches are used for military accomodation.	German soldiers will use churches as military accomodation for men and horses only in the most extreme cases of need.	If the urgent military necessity exist, justification under International Law is granted and must be given out in public with this as the reason. Experience has shown however, that the use of religious buildings for such purposes offers effective propaganda material to the enemy.	
10) Violation of neutral territorial rights by aircraft flying over or by bombing.	10) In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft.	According to Art. 1 of the 5th Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is <u>not to violated.</u> A <u>deliberate</u> violation by flying over this territory is a breach of International Law, if the neutral powers have declared.	An attempt at denial should first be made if it is unsuccessful, a request for pardon should be made (on the grounds of miscalculation of position to the Polish Government and compensation for damage guaranteed.	

H1155-0066

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
		an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of International Law, provided that this action is not expressly permitted.		
11) Measures of naval war-fare which are part of the mine-U-boat war, the blockade and the war on merchant shipping (on the basis of material available to the Naval War Staff)	11a) Stationing of U-boats and war activity within the approaches to the Baltic or within neutral coastal water. b) Prize laws measures as part of the war on merchant shipping, which are objected to by the enemy anestor by neutral as contrary to international law. c) Use of armament by armed merchant ships. d) Announcement of declared areas.	No judgement by international law, of the questions listed here, can be made without concultation with OKW, as it is not known here, what measures are intended should the occasion arise.		
12) Measures aimed at stiffening the will to resist on the part of national minorities	12) Proclamations over the German radio to Hungarian, Slovak and Polish minorities who are opposed to the Czech Government.	The spreading of news by whatever means with a view to raising the moral forces of peoples in the enemy territories who are racially related or connected is included in the ruses of warfare.	Justification of our own measures is not necessary, in any case the opponents will reply with their own i.e. counter propaganda.	

H1155-0067

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES (a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by Int ernational Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
either foreign or of German origin in enemy countries (by the distribution of leaflets by air, proclamations, broadcasts, training and arming),		allowed under Art. 24 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare.		

H1155 - 0068

MOST SECRET

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
1) Bombing or shelling attacks on localities where there are no military installations.		Judgement by International law as in Section I No. 1 c 1		
1a) Bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas.	1a) In an air raid on Berlin, the French Embassy is destroyed	In no case are extra-territorial buildings military objectives, therefore according to Art. 27 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare, they must be spared as far as possible.	If it is at all possible, claim that the enemy carried out deliberate precision bombing and what is specially to be condemned is that the French Embassy contains valuable art treasures and that subjects of enemy states are staying there, having found asylum there. Moreover that the French Embassy made efforts to avert the conflict.	
2) Injuring or killing of subjects of neutral states outside the actual zone.	American Subjects are injured and killed in an air raid on Dresden.	Subjects of neutral statesoutside the actual war zone are protected by International Law.	It will be difficult to prove that the enemydid this with intent. The only other possible assertion is to that as the buildings and persons were clearly distinguishable by indications of American territory, or white flags, therewas no excuse for attacking them. There were no military objectives near the scene of the on-slaught.	

H1155-0069

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by the International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
3) Bombing and shelling attacks on hospitals, military hospitals, churches and cultural monuments.	3) In an air raid on Vienna, hospitals are destroyed and Red Cross personnel and patients killed.	Judgement by International Law as in Section I No. 3 c 1.	Accuse the enemy of having violated Art. 27 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare by omitting to provide suitably for the protection of the hospitals in Vienna, which by day and night were marked sufficiently distinctly by the Red Cross. In this case also, the intention of precision bombing must be imputed as much as possible.	
4) Destruction of villages, settlements, agricultural areas, industrial and communications installations which serve no military purpose.	4) Detonators are placed in the Aussig Dam in order to destroy the surrounding area and the inhabitants by flooding.	Prohibition of international law exist only with regard to the destruction and removal of enemy property, other than in those cases where this destruction or removal is made urgent by the necessities of war. (Art. 23g of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare).	Such destruction as the blowing up of the Aussig Dam can only be branched as the most inhuman, senseless, and useless method of taking revenge on innocent people. Compare similar cases of barbaric action in the Hussite Wars and in the behavior of the Czech Legion in Siberia, 1918/1920.	
5) Use of war weapons which can be employed under certain conditions and of new types of war weapon such as gas, flame-throwers, chemical warfare agents and bacteriological substances.	When Czech troops withdrew from the Sudeten-German area, wells in many places are contaminated.	Judgement by International Law as in Section II par 5 C 1.	Making wells unfit for use by throwing in stable manure for example, is an authorized means of war, International Law forbids only the poisoning of wells. Contamination by bacteria, on which this example is apparently based, is forbidden by International Law both in the Hague Ruling for Land Warfare and in the Convention of 1925. A propaganda	

H1155-0070

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

(a) Incident	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Countermeasur by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
6) Underhands means of waging war, continuing the fight after the enemy hasapparently surrendered - camouflage by abuse of German or neutral national markings.	In Postelberg, Czech trucks and locomotives have been camouflaged by GermanNational markings and swastikas.	Underhand means of warfare as, for example, feigning death and shooting from the rear at advancing troops, showing white flags and firing with hidden machine guns on the approach of the unsuspecting enemy justify immediate reprisals without mercy. The misuse of the flag of truce, the national flag or of the military badges or uniforms of the opponent or of the Red Cross is forbidden. (Art. 23e Hague Rules for Land Warfare) but it becomes misuse only if enemy operations are undertaken under the camouflage; these enemy operations also justify immediate reprisal measures. The camouflaging of Czech truchs and locomotives by German national markings and swastikas isnot contrary to international law. It becomes contrary thereto only if they are employed in enemy operations, under this camouflage.	attack is therefore justified. The enemy must be accused of employing unchivalrous means of warfare, and he will gain little advantage by means which are dishonorable and repugnant to an honest soldier.	

H1155 - 0071

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
7) Maiming or killing of wounded, prisoners, defenseless persons, women and children.	When being taken into the Eger hospital, a seriously injured Sudeten-German motor cyclist shot by Czech soldiers, who said: "The German swine will die anyway."	Killing or injuring one's own subjects does not come under the judgement of international law - killing or injuring of defenseless persons, wounded and prisoners of enemy nationality is expressly forbidden by International Law.	In this case, propaganda can only be directed once more against Czech brutality in general. In addition it must be stressed that those injured and killed were subjects who belonged to Czech state only because they were forced to and whose return to the Reich had already been promised.	
8) Use of prisoners of war for war work (road construction, digging trenches, production of munitions, employment in transport service etc)	German prisoners of war are employed under guard as truck drivers for tranferring back raw materials of war.	Judgement by International Law as in Section I para. 8 C 1.	Discretion must be used in reproaches of this kind, for it is possible that similar accusations could be made against us by the opponent if the fact is to be made use of for propaganda purposes, all that can be asserted is that our prisoners were employed by the opponent for transporting munitions behind their front lines.	
9) Terrorism measures against national minorities aimed at surpressing and breaking their consciousness of nationality, their religious life, and church and cultural activities.	Officials of the Sudeten Party are arrested and abducted, their homes seized and looted.	The oppression of one's own subjects in Czechoslovakia does not come under the judgement of International Law, but to the judgement of the Treaty of 1919 regarding t he protection of minorities. In every case, this would have to be consulted in the judgement of the case. In addition see concluding sentence of para. 7C2	The arrest and abduction of officials of the Sudten Party and robbing and looting them can be branded only as outbreaks of Czech brutality. (similar outbreaks have already been employed for propaganda purposes).	

H1155-0072

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C
Continued

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Counter measure by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
10) Compulsory evacuation of national minorities from their homes, and confiscating their food stuffs, fodder and live-stock etc.	Members of the Polish minority are compulsorily evacuated to the interior of the country in military transports.	A judgement from the standpoint of International law does not come into the question.	Also, all that can be referred to in propaganda are Czech acts of brutality.	
11) Measures for inciting, arming, and taking control of the the civilian population (Franc-tireur war-fare)	In localities on the Czech-Silesian frontier summones to fight German troops are issued and arms distributed to the civilian population.	Measures for inciting one's own subjects, for arming and conducting guerilla warfare, are allowed. The national warning itself must not exceed the limits prescribed by International Law (Art. 1 and 2 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare) i.e. prescribed badges recognizable at a distance bearing arms openly etc.	In this case it would be appropriate to give warnings referring to the civilian warfare of August 1914 in Belgium, which caused the death of thousands of inhabitants. Cunning snipers without uniform and soldiers in civilian clothes, after pretending to be acquiescent, attacked soldiers on the march and in their billets and provoked the reprisals justified by such actions. For use in propaganda, it must be particularly stressed that the above-named conditions justifying a national uprising were not fulfilled and the outward identification marks of armed civilians were lacking.	

H1155-0073

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

(a) Incidents	(b) Example-	(c) Attitude of the International Group		(d) Counter measures by agenda minis
		1) Judgement by Internationallaw	2) Justification by the laws of war	
12) Violation of neutral territorial rights by flying over or bombing it.	Czech airmen drop bombs on the German-Polish frontier destroying the town.hall in Lissa and a church in Rawitsch.	It is contrary to International Law for combat aircraft to fly over the territories of neutral power.	The violation of the neutrality of Polish territory and the destruction of non-military buildings of which the church in Rawitsch is specially protected by International Law, constitute a serious breach of International Law which must be correspondingly use to the full in propaganda. In addition it is necessary to point out that it was obviously a deliberate air raid.	
13) Slanderous propaganda by falso reports on themeasures of the German command and on the combat elements, by accounts of atrocities in press reports, news picture broadcasts, etc.	The Melnik Radio Station spreads reports that dumdum projectiles have been used by German troops Polish newspicture, show falso photographsof this.	Making the enemy contemptible is a stratagem of war allowed by international law, even if is so doing many lies and misrepresentations are made. The efforts made by different powers, Germany's amongst them, to form an international agreement to restrict the propaganda of war atrocities, failed in 1932	Remedy in this case is possible only by correcting the reports and better still by counter-attack, in which of course, we can also make use of the spreading of atrocity stories shows that nothing more can be done than to attempt to beat the opponent at his own game or get equal with him in some way or other.	

H1155-0074

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C 2

19 November 1945

I, CLAREBOULTER, P/O.WRNS. 59549, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. C2.

CLARE BOULTER,
P/O, WRNS
59549

H1155 - 0075

H1155 - 0076

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2815-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

CZ/15.

In Duplicate

Berlin, 13th March 1939.

Diplogerma.

Prague

Telegram in secret code

With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today.

In case you should get any written communication from President HACHA, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take any other action on them but pass them on here by cipher telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the Embassy to make a point of not being available if the Czech government wants to communicate with you during the next few days.

(signed) RIBBENTROP

F 12 426. A/CZ/2

- - - - - - - - - - - -

17 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2815-PS

I, L. A. Hill, M.C., British Army, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2815-PS.

L. A. Hill, M. C.
Major, British Army
217840

H1155 - 0077

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NUMBER 2802 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

13. III. 39

CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE FUHRER AND THE SLOVAK PRIME MINISTER TISO

in the study of the Führer in the New Reich Chancery from 18.40 - 19.15 hours, 13 March 1939.

Other Persons Present were:

The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Minister of State Meissner,
General Keitel
State Secretary Dietrich,
State Secretary Keppler,
Minister Durcansky,

The Führer greets Prime Minister Tiso and describes to him in a long detailed account the developments in Czechoslovakia. Since the Autumn of last year, Germany had experienced two disappointments. One was with regard to Czechoslovakia, partly because of ill-will, partly as for example in the case of Chvalkowsky who out of weakness, could not prevent the development of political circumstances, which were intolerable to Germany. Czechoslovakia had only Germany to thank that she had not been mutilated further. With the greatest forebearance Germany had renounced claims to the islands of German speech (Sprachinsel) lying on her borders in order to assure to Czechoslovakia a normal living space. There had been no thanks for this. No Czech had lost his job in Germany. On the contrary, numerous Czechs had been received by us. Not a hair of those persons' heads had been ruffled, nor had they been insulted or attacked. It was envisaged quite differently on the Czech side. The sternest dismissal measures had been carried out against Germany, thousands had found themselves without means of earning their bread. Everywhere Germans had been provoked or discriminated against. The Germans had been subject to constant surveillance so that their situation was now worse than before the September crisis. This development was not in accordance with the agreements. Until the day before yesterday Germany had striven for an absolutely loyal attitude in the press. It (the press) had been restrained and had not mentioned many things which had happened there in order to maintain a wholesome atmosphere. During this time the Czech press had repeatedly published unfavorable things about Germany, certain organs had not ceased their systematic agitation. Pamphlets and propaganda by word of mouth had been continuous. The momentary situation was described to the Czechs as a temporary affair, time and again hopes based on a change to the disadvantage of Germany had been awakened in the people. The Führer had already spoken of this to Chvalkowsky and reproached him that oil had continuously been thrown on to the fire. Central Europe was a fixed, closed economic area which could only live when fully pacified. It needed pacification. Geographically the situation was made clear by the fact that Bohemia and Moravia were enclosed by Germany, and Germany could never tolerate in her own territory a hot-bed of unrest.

In recent weeks the circumstances had become unbearable. The old spirit of Benes had again been revived. The Czech people had been incited to resistance. Conditions were insecure and tumultous.

H1155 - 0078

Yesterday incidents in Brünn and Iglau occurred. While we had treated the Czechs in Germany well, the situation in Czechoslovakia was unstable, Germany could no longer permit these conditions. Likewise, German nationals over there were defending themselves, as they did not see why things should be worse now than before.

We had solved the Czech question then according to our world interpretation. If, however, this solution leads to no results, then we have decided absolutely to pursue it to its conclusion, without consideration for this ideological principle.

The second disappointment for us was the attitude of Slovakia. In the past year the Führer had had to face a difficult decision, whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Slovakia. The Führer had been under a wrong impression as he had of course believed that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This error was founded on the fact that Slovakia was further away from Germany and on the importance of the more serious problems which then overshadowed this problem. It was only in the crisis that the Führer was disuaded from this opinion. It was then that he first heard and noted that Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs.

At Munich the Führer did not play power politics, in his decisions, but took the line of national politics. He did something which alienated some of his friends in Hungary from him, namely against those whose wishes he had carried out this principle for Hungary also. He had repeatedly explained this some months previously.

Now he had sent Keppler as his minister to Pressburg, to whom Sidor had declared that he was a soldier of Prague and would oppose a separation of Slovakia from the Czech-Slovak Union. If the Führer had known this earlier, he would not have needed to antagonize his friends Hungary, but on the contrary, let events follow the course they were then taking.

Now he had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in order to make this question clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his people or even a single soldier to something which was not in any way desired by the Slovak people. He would like to secure final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication of interior instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not a question of days, but of hours. He had stated at that time that Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would stand by his words long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was no longer responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German interests and those did not lie east of the Carpathians. Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged to Germany.

H1155 - 0079

The Führer asked the Reich Foreign Minister if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He showed the Führer a message he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Führer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself.

Tiso thanked the Führer for his words. He had for some time longed to hear from the Führer himself how he (the Führer) stood in relation to his (Tiso's) people and country and how he regarded the problems. He took note of the statement, and gave the assurance that the Führer could rely on Slovakia. He wished to be excused for the fact that under the impression made by the Führer words he could not clearly express his opinion at that moment or could hardly make a decision. He wished to withdraw with his friend and to think the whole question over at his ease; they would however, show that they were worthy of the Führer's care and interest for their country. With that the conversation was ended.

Signed:

Hevel.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2802 PS

20 November 1945

I, ENID M. STANNING, P/O, W.R.N.S., 52012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Number 2802 PS.

ENID M. STANNING
P/O, W.R.N.S.,
52012.

H1155 – 0080

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2790 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(initials) R-M-

Copy for the office of RAM (Reich Foreign Minister)

Discussion between the FUEHRER and Professor TUCA and Secretary of State KARMASIN, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister in the new Reich Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12th February 1939 between 1700 and 1815 hours.

After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with "My Fuehrer" and he voices the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself, might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as economic point of view. The fact that they still belonged to the Czech state was only possible because of the thought that the present government was only transitory, but he and his colleagues were determined to give in to the pressure of the Slovak people and to bring about an independent Slovakia. The destiny of Slovakia rested with the Fuehrer. Just as he had suffered imprisonment for his convictions, he was equally prepared to sacrifice his life for his ideals. Should there be a rising, the Czechs would immediately try to suppress it with bloodshed, but the mere word of the Fuehrer sufficed to halt these attempts. The same applied to the aspirations of Hungary and Poland, who would be stopped by a single word of the Fuehrer. "I entrust the fate of my people to your care."

F19 054

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2790 PS

22 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2790 PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc.,
33925738

H1155 - 0081

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2798-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Conversation between the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and the President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancellery on 15 March, 1939, 1315 to 1415 hours.

Others present were:

General Field Marshal Goering
General Keitel
Secretary of the State von Meiszäcker
Minister of the State Meissner
Secretary of the State Deitrich
Councillor of the Legation Hewel

President Hacha greets the Fuehrer and expresses his thanks for being received by the latter. He states that he has long wished to become acquainted with the man whose remarkable ideas he has often read and followed. (They are seated) Hacha: He had been unknown until a short time ago. He had never taken part in politics, but had been a legal official in the Vienna Administrative Department, as as such he purposely had not paid any attention to politics, in order to remain impartial to the parties toward whom he had to act as a judge. In 1918 he was called to Prague and in 1925 was appointed President of the Administrative Court of Justice. As such he had had no connection with the politicians, or as he would rather say, to the "politicasters", and very seldom came into contact with them. He must mention at once that he had hardly any relations with the government, and that his communications with the members of the government were restricted to a minimum. He never had been "persona grata". He met with President Masaryk only once a year at a supper for the Judges, and he met Benes even more rarely. The one time he had met the latter, they had had a misunderstanding. Otherwise the whole regime was strange to him, so strange that immediately after the revolution, he had asked himself if it was fortunate for Czechoslovakia to be an independent state. This fell the task fell to me of heading the state. He was an old man. His misgivings were overcome when it was represented to him as a patriotic duty to take over the position. In taking over this position he was faced with the most difficult task of his life, and thus he had been bold enough to ask the Fuehrer to receive him.

He was convinced that the fate of Czechoslovakia was in the hands of the Fuehrer, and he believed that his fate was well cared for in his hands. He had no grounds for complaint in what had recently taken place in Slovakia. He had long been convinced that the various populations in this body-politic cannot live together. Although their language was quite similar, they had developeddifferently and Czechoslovakia was more closely related to Germany than to Slovakia, which leans more toward the Hagyars. The Czechs had had relations only with the Protestant Slovaks while they had repulsed the Catholics. For these reasons a good understanding could never have been reached, and he was glad that matters had developed in this way. He was not alone in this opinion, which surely was shared by 80% of the population.

H1155-0082

Half an hour ago he had received the announcement that the Carpatho-Ukraine had declared itself independent. He believed that the Fuehrer will have none too favorable experiences with the Slovaks. The Fuehrer had probably heard rumors in the last few days that Prague had committed a violation of the constitution. This violation of the constitution would then have to be blamed on him. But he a jurist knew that the government was dismissed on a strictly legal basis. For the Constitution itself had not been observed by a portion of the Czech Government. In this connection, unfortunately events occurred which he regreted, but which were brought about by application of measures to enforce order. They had not been intentional. But, otherwise, he was not shedding any tears over Slovakia.

But now he came to that which moved him most, the fate of his people. He believed that the Fuehrer was the one who'd understand him if he stated the opinion that Czechoslovakia had the right to want to live a national life. The geographical location of Czechoslovakia naturally required the best relations with Germany. This was the basis of its existence as an independent nation. This conviction was shared by the larger part of the Czech people. There were of course, several exceptions, but it must be considered that the new Czechoslovakia had been in existence for only 6 months. Czechoslovakia had been reproached for still having many adherents of the Benes system. But they are not the ones who are named as such. Only in journalistic circles did this system still have friends. The government was trying, by every means, to shut them up. This was about all that he wished to present.

The Fuehrer replied that he regretted that he had to require this journey of the President. But this morning, after long consideration he became convinced that this journey, in spite of the advanced age of the President could be of great advantage to his country. For it was only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene. The German Reich, on principle, feels no enmity toward any other nations. We are fond of, or at least uninterested in nations that do not wrong us. The German people have no hatred for Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia, however, had a very different attitude towards us. The Fuehrer gives various examples to illustrate how this attitude has shown itself in connection with great political events as, for instance, during the occupation of the Rhineland. At that time Czechoslovakia had addressed a note to France saying that Czechoslovakia would be also ready to join in, in the case that France would take military steps against Germany. Czechoslovakia had done so, notwithstanding the fact that the territory in question was originally German. This same attitude she had shown many times, for instance, against Italy during the Ethiopian conflict, etc.. In 1938 the situation had become unbearable. On 28 May he had decided to draw the consequences. He did not feel hostility against any nation but he was the most ruthless defender of the rights of his own people and in this fight he was determined to take any step. In regard to this he was the front soldier who ruthlessly and without scruples stands up and fights for his conviction. His loyal attitude alone was responsible for the remaining part of Czechoslovakia. He took the risk of turning the friendly attitude of Hungary towards him into a hostile one by stopping Hungary's political ambitions and forcing her to solve the problem according to ethnographic principles as Germany did. He did this despite the fact that the craziest economic and tariff situations followed. He took the responsibility for these restrictions not because he could not have acted otherwise but because he was convinced that it was the right thing to do.

For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a means to an end. London and Paris were not in a position to really stand up for Czechoslovakia.

H1155 - 0083

Czechoslovakia was a matter of indifference to him.

If Czechoslovakia had kept closer to Germany, it would have been an obligation to Germany but he was glad that he did not have this obligation now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the little Carpathian Mts. He did not want to draw the final consequences in the autumn because he had believed that it was possible to live together. But even at that time and also later in his conversations with Ch alkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this state if Benesch's tendencies were not completely revised. Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Fuehrer to have patience. The Fuehrer saw this point of view, but the months went by without any change. The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth to mouth propaganda, dismissals of Germans and many other things which, to him, were a symbol of the total positive. At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to him he drew his consequences because, had the development continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the State. Since, Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission such an army is meaningless. He enumerates several examples which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the future. Added to this were the inevitable development of economic necessities and, further, the protests from national groups which could no longer endure life as it was.

"This it is that the die was cast on the past Sunday. I sent for the Hungarian ambassador and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from this country". We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany's attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the government. He believes in the honesty and straight forwardness of Hacha and Chvalkowsky but doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.

At 6 o'clock in the morning the Germany army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German air force would occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia at the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, autonomy and a certain national liberty.

H1155 - 0084

We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not have yielded, the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that the Czech people should live a full national life and he believed firmly that a way could be found which would make far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in counter-pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would then not be possible any more for him to give the promised alleviations. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would result in a hatred which would force him because of his instinct of self-preservation, not to grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when he was readying the foreign press. It would leave the impression on him which could be summarized in a German proverb: "The moor has done his duty, the moor may go".

That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and wished in memory to the past that Czechoslovakia would be conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which corresponded with his just mentioned suggestions.

That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the blood shed would also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a form of construction which would be so far-reaching for Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the old Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for the German people.

The hours went past. At 6 o'clock the troops would march in. He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech batallion. The military action was no small one, but planned with all generosity. He would advise him now to retire with Chvalkowsky.in order to discuss what should be done.

Hacha states that the situation was quite clear to him and that in this case any resistance was senseless. But he would ask the Fuehrer how he would go about, to restrain in four hours all of the Czech people from resisting. The Fuehrer says he should hold council with his men. The now rolling military machine could not be stopped. He should turn to his offices in Prague. It was a great decision but he could see the possibility for a long period of peace between both nations. If the decision would be different he could foresee the destruction of Czechoslovakia.

Hacha asks whether it was the whole purpose of the invasion to disarm the Czech army. This could perhaps also be done in a different manner.

The Fuehrer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He did not see any other possibility for disarmament and asked the other gentlemen whether they shared his opinion which was answered in the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the Czech army was by the German army.

Today this was for Hacha the hardest step of his life, but he believed that already in a few years this decision would be viewed as comprehensible and in 50 years probably as a blessed one.

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After that both Czechs are retiring.

After the conference between Hacha and Chvalkowsky with our gentlemen at the conclusion of which one had come to an understanding on the wording of the agreement, the gentlemen mentioned at the beginning of this memorandum come once together to a final discussion in the Fuehrer's study.

Once again the military situation is being thoroughly discussed and the General Fieldmarshall describes the situation once more in detail. The Fuehrer thinks that perhaps Hacha's message may have not gotten through to some places where clashes of arms may be expected, but one could by and large figure on an invasion without incidences.

The Fuehrer continues that according to his belief inspite of all the embitterment which could be caused by the invasion and occupation by Germany nevertheless the conviction would slowly dawn that a living together of the two nations for centuries was advantageous. The idea that the two people were compelled to fight each other would disappear. Czechoslovakia was surrounded by Germany and every reasonable person would have to admit that a close living together of the two nations whould be the watchword. Furthermore the problem of denationalisation played no part since such an idea was complete foreign to the Germans and to Nationalsocialist ideology. We don't desire nor aim at denationalisation. The ones should live happily as Czechs and the other as Germans.

Hacha replies that this remark of the Fuehrer was of the greatest importance to him.

The Fuehrer continued that only in economic, military and political matters could no opposition be allowed. Czechia should keep her own head of state, and his principles which he will carry through formed the basis for a pacification of this territory for centuries to come.

Hacha interjected and remarked that in other words this was not a plan for purchasing souls like it was during Austrial rule, and asked whether, economically, a custom's union was planned.

The first point the Fuehrer denied with a smile. The second point was answered in the affirmative by the General Fieldmarshall stating that Germany and Czechia were one territory economically speaking. Furthermore Czechia would receive orders which would certainly double her production.

The Fuehrer said that the Czech people would again economically through the union with Germany because they would become a part of the great German economic territory. He did not want to destroy Czech economy but would enliven it tremendously.

Hacha asked whether detailed directives to that effect had already been prepared.

The Fuehrer replied that this was the responsibility of an economic commission because for him, too, the whole affair had come very suddenly. A few weeks ago he did not know a thing about the entire business. He talked again about the past and the tactics employed by Benes and finally mentioned the 28 May on which date he had announced his decision to act to a small circle. The Fuehrer concluded that this settlement which now would be made was to be final, bearable, and should leave no doubts. In any case the Czechs would obtain more rights than they had ever granted to the Germans within their territory.

Thereupon the agreement was signed by the Fuehrer, the Reich's, for Foreign Affairs, Hacha and Chvalkowsky.

Signed: Hewel

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2798-PS

21 November 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/Sgt, AUS, 33,812,169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of document No. 2798-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/S AUS
33,812,169

Document 3061-PS

Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary
COLONEL DR. B. ECER
Czechoslovak Representative on the United Nations Commission
for Investigation of War Crimes

Nurnburg, 1 December 1945

Supplement No. 2 to the Official Czechoslovak Report

called "German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia"

Presented by order of the Czechoslovak Government by Colonel Dr. B. Ecer, Plenipotentiary Minister, Czechoslovak Representative to the Commission of the United Nations for the Investigation of War Crimes in London, at the time Chairman of the Czechoslovak Delegation to the Nurnberg Proceedings.

By order of my Government I submitted in September of this year an official report to the four prosecutors of the International Military Tribunal in accordance with Article 21 of the Statute of the International Military Tribunal, as established by the Agreement of 8th August, 1945.

On 14 November, 1945, I submitted Supplement No. 1 to this report concerning Konstantin von Neurath's responsibility for crimes committed against Czechoslovakia.

Hereby I submit Supplement No. 2 to the first official report. This Supplement No. 2, which is also a government document according to the above-mentioned Article 21, contains further proof of the guilt of the defendants in regard to the preparation for an attack on Czechoslovakia. The report contains, in other words, as a supplement to the first part of the original official Czechoslovak report, further proof concerning the following actions of the defendants:

a. Pre-war infiltration by natives and by imported "Fifth Columns".
b. Subversive activity.
c. Bribery and use of corruption.

The supplement contains also further proof of the collaboration of the German Reich Government and the German Reich Nazi Party with the leaders of the German minority in Czechoslovakia - especially with the leaders of the Henlein Party (SDP) for the purpose of removing the Czechoslovak Republic and preparing the military action of the German Reich against the Czechoslovak Republic.

A number of persons in Czechoslovakia have been questioned in regard to these matters; partly by the Ministry of the Interior (Department of

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Political Intelligence Service); partly by Czechoslovak Courts of Justice.

My present report contains relevant excerpts from these statements.

I. Karl Hermann FRANK formerly the Reichs Protector's Deputy and later German Minister of State in Prague.
(Interrogated by the Ministry of the Interior)

a) Record of 15 August, 1945, in Prague.

Frank stated in this record that during the year 1938 he was several times in Germany. He participated in a trip to Breslau, together with the entire Party Administration of the SDP, in order to visit the Athletic Festival which was to take place there. He spoke there for the first time with Hitler. Hitler told Frank to "hold out and wait". Frank added in the interrogation that he interpreted Hitler's words as meaning that Hitler himself had taken the fate of the Sudeten Germans into his own hands.

In reply to the question as to who had organized the illegal crossing of the border by members of the SDP into Germany in the autumn of 1938, Frank stated that the illegal crossing of the border took place in accordance with a proclamation by Henlein dated 17 or 18 September, 1938, and published in Asch, as well as in accordance with illegal circulars, and that the people who crossed the border illegally joined the so-called Free Corps in Germany. Frank himself had, as he said, crossed the border on 17 or 18 September, 1938.

In reply to the question as to whether he realized that he thereby committed high treason, Frank answered: "I was completely aware of the fact, that by following the proclamation of Henlein, with whose proclamation I was in complete agreement, I as a Czechoslovak citizen had committed high treason in the eyes of the Czechoslovak law."

At the interrogation on 15 August, 1945, Frank stated that Henlein and his staff were at the Dondorf Castle near Bayreuth. Frank was, according to his own statement, a mere member of the staff. Henlein himself, who had the title "Freikorps Fuehrer" (Free Corps Leader), was in charge of the staff. According to Frank the Free Corps was formed at the order of Adolf Hitler, and during the last days of September in Reich German territory it was provided with a small number of small-arms belonging to the German Wehrmacht. Frank stated further that Henlein's proclamation - he meant the proclamation of 17 or 18 September, 1938 - was issued by

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Hitler's order. He admits that this proclamation may possibly have been compo[illegible] in the Ministry of Propaganda. Frank then described the formation of the Free Corps, which according to his statement was composed mainly of Sudeten Germans and which had a force of approximately 15,000 men, and told of attacks and actions which the Free Corps had undertaken on Czechoslovak territory. The orders for such an action in the vicinity of Asch came, according to Frank, directly from Hitler or Himmler. Frank, himself, agreed to these actions and crossed the border for the purpose of joining the Free Corps. Frank stated further that he agreed with all of Hitler's plans in reference to Czechoslovakia, whether they were of a political or Military nature.

b) Record of 9 October 1945

In reply to the question as to who financed the Henlein Party, Frank answered that he thought the party had been receiving money from Germany since 1936. However, he did not know the source. In the year 1938 money arrived from the so-called "Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle" in Berlin (Central Office for National Germans) through the mediation of the German Ambassador in Prague. He stated that he had been with Henlein several times at the German Ambassador's in Prague and that he together with Henlein had received money for the Party from the German Ambassador. He admitted that the receipt of the money was not consistent with the duties of a Czechoslovak citizen.

He admitted also that he had gone alone to the German Embassy in Prague several times and that he informed the German Ambassador about the inner political situation in Czechoslovakia. He added "The delivery of information to Germany from the SDP by means of the Embassy began in May, 1938, and that brought about a direct, political cooperation with the delivery of confidential material also". Frank admitted that he thereby had committed high treason. After Henlein's conversation with Hitler at Obersalzberg (Frank does not give the date of this conversation but from the content of his statement it is evident that this conversation took place at the end of August, 1938) the party received direct orders from Berlin through Konrad Henlein. He admitted further that the activities described above were directed against the Czechoslovak State, that they

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were high treason and that the German Embassy in Prague was willing to assist toward this end.

c) Record of 9 October, 1945.

In the statement of 9 October, 1945, Frank explained the role played by the so-called "Aufbruchskreis". The Aufbruchskreis was a group of former National-Socialistic delegates with Kasper, Krebs and Jung at the Head. The National Socialist Party was voluntarily dissolved in Czechoslovakia in 1933, in order to prevent its being dissolved officially. Several of its leaders fled to Germany (see page 10 of the original Czechoslovak document). In 1937 several of the former National Socialists, who had remained in Czechoslovakia, succeeded in getting into the Henlein Party while several of its exponents, among them Kasper, were taken into the chief administration of the SDP. Other German National Socialists of Czechoslovakia remained permanently in Germany and carried on from there propaganda against the Czechoslovak Republic. To these belonged in particular the former member of the Czechoslovak Parliament, Krebs. Frank said that Krebs was a friend of Frick and that he had therefore been taken into the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Frank himself was in touch with the Chairman of the "Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland" (National Society for Germanism Abroad), Steinacher, whom he met personally in Germany. Frank confirmed the fact that the "Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland" financed the Sudeten German Party. The money was always received by Henlein. Krebs stated that the purpose of this connection with the German Reich Authorities (Reichsstellen) was the establishment of national unity on both sides of the border and that it signified the preparation for a uniting of the two sides. Later, on the same day he added to his statement the fact that this connection had existed since 1933 and that in 1936 a further connection between the SDP and Kreis was established in connection with the so-called working class (Reichsnaehrstand). Similar connections were established within the field of Party education and within the field of sports and physical education.

d) Record of 10 October 1945.

In his statement on this day Frank admitted on the basis of the documents placed before him that Konrad Henlein received direct orders for espionage from the German Reich Authorities (Reichsstellen) and that he had

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them carried out by Sudeten German persons. He believes, as he said, that there was a special German espionage system in Czechoslovakia, and that it was conducted directly by Germany. In the summer of 1938, as Frank remembers, Henlein was twice with Rudolf Hess; Frank continued his account with the words: "All conversations during the summer of 1938 between Henlein and me on the one side and the Reich Authorities (Reichsstellen), especially Adolf Hitler, Hess, and Ribbentrop, on the other side, were for the purpose of informing the Reich Authorities of the development of the political situation in Czechoslovakia. They took place at the request of the Reich authorities".

Frank told further that he had a conversation with Ribbentrop in August, 1939, through the mediation of Lorenz (Lorenz, the SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, was the leader of the so-called National German Central Office /Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle/ in Berlin, which took over the role of the "Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Auslande") and informed Ribbentrop about the political situation in Czechoslovakia and especially about the negotiation of the Czechoslovak Government in regard to the status of the nationalities. At noon he had a conversation with Hitler, in which Ribbentrop took part. The result of this conversation was the assurance (Frank did not say by whom) that the policy of the SDP in Czechoslovakia would be approved and that the Reich would be able to carry out the solution of the Sudeten German question. Frank stated expressly that this trip to Ribbentrop and Hitler was a secret one and that Henlein was the only one who knew about it. Frank stated further that through these negotiations he committed an offense against the laws of the Republic. He added: "In reply to the question I state that I am aware of the treason which the Party and its entire chief administration committed by receiving money from a foreign country for hostile actions against the State."

e) Record of 12 October 1945.

In this interrogation on 12 October, 1945, Frank described the trip of a large majority of the Party Administration to the Parteitag of the NSDAP in Nurnberg. During this period Konrad Henlein had a conversation with Hitler (according to Frank's statement) and told Frank afterward that Hitler and Goering would take a firm stand in regard to the Sudeten German question--which actually happened. Frank continued: "I remember only that

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they both spoke sharply and threateningly against Czechoslovakia and announced the solution of the Sudeten German problem." Frank said further that after the return from Nurnberg the further activities of the SDP were already directed toward armed revolt. He quoted an order for the battle against the Republic issued by Henlein on 17 September, 1938. On the same day Frank fled with Henlein to Germany and from there they both directed all actions against the Republic. He described the activities and actions of the Sudeten German Free Corps to which, as Frank stated officers of the SS, SA and NSKK were assigned. Hitler appointed Henlein commander of the Free Corps; Frank was his deputy. Propaganda for the purpose of disintegrating Czechoslovakia was handled at this time by the Ministry of Propaganda. Arms were smuggled from Germany into Czechoslovakia. Frank added to his testimony that at that time a colonel or lieutenant colonel of the German armed forces had for the time being been assigned to the Command of the Free Corps as a liaison officer. He then described the events after the Munich agreement. He was present at a large public demonstration in Karlsbad, at which Hitler declared: "For you Sudeten-Germans the nation is ready to draw the sword".

f) Record of 18 October 1945.

Frank described the course of the occupation of the so-called Sudeten territory, how the Henlein party had become a part of the NSDAP through Hess, how the new organization of the party was carried out exactly according to the German pattern, and how, finally, the various Nazi organizations such as the SS, SA, NSKK, NSFK, HJ and BDM were established in the Sudeten territory. Frank mentioned the names of the Sudeten Germans who had been placed at the head of the various party organizations. He then described the election for the Reichstag which was proclaimed on the Sudeten territory on 4 December 1938. Finally he described the organization

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of the Reich German State Administration in the Sudeten Territory, of which Henlein, as Reich Commissioner, was the head. He confirmed the fact that the majority of the leading positions were taken over by Reich German officials. He mentioned also, how the population of the Czech territories, which had been occupied by the Germans in violation of the Munich agreement, were treated. He said, "German officials were appointed also in the Czech-speaking territory. The majority of the Czech schools were closed and the Czech children were sent to [German] schools. All signs in Czech were removed; protection for the Czech minority did not exist." When the interrogator reminded Frank that Hitler had repeatedly stated that he wanted no Czechs, Frank said: "I admit that in the annexation of purely Czech territories such as the vicinity of Domazlice, Pilzen and Turnov he (he means Hitler) has in no way complied with his declaration."

He then described the terror system which was employed against the Czechs and the Jews in the occupied Sudeten Territories. Finally he described the preparations for the final occupation of the rest of Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939, and the cooperation with the Czech Fascists for this purpose. He characterized this latter act of Hitler's in the following manner: "Even though Hitler declared that he did not want any Czechs in the Reich, he had broken and violated this declaration by occupying the Czechoslovak Republic." And Frank added: "As everything else that Hitler undertook, this action was enthusiastically approved by the population (Frank means the German population) and the population backed it". He then described the march of the German troops into Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March, 1939, and the arrival of Hitler, who, according to Frank, was accompanied by Lammers, Frick, Stukart, Himmler, Daluege, Heydrich, Keitel, Brauchitsch and other generals. Frank, together with Henlein and Hoeppner, was summoned to Hitler in his private parlor car.

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According to his statement, he happened to be present on March 16 in the room where Ribbentrop broadcast the proclamation and the establishment of the Protektorat over the radio, and added: "Subsequently I found out that the proclamation was composed by Hitler together with Frick, Stuckart and Ribbentrop during the night of the 15 to the 16 of March, 1939". He described then, how he had been ordered to go to Vienna to see Hitler in the Hotel Imperial between the 17 and 19 March, 1939. He, together with Neurath, was received by Hitler during the forenoon. Frank continued: "Hitler told us that he was appointing von Neurath as Reich Protector and me as State Secretary". Frank stated further, that Neurath had been placed directly under Hitler. Frank accepted the position as State Secretary, although, as he said, this was in conflict with the principle of self-government which he had defended up to October 1, 1938. He did it because it was Hitler's order. He learned later on that Hitler had mentioned to Hacha that either a protective agreement in the form of a Protectorate must be made, or else the German troops would march into Czechoslovakia, and that they were ready to do so.

Concerning the occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, and the establishing of the Protectorate, Frank expressed himself as follows: "The conclusion of the protective agreement between Hitler and Hacha and the establishing of a protectorate such as the establishing of an independent Slovakia with an independent protective agreement between the Reich and Slovakia signified an action of pure political force. This violated all laws, since Hacha, according to the Czechoslovakian laws, was not authorized to negotiate such an agreement with Hitler without prior consultation of the parliament still in session."

"I am aware of the fact that my appointment as Secretary of State was a one-sided political act on the part of Hitler and that

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the establishing of the Protectorate was carried out without regard for Munich, Voelkerbund, the agreement concerning the protection of minorities, etc."

2. RECORD ON 19 NOVEMBER 1945 OF MRS. MILADA RADLOVA, nee HACHOVA, DAUGHTER OF THE FORMER DECEASED SO-CALLED STATE PRESIDENT DR. EMIL HACHA (taken down by the Ministry of the Interior)

Mrs. Radlova was questioned concerning Hacha's trip to Berlin on 14 March, 1939 and his conversation with Hitler. She described her father's departure, whom she accompanied, and his arrival in Berlin, where they got off at a hotel, and said among other things: "My father has never given me a complete report of his conversation with Hitler. From his verbal remarks I only found out, that Goering said to my father during his visit with Hitler on the night between 14 and 14 March, 1939 that he would be very sorry if he were to be forced to destroy so beautiful a city as Prague, in case my father did not give his approval of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the German Army, and if the Czechoslovak Army were to use armed force in opposition to the occupying forces. What Hitler said to my father - Dr. Hacha - I have not found out. Not until later did my father tell me that it was a great blow to him to find out that Bohemia and Moravia were to be occupied by the Germans. As a matter of fact, my father thought at first that his trip concerned Slovakia since it was known that many Slovaks, as for instance TUKA, SANO, MACH, etc., wanted to make Slovakia an independent state. Not until his arrival in Berlin on 14 March, 1939 did my father find out that on this day Moravska-Ostrava had been occupied by the Germans. He had also told me that Hitler was very much enraged, because my father arrived so late in Berlin.

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DOCUMENT NO. 3061-PS
OFFICE, U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

3. RECORD OF 19 NOVEMBER 1945 OF DR. AUGUST POPELKA, THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CHANCERY OF THE SO-CALLED PRESIDENT OF STATE, HACHA.

Dr. Popelka stated, that he had learned about the conversation between Hitler and Hacha during the night of the 14 and 15 March, 1939 through a document which Dr. Hacha had personally composed and signed. This document was retained as a secret document in a special cabinet. Dr. Popelka, as director of the Chancery, had access to this cabinet and read the document. He recalls having read that Hacha had to wait until 0200 hours in the morning during his visit with Hitler. The room in which he waited was brilliantly lit. Hitler was surrounded by a large number of military aides. Hacha reproduced in the document a statement made by the defendant Goering to the effect that if Hacha would not accept the conditions which had been placed before him with regard to the occupation

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of Bohemia and Moravia, he, Goering would attack Prague from the air and destroy it completely in order to give England and France a warning example, so that these countries could see what would happen to their cities if they engaged in war. Hacha began the conversation with Hitler with the Slovakian question. Hitler did not react to it and told Hacha that he had just given orders for the German troops to occupy Bohemia and Moravia at 0600 hours on the 15th of March. Hitler then presented the conditions which Hacha was to accept. Hacha objected. However, that did not help. From Dr Hacha's document it was evident that he had been forced to sign the document for the German protection, that he had not voluntarily sought protection and that he signed the document under psychological pressure. Dr Popelka continued: "The document read, as I remember, that Dr Hacha was under such a mental strain during his visit with Hitler that he had an attack and had to have an injection by Hitler's personal physician, who was present. From the document and from remarks which Hacha made later in my presence, I am under the impression that Hacha acted under the pressure of Hitler's and Goering's threats against the Czechoslovak people, and that he was given no time in which to think over the matter or consult with the proper governmental agencies."

4. RECORD OF 19 NOVEMBER 1945 OF DR JOSEPH KLIMENT, FORMER POLITICAL REPORTER (REFERENTEN) FOR DR HACHA AT THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR IN PRAGUE

Dr Kliment stated that he accompanied Dr Hacha as an official of his chancery to Berlin. He was not present during the conversation between Dr Hacha and Hitler. He can remember the information which Dr Hacha gave to him and other outstanding Czechoslovak persons in the Hotel Adlon when he returned at 0430 on 15 March 1939. During his visit to Hitler, Dr Hacha had wanted first of all to solve the Slovakian problem. Hitler had listened to Hacha and he had then only said that the question of Slovakia was not the object of his interest. He had decided to occupy the Czechoslovak countries with the German Armed Forces, starting at 0600 in order to secure peace in Central Europe. He added to this that his decision was final. Then Goering stepped over to Dr Hacha and

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said to him: "My official task (Amt) is difficult. I have nothing at all against your beautiful city. However, if you want to do anything at all against the decision of the Fuehrer, especially if you should attempt to get help from the West, then I shall be forced to show the world the 100 percent effectiveness of my Air Force". Dr. Hacha then told those who had accompanied him that it was not until these far-reaching threats had been directed against the entire nation that he decided to sign the declaration already placed before him concerning the protection of the Czechoslovak countries and the Czechoslovak people through the Chancellor of the German Reich.

Dr. Kliment continued: "It is clear to me, as an immediate participant of those days, that during the fateful night Hitler, Goering and the others who were present, especially Ribbentrop, employed the highest pressure that could be used against the spokesman of a people: that is, the threat to destroy completely their capital, Prague, from the air. Only the fear of reprisals against the Czechoslovak people influenced Dr. Hacha, in my opinion, to bow to the dictates of Hitler."

Dr. Hacha confirmed that during the conversation with Hitler he had received a strength-giving injection, although he had protested against it. Concerning Ribbentrop's participation in the events on 15th of March 1939, Dr. Kliment said: "Concerning Ribbentrop: Aside from the treacherous role he had played in submitting the despotic order concerning the establishing of the Protectorate, I can still remember today the overbearing and imperious manner in which he conducted himself when he took over the town."

I can report another breach of confidence which he committed against the Czechoslovak people. He had assured Dr. Hacha that it would be impossible in the Czechoslovak countries for a Sudeten-German to carry out reprisals against the Czechoslovak population. Instead of that it is common knowledge that K. H. Frank, the former Sudeten official and the arch enemy of the Czechoslovak people, was appointed to the most important Reich Office in the Czechoslovak countries. And Ribbentrop, in spite of his promises and his decisive and open participation in all the events mentioned, did nothing to keep his promises.

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5.) INTERROGATION OF FORMER SLOVAKIAN POLITICAL LEADERS

The following persons, who were leaders in the so-called "Independent Slovakian State", were interrogated.

a) Dr Josef Tiso, former State President, interrogated by the district court Bratislava on 19 November 1945.

b) Dr Vojtech Tuka, former Minister, interrogated by officials of the Ministry of Interior (Department for Political Information Service).

c) Alexander Mach, former Minister, interrogated by the district Court Bratislava on the 19 November 1945.

d) Dr Mikulas Pruzinsky, interrogated by the district court Bratislava on 19 November 1945.

e) Adalar Kocis, interrogated by the district court Bratislava on 19 November 1945.

The Object of the Interrogation was:

The participation of the Nazi conspirators in the tearing away of Slovakia from the Czechoslovak Republic, carried out on 14 March 1939.

All witnesses confirmed, partly from personal experience, partly on the basis of information that they had received, the following facts:

a) That Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering and other Nazi leaders demanded the proclamation of the "Independent Slovakian State" from Slovakian political leaders on 13 March 1939.

b) That Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering and others at the same time threatened in various ways the occupation of Slovakia by German troops up to the river Vah and the distribution of the remainder of Slovakia among her northern and southern neighbors if the Slovaks did not declare their "independence"; whereupon during the night between the 13th and 14th of March, Ribbentrop gave Dr Tiso until 14 March at 1300 to make up his mind.

c) That incidents such as shootings, bombing attacks etc, were organized in Bratislava by Germans with the assistance of SS-officers and in cooperation with the local German Consul

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in order to justify the invasion by German troops.

I hereby submit the present document in the name of the Czechoslovak Government and I have the honor to state that my Government reserves the right to submit additional documentary material to the prosecutors.

Colonel Dr. B. ECER

/s/ Dr B. Ecer

Extraordinary Envoy and Minister
Plenipotentiary.

Representative of the Czechoslovak
Republic at the Commission of the
United Nations for the Investigation
of War Criminals

Chairman of the Czechoslovak Delegation
in the Nuernberg Process

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Exhibit #3 135
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1430-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

PAGE 606. 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT PART II

DECLARATION CONCERNING THE GERMAN-SLOVAK TREATY OF PROTECTION CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE STATE OF SLOVAKIA, March 24, 1939

Between the German Government and the Slovak Government, a treaty was signed on 18 March 1939 in Vienna and on 23 March 1939 in Berlin extending protection by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia.

The treaty became effective on March 23, 1939; its text is published hereinafter.

Berlin, March 24, 1939.

VON RIBBENTROP
Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs

Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia

The German Government and the Slovak Government have agreed, after the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences resulting from this fact. For this purpose the undersigned representatives of the two governments have agreed on the following provisions.

ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its territory.

ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall have the right, at all times, to construct military installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians and the Javornik Mountains.

The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to assure that the land required for these installations shall be conveyed to the German armed forces. Furthermore the Government of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military installations.

Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces in the zone described in the first paragraph of this Article.

German citizens who, on the basis of private employment contracts, are engaged in the construction of military installations in the designated zone shall be subject to German jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces.

ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection agreed upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times conduct its foreign affairs in close agreement with the German Government.

H1155-0102

ARTICLE 5. This treaty shall become effective as of the date of its signature and shall be valid for a period of twenty-five years. The two governments will reach an understanding on the extension of this treaty in due time before the expiration of that period.

In witness whereof the representatives of the two parties have signed the above treaty in duplicate.

Vienna, March 18, 1939. Berlin, March 23, 1939.

For the German Government:

VON RIBBENTROP

For the Slovak Government:

DR. JOZEF TISO
DR. VOJTECH TUKA
DR. F. DURCANSKY

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1439-PS

17 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1439-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

H1155-0103

(703)

T C 53 A

Marginal Note to the Law concerning the Reunion of the Memel Territory with the German Reich of 23 March, 1939.

D.d.d.P. Vol.VII Pt.2. P552.
Note 2.

The transfer commissioner (Ueberleitungskommissar) for the Memel Territory, Gauleiter and Oberpraesident Erich Koch, effected on 3 April 1939 during a conference at Memel the final incorporation of the late Memel Territory into the national-socialist party Gau of East Prussia and into the state administration of the East - Prussian Regierungsbezirk of Grunbinnen.

Exhibit GB 136
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2953 PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Reichs Führer-SS
Chief of Security HQ.
III 1123 AZ: g.Rs. /39 POS./Kt.

29th June 1939

Stamp-
Foreign Office
Rm 38 g. Rs.
received 29th June 1939
1 Encl.

Stamp- Most Secret

To the Reich Foreign Minister
SS Major General (Gruppenführer) v.Ribbentrop
Wilhelmstrasse 63.
Berlin W. 8.

Dear party comrade v. Ribbentrop,

Enclosed please find a further report about the "Woldemaras Supporters". As already mentioned in the previous report the "Woldemaras Supporters" are still asking for help from the Reich, I therefore ask you to examine the question of financial support, brought up again by the "Woldemaras Supporters", set forth on page 4 para 2 of the enclosed report, and to make a definite decision.

The request of the "Woldemaras Supporters" for financial support could, in my opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms should not, however, be made, under any circumstances.

Heil Hitler.

Yours

HEYDRICH.

Enclosure.

F 12 348.

A/L/2

Translation of Extract to RM 33 Most Secret

In the middle of May it was decided to form a secret Lithuanian national socialist party. Its leaders are the most trustworthy members of the "Woldemaras Supporters". The direction of the work within the Officers - Corps is said to be in the hands of old members of the "Woldemaras Supporters". Besides that, they are said to have one assistant who is on the personal staff of President Smetana. In order to make full use of antisemitic feeling in Lithuania it is intended to stage programs against the Jews. The sum of 100,000 Lit (about 41,000 Mark) is required for this illegal work. Besides that a leading "Woldemaras Supporter" is enquiring whether the Reich would send weapons as well. The reply was given to the effect that money would possibly be provided but, weapons, however, would definitely not be delivered.

The fight against the Jews would result in a further increase in the escape of Jewish capital, causing Lithuania to be more dependent than ever on the German market.

18 November 1945.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2953 PS.

I, Betty D. Richardson, WRNS. P.O. 66370, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 2953 PS.

Betty D.Richardson, WRNS
P.O. 66370

H1155-0105

Exhibit #B 137
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2952-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

ZU R.M. 33 g.Rs.

MEMORANDUM

During the last 1½ years, Lithuanian activists, under the name of WOLDEMARAS SUPPORTERS, have asked German offices repeatedly for support in the matter of weapons and money through the mediation of Memel Confidence agents of the foreign office and the State Police H.Q. in Tilsit. Imminent large scale plots to seize power were always pointed out with these requests without anything ever happening afterwards.

Thorough investigations have shown that the so-called "Woldemaras Supporters" are composed of persons who are dissatisfied with the Government of the Lithuanian President SMETONA for the most varied reasons. A certain uniformity exists merely in the rejection of the friendly disposition towards Poland of the intellectual circles, as well as the Christian Democratic Party, which at present is decisively represented in the Lithuanian Government. It has not yet been possible to identify the presence of a definite policy in the leadership of this group. No connections worth mentioning exist with Woldemaras, who lives in France, writing religious compositions and receiving a small pension from the Lithuanian Government on the condition not to return to Lithuania and to remain quiet politically. It must therefore be considered as extremely questionable whether this Group of Activists, with whom the name "Woldemaras" is hardly more than an advertisement, will attain political influence in the near future. It is not in the interest of Germany to weaken the position of the Army Commander RASTIKIS, whose influence on the political direction of Lithuania is increasing. On the other hand it is not disadvantageous if the friendly endeavours towards Poland meet with active opposition.

The Woldemaras Group has occasionally been supported, for these reasons, with the approval of the Foreign Office (AUSSENAMT) by small amounts of money (amounts of a few hundred marks) so that its activities and its developments could be kept under observation. Support through the delivery of arms, aircraft and motor vehicles which had been asked for at different times, has not been given.

H1155-0106

2952

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2592 - PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CONTINUED

It will be appropriate to adopt the same practice in future as well. Support on a larger scale will offer prospects for success only at such time as the Woldemaras group has shown that it is in the position to create the basis for an effective intervention in Lithuanian politics by itself.

With regard to the pogrom-plans of the "Woldemaras Supporters" it has to be said that for some time past the Lithuanian Government has been working successfully towards the elimination of Jewry from Lithuanian economy. This has resulted in an ever growing increasing emigration of Jews during the last years. The Jews have always been excluded from Lithuanian public life. The preparation of pogroms could easily lead to a disturbance of this well planned development, which is gratifying to us.

Berlin, 19th July, 1939.

Doertenbach.

R.M. (Added in handwriting)

I support small regular payments, e. g. 2-3,000 marks quarterly.

(Signed) W

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2592 PS

November 16th, 1945

I, Pfc ERNST M. COHN 33 925 738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document 2592-PS.

Pfc ERNST M. COHN

33 925 738.

H1155-0107

PS 2357

EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE REICHSTAG

20 February 1938

"In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement of the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state that in our relations with the State with which we had had perhaps the greatest differences, not only has there been a detente, but in the course of these years there has been a constant improvement in relations ..... This good work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that, since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, the most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions by this State, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with Danzig, has today, in spite of the attemps of certain mischief- makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly cooperation.

"Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us - peace."

H1155-0108

T.C.73.No.37.

Document No. 37

Extracts from Chancellor Hitler's Reichstag Speech
February 20, 1938.

"With one State only did we not want any connection or any close relations - with Soviet Russia....."

"Any attempts to spread Bolshevism, irrespective of where they occurred, would have our abhorrence and, if they threaten us - our enmity....."

"In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement of the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state that in our relations with the State with which we had had perhaps the greatest differences. not only has there been a detente, but in the course of these years there has been a constant improvement in relations. I know perfectly well that this is above all attributable to the circumstance that at the time there was no Western parliamentarian in Warsaw, but a Polish Marshal, who as an eminent personality realized the significance, so important to Europe, of such a German-Polish detente. This good work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time. has stood the test, and I may say that, since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, this most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions in this State, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with Danzig, has to-day, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly co-operation.

Replying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us - peace.

H1155-0109

Tc 76

G/12.

Most Secret.

To the Reichminister
via the State Secretary.

Berlin 26th August 1938

F 12 311.

(signed) Prufer.

II

4. The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem, might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the Entente. Neither France nor England are looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct foreign interference and through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults, suffer the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step by step and would have to lead to a loss of power in the remaining territory by means of a plebiscite and an annexion of territory.

F 12 298.

The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any definite time and this fruit could be plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the desired developments.

For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudetan - Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the choice of nationality was being withheld from those Germans will do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of dissolution of the Czech form of state may or may not be finally speeded up by mechanical means as war. The fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be clearly decided by this: but would nevertheless be definitely sealed.

5. This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of boundaries in the south east and their transfer to the east and north east must make the Poles sit up. The fact that after liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally assumed that

H1155-0110

that Poland will be the next in turn.

But the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however, it is important for the time being, to carry on the German policy, under the well known and proved slogans of "the right to autonomy" and "Racial unity". Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically, than our forces could stand up to.

F 12 297.

H1155-0111

T.C.73 No.40.

Document No.40

Extract from M. Lipski's minute of his conversation with M. von Ribbentrop

Nuremberg September 10 , 1938.

M. von Ribbentrop emphasized the necessity for good Polish-German relations: this was his own conviction which had regard to the common interests linking both States. His personal view was confirmed by the line adopted by the Chancellor. As long, therefore, as the Chancellor desired to maintain his present post, he would work positively for the development of Polish-German relations.

Granted this general assumption minor issues disturbing Polish-German relations must be settled in a friendly spirit.

H1155-0112

T.C.73 NO.42.

Document No. 42

Extracts from Chancellor Hitler's Speech in the Sportpalast

September 26 1938.

"We have no interest in oppressing other nations. We desire to be happy in our own way and let the others be happy in their own ways....."

"The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies I wanted to prevent this. I know well enough that I would not have been successful if Poland had had a democratic constitution. For these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the most blood-thirsty way agitators. In Poland there ruled not a democracy, but a man; and with him I succeeded in precisely twelve months, in coming to an agreement which, for ten years to begin with, entirely removed the danger of conflict. We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification. We realise that here are two peoples which must live together, and neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 millions will always strive for an out-let to the sea. A way to understanding then, had to be found; it has been found; and it will be continually extended further. Certainly things were difficult forthis area. The nationalities and small groups frequently quarrelled among themselves. But the main fact is that the two Governments, and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two countries, possess the firm will and determination to improve their relations. It was a real work of peace, of more value than all the chattering of the League of Nations Palace at Geneva.

H1155-0113

"POLISH WHITE BOOK".

No. 44.

M. Lipski to M. Beck.

Berlin, October 25, 1938.

In a conversation on October 24, over a luncheon at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, M. von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of issues (Gesamtlösung) between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years and a guarentee of Polish-German frontiers. As a possible sphere for future co-operation between the two countries, the German Foreign Minister specified joint action in colonial matters and the emigration of Jews from Poland, and a joint policy towards Russia on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact. M. von Ribbentrop asked me to communicate his suggestions to you. He would like to discuss these matters with you, with my participation.

In my reply I referred him to the Chancellor's declaration on the Danzig question, made to me on November 5, 1937, and repeated to you in Berlin on January 14, 1938.

I also pointed to the importance of Danzig as a port to Poland, and repeated the Polish Government's principle of non-interference in the internal life of the German population in the Free City, where complete self-government is established.

Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you.

After the conversation M. von Ribbentrop invited me again to call on him and, mentioning the issue of the union of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia with Hungary, put to me the question whether I was raising it with the German Government as a Polish postulate. He added that, if the Polish Government agreed to the German conception regarding Danzig and the Motor Road, the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia could be solved in accordance with Poland's attitude to the matter. I answered that my only task was to inform the German Government of Poland's attitude in regard to Hungary's postulate in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, as Poland had also done to the Italian Government.

H1155-0114

TC 73 / 45.

M. BECK'S INSTRUCTIONS TO M. LIPSKI.

Warsaw, October 31, 1938.

In connection with your indication of the Reich Government's desire to achieve a general agreement which would finally stabilize Polish-German relations in accordance with the principle of a good and friendly co-existence, as expressed by M. von Ribbentrop in his conversation at Berchtesgaden on the 24th inst., please inform the governing circles of the Reich of our following views:

(1) Although, to our sincere satisfaction, the last crisis did not lead to a general European military conflict, in the eyes of the Polish Government the value of good Polish-German relations in a general stabilization of peace is not only of undiminished importance, but, in face of the dominating general political chaos, has gained in weight and cogency.

(2) In the sphere of Polish-German neighbourly relations, in spite of local difficulties, great progress has been made, since it has not escaped our notice that the Reich Chancellor's declarations in regard to us, made in his public statements, contain increasingly precise and unequivocal formulas.

(3) The Polish-German Agreement of 1934 has stood the test of the greatest political upheaval post-war Europe has so far experienced. In these circumstances, it is only logical to emphasize this achievement, by impressing the publics of both countries with the fact that the said Agreement was not of a transient and tactical nature. On the contrary, it expresses the firm resolution to repair mistakes of past history, which has been so abundant in strife and conflict without advantage of either of our nations.

(4) In the opinion of the Polish Government the subject of any future understanding concluded with the object of permanently maintaining good neighbourly relations would have to be the following:

(a) A certain extension in the period and form of the 1934 Declaration, as the basis of relations between the two States.

(b) Such a settlement of the problem of the Danzig Free City as would prevent, in future, the continually recurring difficulties of a technical and psychological nature which arise from friction in this sphere. The question of the Free City is urgent because in the state of affairs hitherto prevailing, with the League of Nations reserving very far-reaching prerogatives to itself, but not able to fulfil its task in a manner beneficial to the Free City and to Polish interests, the need arises for the Polish and Reich Governments to approach the problem in a spirit of frankness.

(5) On the Polish side the fact will always remain that so important a State as Poland has access to the sea which is reduced to the minimum possible, and this at a time when the Republic's sea commerce and its mercantile marine are naturally developing on a very wide scale. The construction of Gdynia port considerably enlarged Poland's possibilities, but the position of the Free City at the mouth of the Vistula (which, especially since the creation of the Polish Central Industrial Area, is an increasingly important communication way) confers quite special importance on the Free City from the aspect of Polish maritime interests. A very large number of further basins can still be excavated at Gdynia, but it would be impossible to find any substitute for the natural port situated at the mouth of the main Polish waterway. On the other hand, the exploitation of any port under normal economic conditions is only possible when it is situated within the Customs area of the country which forms its hinterland. For this reason, in past ages the Free City of Danzig, while enjoying local autonomy because if the nature of its population, was even under Polish sovereignty. It should be added that the Danzig delegation to the

H1155-0115

Congress of Vienna had, as its chief task, the maintenance of its connection with whatever type of Polish State might arise as the result of the deliberations of that Congress. These historical considerations are meant only as illustration and commentary. Present-day realities provide clear arguments for a definition of the bounds of Polish interests in relation to the Free City.

(6) In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish Government the Danzig question is governed by two factors: the right of the German population of the city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life and development; and the fact that in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely bound up with Poland. In the present state of affairs the existing Statute and agreements guarantee Poland:

(a) Unrestricted access to the sea by waterway and railway.
(b) The ownership of the railways serving the port at Danzig and the port at Gdynia.
(c) The inclusion of the Free City in the Polish Customs area.
(d) The rights of the Polish minority.

Other rights derive from these four cardinal conditions. The Statute contains yet another fifth condition which, despite several declarations of the Danzig Senate, the last being made in 1932, has never been fulfilled. The failure to fulfil this condition reacts most unfavourably upon the economic position of the Free City.

(7) Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a friendly understanding with the Government of the German Reich, the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral Polish-German Agreement. This Agreement should guarantee the existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the complications involved in such a system, the Polish Government must state that any other solution, and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects. Even in 1933, after the conversations had been opened which led to the conclusion of the 1934 Declaration, Marshal Pilsudski raised the Danzig question as a sure criterion for estimating the German Reich's intentions towards Poland. This was made known both through diplomatic channels and also, so far as I remember, in a conversation between Marshal Pilsudski and Dr.Goebbels. I expressly consider that this point of view is binding upon Poland.

(8) In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am ready to have final conversations personally with the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be dangerous for the future.

H1155-0116

C.137.

Translation

C.137.

Top Secret.

Typed by officer

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 24/11/38.

No. 241/38 top secret important L Ia.

Re:- The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 236/38 top secret important matter L Ia of 21/10/38.

10 Copies
3rd Copy.

(Handwritten) to be placed before the C-in-C

Important Matter
By hand of Officer Only.

1st Supplement to Instruction dated 21/10/38.

The Führer has ordered:-

1) Apart from the 3 contingencies mentioned in the instructions of the 21/10/38, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise ("4). Occupation of Danzig").

The preparations will be made on the following basis:-

Condition is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favourable situation, not a war against Poland.

No. 3 of the "instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war" (OKW No. 230/38 top secret important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will come into operation.

Occupation by the army has to take place from East Prussia. The troops to be employed for this purpose must not simultaneously be earmarked for the occupation of the Memelland, so that both operations can, if necessary, take place simultaneously.

The Navy will support the army's operations by attack from the sea according to detailed orders from the C-in-C Navy. The forces participating are to be instructed to co-operate with the army. The details of the support to be given by the navy are to be agreed between the branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH and OKM).

How far air force units can collaborate in the occupation is to be investigated by the Reich Marshal of the Air Force and the C-in-C Air Force and to be agreed in direct co-operation with the other two branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH and OKM).

The plans of the branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH, OKM and OKL) are to be submitted by the 10/1/1939.

2) No. 3 of the "instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war" (OKW No. 230/38 top secret important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will also apply for the "occupation of the Memelland" (part 3 of the instructions dated 21/10/38).

Distribution:
OKH = 1 (Copy No.1) OKM = 1 (Copy No.3)
RdL u.ObdL= 1 (" " 2) OKW = 7 ("No.4-10)

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
K E I T E L.

3625.

MINUTE OF M. BECK'S CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR HITLER.

Berchtesgaden, January 5, 1939.

The conversation took place in the presence of M. von Ribbentrop, M. von Moltke, M. Lipski and Count Michal Lubienski.

The Chancellor began by asking M. Beck whether he had any special questions to ask, as he was quite ready to be at his service with any explanations. In replying, M. Beck mentioned the Danzig situation and the Danube problem.

The Chancellor explained at length how the arbitration at Vienna had come about, laying the blame on the Hungarian Government's tactics for Budapest's failure to give effect to the postulate regarding Carpathian Ruthenia.

The Chancellor pointed out that in regard to Poland he always and invariably tried to follow the policy initiated by the Declaration of 1934. In his opinion the community of interests between Germany and Poland, so far as Russia was concerned, was complete. For the Reich, Russia, whether Tsarist or Bolshevist, was equally dangerous. The latter was perhaps a greater danger because of Communist propaganda, but the former was more dangerous in the military and even more the imperialistic sense. For these reasons, a strong Poland was an absolute necessity for Germany. At this point the Chancellor remarked that every Polish division engaged against Russia was a corresponding saving of a German division.

The Chancellor further declared that he was interested in the Ukraine from the economic viewpoint, but he had no interest in it politically.

The Chancellor then discussed the Danzig question, and emphasized that, as it was a German city, sooner or later it must return to the Reich. He stated that, in his opinion, by way of mutual agreement it would be possible to find some way out and achieve a form of guarantee to the legitimate interests of both Poland and Germany. If an agreement was reached on this question, all difficulties between the two States could quite definitely be settled and cleared out of the way. He emphasized that he was ready in that case to give an assurance, similar to that which he had given France with respect to Alsace and Lorraine, and to Italy with respect to the Brenner. Finally, he drew attention, without stressing the matter, to the necessity for greater freedom of communication between Germany and East Prussia.

M. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this matter.

In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new, some new form, for which he used the term "Körperschaft", which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish Government.

H1155-0117

H1155-0118

TC 73, No.49

EXTRACT FROM MINUTE OF M.BECK'S CONVERSATION WITH M. VON RIBBENTROP

M.Beck asked M. von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today for the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement.

In answer M. von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up of friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and interests of the two parties concerned.

(1946)

H1155-0119

SPEECH BY RIBBENTROP IN WARSAW, 25 January, 1939.

PS 2530

".....In accordance with the resolute will of the German National Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing Agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German foreign policy. The political foresight, and the principles worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations....."

H1155-0120

TC 73 No. 57

Extract from Chancellor Hitler's Reichstag Speech
January 30, 1939.

"We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any difference of opinion to-day among the true friends of peace as to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which brought such relief, had not been entered into five years ago. In signing it, the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his people just as great a service as the leaders of the National-Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe."

H1155-0121

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Geheime Reichssache)

TOP SECRET
To be transmitted by officer only

Minutes
of a Conference on 23 May 39

Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder

Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Admi. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmidt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Comdr. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

(Page 2)

The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

1) Analysis of the situation.
2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from that situation.
3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematized form below.

Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:

1) The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;
2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany has dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as "Encroachments". The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force. (p 3)

H1155-0122

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissable. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years, the situation is today as follows: (p. 4)

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no "supplementary enemy". Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of the treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space on the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be able to rely upon record harvests, even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour. (p. 5)

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with

H1155-0123

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France, (p 6).

Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it.
If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.

Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.

If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. (p 7) The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.

What will this struggle be like?

England cannot deal with Germary and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resistance.

The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications, in order finally to force them into cooperation.

Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure. (p 8)

Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.

The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.

H1155-0124

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-79
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Question: Short or long war?

Every country's armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years' duration.

History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power. (p 9)

England is the driving force against Germany.
(Literally: England is the motor driving against Germany). Her strength lies in the following.

1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organizers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.

2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies. This power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.

England's weakness:

If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war. (p 10). It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet, landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.

The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on the fleet's protection.

If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.

Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:-

1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles concerned;
2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise;
3. Human failings;
4. Weather conditions.

The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. (p 11) It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.

H1155-0125

1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter.
This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.

2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.

The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.

England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.

(page 12)

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent;
Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
Time will not be on England's side;
Germany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:-

1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.

2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an Air Force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

4. Once the army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army's battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy. (p 13)

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

H1155-0126

This is the plan of attack.

The plan demands:- (page 14)

1. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness:-
   e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more effective? individually or considered as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.

   (b) Is air attack more important on a factory than on a battleship? Where are bottle-necks in production located?

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army.
   The Army must move straight from its peace stations to overrun neighboring states. (Literally: Neighboring states must be overrun direct from barracks).

3. A study of the enemy's weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

The Fuehrer has therefore decided to order the formation of a small planning staff at OKW. It will include representatives of the three services, and, as and when necessary will call upon the services of the three Commanders in Chief or Chiefs of Staff.

This Staff will keep the Fuehrer informed and report to him.

(page 15)

The planning staff is resp nsible for the planning of operations on the highest level, and of the technical preparations and organization necessarily required by the decisions taken.

The purpose of certain regulations concerns no one outside the staff.

However great are the increases in the armaments of our adversaries, they must, at some time, come to the end of their resources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting - 120,000 men in each age class!

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot Line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Fuehrer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entirety, is important.

The object:

1. Study of the problem in its entirety.
2. Study of the procedure.
3. Study of the necessary requirements.
4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and skeptical judgment.

Working principles:

1. No one must be admitted who is not concerned.
2. No one may know more than it is necessary for him to know.
3. When must the person concerned know, at latest? No one may know of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know of it.

At the request of Field Marshal Goering, the Fuehrer decrees that:

a) The various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.
b) There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding program.
c) The armaments programs are to be postponed to 1943 or 1944.

Certified correct record
(Sgd) Schmundt, Lt Col.

- - - - - - - - - -

18 November 1945

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L-79

I, Leo Davenport, S/Sgt, 32496587, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant in the English and German languages and this is a true translation of Document No. L-79.

Leo Davenport
S/Sgt, 32496587

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1014-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

SECOND SPEECH BY THE FUEHRER ON 22 AUG '39.

It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade-barrier, not on block and with severance of relations. Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers. Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisities were not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only through his mental power.

Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.

I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, - never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.

Have no pity, brutal attitude. 80 million people shall get what is their right. Their existence has to be secure . The strongest has the Right. Greatest severity.

Quick decision necessary. Unshakeable faith in the German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders give way.

First aim, advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war of atrition.

New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until complete elimination.

Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1014-PS.

12 Oct. 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf 0-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true translation of Document No. 1014-PS.

'Sgd' FRED NIEBERGALL

2nd Lt. Inf.
?-133 55 67.

H1155-0128

H1155-0129

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2987-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Extracts from the Diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano

Introduction (From Para. 5)

But the alliance /between Germany and Italy/ had one clause according to which, for a period of three to four years, neither Italy nor Germany would raise questions likely to disturb order in Europe. However in the summer of '39 Germany advanced her claims against Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any intention of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite these denials I remained unconvinced; I wanted to make sure for myself, and on August 11 I went to Salzburg. It was in his residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were waiting to go to eat, of the decision to start the fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. "Well, Ribbentrop," I asked him while we were walking in the garden, "What do you want? The Corridor or Danzig?" "Not any longer" -- and he fixed on me those cold Musee Grevin eyes of his -- "We want war."

* * *

January 20 and 21, 1941 (Mussolini and Ciano are visiting Hitler and Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg)

Mussolini says he brought him up to date on Italian affairs and talked to him about the unenthusiastic but not actively antagonistic attitude of the King, and finally told him of the Badoglio affair, which Hitler compared to the Frisch affair. The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am less pleased, particularly as Ribbentrop, who had always been so boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of it ending before 1942. And what will happen to us?

There were many other conversations, the most important of which took place Monday with the military leaders. Hitler spoke for some two hours about his forthcoming intervention in Greece; the entire question was presented from a technical point of view as part of the general political picture. I must say that he is a past master at this. Our military men were much impressed . . .

On the whole, results of the visit are good. There is complete solidarity between the two countries and we will act together in the Balkans . . .

* * *

August 11, 1939

I have collected in the conference records verbal transcripts of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. Here I shall only note some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop is evasive every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming German action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many times about German intentions towards Poland not to feel embarrassment now over what he must tell me and what he is preparing to do.

H1155-0130

The will to fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution which might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain that even if the Germans were given everything they demanded, they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by the demon of destruction.

Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this doesn't shake him in the least. I realize how little weight this view carries in German opinion.

The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear conscience. He has not.

August 12, 1939

Hitler is very cordial, but he, too, is adamant and relentless in his decision. He speaks standing in the large drawing room of his house, in front of a table on which some maps are spread. He displays a thorough knowledge of military affairs. He speaks with great calm and becomes excited only when he advises us to deliver the coup de grace to Yugoslavia as soon as possible.

I soon realize that there is nothing more to be done. Our arguments cannot serve to check him in the slightest. He keeps repeating that he will localize the conflict with Poland, but his affirmation that the great war must be fought while he and the Duce are still young leads me to believe that he is once again speaking in bad faith.

He has words of high praise for the Duce but listens in a disinterested and impersonal manner when I tell him of the trouble which a war will bring upon the Italian people. Fundamentally I feel that the alliance with us is useful to the Germans only for the number of forces we can divert from their fronts; nothing more. Our fate doesn't interest them. They know that the war will be decided by them, not by us. And at the end, they promise us a gift of charity.

August 13, 1939

The second talk with Hitler is shorter, and I would say more concise. Even in his manner the man reveals more than he did yesterday his desire for immediate action. The parting is cordial, but reserved on both sides.

At the Palazzo Venezia I report to the Duce . . .

The Duce's reactions are mixed. At first he agrees with me. Then he says that honor forces him to march with Germany. Finally, he admits that he wants his share of the booty in Croatia and Dalmatia.

* * *

December 3, 1941
Wednesday

Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and proposes the signature of an agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the

H1155-0131

communication and said: "We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as September 1939." What does this new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy - much too easy - to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive.

December 4, 1941
Thursday

Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of provoking America's intervention pleases the Germans less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it . . .

* * * * *

December 5, 1941
Friday

A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness. After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter was very glad I hadn't . . .

* * * * *

December 8, 1941
Monday

A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain: that America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be so long that she will be able to realize all her potential force. This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting that in the "long run" I may be right. Mussolini was happy too. For a long time he has favored a definite clarification of relations between America and the Axis . . .

* * * * *

H1155-0132

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2987-PS

20 November 1945

I, KENNETH R. BOYLE, Captain, Infantry, 0447520, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and Italian languages, and that the above is a correct and true partial translation of Document No. 2987-PS.

KENNETH R. BOYLE
Captain, Infantry
0447520

H1155-0133

Extract from Count Ciano's Diary.

2987 (1)-PS

Introduction.

"However in the summer of '39 Germany advanced her claims against Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any intention of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite these denials I remained unconvinced; I wanted to make sure for myself, and on August 11 I went to Salzburg. It was in his residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were waiting to go to eat, of the decision to start the fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. "Well, Ribbentrop", I asked him while we were walking in the garden. "What do you want? The Corridor or Danzig?" "Not any longer" -- and he fixed on me those cold Musee Grevin eyes of his -- "We want war".

(2)

January 20 and 21, 1941.

Mussolini says he brought him up to date on Italian affiars and talked to him about the unenthusiastic but not actively antagonistic attitude of the King, and finally told him of the Badoglio affair, which Hitler compared to the Frisch affair. The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am less pleased, particularly as Ribbentrop, who had always been so boastful in the past told me, when I asked him outright how long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of it ending before 1942. And what will happen to us?

H1155-0134

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/A

DIRECTIVES FROM HITLER AND KEITEL PREPARING FOR WAR AND THE INVASION OF POLAND.

(Extracts from a file containing Directives with detailed Annexes. The Directives are mostly translated in full. The Annexes, owing to their length, are given mostly in the form of precis. The extracts are supplemented by C-(26).

1. Translation of document signed by KEITEL.

Top Secret
Officer Only

The High Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 3rd April 1939
WFA Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only L Ia

SUBJECT : Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40 5 copies
2nd copy

The Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being re-issued.

Part I ("Frontier Defence") and Part III ("Danzig") will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

(Marginal note in ink "Attached")

Part II "Fall Weiss" is attached herewith. The signature of the Führer will be appended later.

The Fuhrer has added the following Directives to "Fall Weiss":

1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from 1.9.39 onwards

2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for "Fall Weiss" and to arrange by conferences the synchronised timings between the 3 branches of the Armed Forces

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/A

3) The plans of the branches of the Armed forces and the details for the time-table must be submitted to the OKW by 1.5.39.

= used as an operational codeword for Defence of the Reich Frontier. See Annex I.

+ Translator's note: "Fall Weiss" (literally "Case White") is the cover name for the intended invasion of Poland.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.

(signed) KEITEL.

H1155-0135

Distribution:-

OKH	=	1 (Copy No. 1.)
OKM	=	1 (" " 2.)
++ RdL u Ob.d L	=	1 (" " 3.)
OKW(L)	=	2 (" " 4 u. 5)
Total		5

++ (Translator's Note : Reichsmarschall der Luftwaffe und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, i.e. Goering.)

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/B

2. Translation of document signed by HITLER.

Top Secret.
Officer Only

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Berlin, 11th April, 1939
OKW Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only. WFA/LI

5 copies
2nd Copy.

Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40.

I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of the war.

Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities :

I) Safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks. (see Annexe I)

II) "Fall Weiss" (see Annexe II)

III) The Annexation of Danzig (see Annexe III)

Annexe IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development.

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Distribution :

OKH	=	1 (Copy No. 1)
OKM	=	1 (" " 2)
RdL u. Ob.d.L	=	1 (" " 3)
OKW (WFA/L)	=	2 (" " 4 u. 5)

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/C

3. Precis of Annexes to 2. (Portions in quotes are translations of the text)

(The Annexes are unsigned)

H1155-0136

Annexe I.

Directives of a general nature to the 3 branches of the Armed Forces for the defence of the Reich frontiers and air and sea defence. Preparations for this must be made in such a way that an effective defence is possible at any time without a general or partial mobilisation. The code word is "Frontier Defence" ("Grenzsicherung")

The Directives are supplemented by

"Special Orders".

Setting out the organisation of defence powers in more detail. Of particular interest is para 2) of these Directives translated below showing the intention of concealing mobilisation.

"2) Legal Basis.

It should be anticipated that a state of Defence or State of War as defined in the R.V. Law① of 4.9.38 will not be declared. All measures and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilisation are to be based on the laws valid in peace-time".

① Translator's Note: R.V. "Reichsverteidigung" = Reich Defence.

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/D

4. Annexe II contains the directives for "Fall Weiss"

In para 1) headed "Political Hypotheses and Aims" it is stated that quarrels with Poland should be avoided. Should Poland, however, change her present policy which is based on the same principle and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a "final settlement" will be necessary notwithstanding the pact with Poland. ② The Free State of Danzig will be incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. "Policy aims at limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France and British restraint as a result of this. Should Russia intervene, this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism. German military exigencies will determine the attitude of the Baltic States. Hungary is not a certain ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis".

② "The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength and to create, in the East, a situation which satisfies the requirements of defence"

In para 2) - Military conclusions are drawn from the above political promises.

The remaining paras set out the tasks and operational objectives of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces. "A camouflaged or open ('general' added in ink) mobilisation will not be ordered before D-day - 1 at the last possible moment".

The Army may, on its Southern flank, enter Slovak territory. In the North, a junction between Pomerania and East Prussia must be quickly established. "The preparations for the opening of operations are to be made in such a way that without waiting for the planned assembly of mobilised units - positions can be taken up immediately by the first available troops."

H1155-0137

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/E

5. Translation of a document signed by Keitel.

Typed by Officer

Top Secret. Officer Only

High Command of the Armed Forces.
WFA. Nr 67/39 Top Secret Officer Only. L(I)

Berlin, 24th June 1939

5 Copies
2nd Copy

Subject :- "Fall Weiss"

Marginal Stamp: Ob.d.M. A I Op 76/39, received: 26.6.39. Enclosures: Several initials, one presumably is Fricke's initial.)

The Army High Command is herewith directed to prepare all measures necessary for the capture, in undamaged condition, of the bridges over the lower Vistula. On the completion of preparations, the Army High Command will briefly report to the Armed Forces High Command.

Besides, the Army and Navy High Commands will again examine whether the element of surprise in sudden attacks against the bridge at Dirschau will be impaired by preceding actions of the Navy in the Danzig Bay. In view of the importance of the bridge, it should be stated if the consent of the Army High Command to the intended measures of the Navy (mining before D-day) is upheld.

Marginal note in blue pencil: Accordingly an announcement, with its alarming effect, must not be made before D-day. Even the measures in front of Gd.+ etc. may cause alarm. Therefore, the consent of the OKW is required".) Note in red pencil, initialled by S = Translator's Note: CINCNEWMD.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces.

(signed) KEITEL. 24.6.

Distribution:-

OKH	1st Copy
OKM	2nd Copy
R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L.	3rd Copy
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WFA/L	5th Copy.

Yes. But this must first be settled with the Army High Command General Staff)')

+ Translator's Note: Probably Gdynia

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/F

6. Annex II is supplemented by further "Special Orders for "Fall Weiss"

Here again it is stated, as in the Special Orders attached to Annexe I, that a State of Defence or War will not be declared.

H1155-0138

The directives refer to mobilisation (a clandestine mobilisation will not include the civil sphere and the armaments industry, a public one will) the area of operations and exective power, the organisation of frontier guards, Goering's powers, clearing the frontier areas, receiving refugees, evacuation measures, division of responsibilities, communications, etc. As regards feeding the troops, the directives say that they can take food from the occupied area, on orders of the Army High Command, but the German minority should be spared because of its distressed condition. Requisitioning may be carried out "in accordance with the Hague Land War Convention". Supplies by people of German race must however be paid for in German currency.

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/G

7. Annexe III deals with the Annexation of Danzig

"A lightning annexation of the Free State of Danzig may be carried out, independently of "Fall Weiss", to exploit a favourable political situation".

The rest of the directive deals with the tasks of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces in preparing and carrying out this operation.

Annexe III is supplemented by "Special Orders for the Annexation of Danzig".

The annexation should be considered as an act of restoring a purely German area to German sovereignity after a long separation. In this case, too, a State of Defence or War will not be declared. Mobilisation is not intended "as the coup will be carried out by only a part of the Peacetime Army". A number of other administrative and organisational measures in carrying out this operation are laid down.

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/H

8. In Annexe IV (unsigned) the organisation and exercise of the powers of Command in East Prussia in case of a warlike conflict are laid down in detail.

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/I

9. In Annexe V dated 12.5.39., signed by Hitler, the operational areas for the Army are defined under reference to a map which is included in the file.

With regard to these operational areas, the following directive is given in the last para of the Annexe.

"If our troops advance beyond the Reich frontier or the further frontier of the Slovak protected zone, the operational area will be extended accordingly in the direction of the advance".

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/J

10. Precis of Directives dated 10 May 1939, signed by KEITEL.

Subject : Exercise of military powers in the operational areas of the Army.

These directives, outlining at first the principal tasks of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces, deal with the division of

H1155-0139

military authority and duties between the 3 branches and their various commands in the operational area of the Army in general.

(SLC-24.6/C-120)/K

11. Translation of a document signed by HITLER.

Top Secret
Officer Only

The Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 10th May 1939

7 Copies
2nd Copy

Nr. 48/39 Top Secret WFA/L(I)

Subject : Directive for the uniform preparation of War, by the Armed Forces, 1939/40 (OKW. Nr. 37/39 g.K.Chefs. WFA/L(1) of 11.4.39.)

amp:
d.M. AI
50/39
eived:
5.39
losures: 1
ached in note
report)

Herewith, as Part VI of the "Directive", instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy.

The Commanders-in-Chief of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces will report to the Armed Forces High Command on the measures taken in consequence of these instructions by 1st August 1939

ginal note in
ying pencil
ne 31.7.
e in green
cil:
rbal report in time".
e in copying pencil:
ore leave: from 1.7. onwards)
rbal report has been
de on 30.6. Ia(Initial) 29."

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Note in red pencil:
"Submit report about 20/25. VI
Translator's Note:
S. (SCHNIEWIND) 16.5.)

Distribution:-

O.K.H.	=	1	(Pruef Nr. 1)
O.K.M.	=	1	" " 2
R.d.L.u.Ob.d.L.	=	1	" " 3
O.K.W. (W Stb)	=	1	" " 4
O.K.W. (Ausl/Abr)	=	1	" " 5
O.K.W. (L)	=	2	" " 6 u. 7)

H1155-0140

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/L

12. Precis of Annexe VI referred to in 10

"Directives for the war against the enemy economy (economic warfare) and measures of protection for our economy".

Navy and Air Force in particular are directed to make preparations for the immediate opening of economic warfare, principally against Britain, and, as second priority, against France, in the event of "Grenzsicherung" (Translator's Note: see Annexe I) being ordered. The measures to be taken by Army, Navy and Air Force are described in detail and based on the assumption that the operations will be offensive in character.

A Directive for "Fall Weiss" (see Annexe II) sets out as the main objective the capture, in undamaged condition, of Polish economic installations. A speedy occupation of the industrial areas of Polish Upper-Silesia and Teschen is considered important. Poland must be cut off from imports by sea, and this must be borne in mind when dealing with ships sailing under neutral flags and perhaps carrying goods for Poland to neutral ports.

H1155-0141

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

concerning

POLISH - GERMAN and POLISH - SOVIET RELATIONS

1933 - 1939.

- - - - - -

The Polish White Book.

No.61.

M. Lipski, to M. Beck

Berlin, March 21. 1939.

I saw M. von Ribbentrop to-day. He began by saying he had asked me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their entirety.

He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw students' demonstrations during Count Ciano's visit. He said the Chancellor was convinced that the poster in Danzig had been the work of Polish students themselves.[1] I reacted vigorously, asserting that this was a clear attempt to influence the Chancellor unfavourably to Poland.

He mentioned the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, which had particularly troubled Polish opinion, and stated that this question had been settled in conformity with Poland's wishes. This was to be communicated to you by Ambassador von Moltke. He spoke of the experts' negotiations on the Minority questions, and dwelt on the fact of the failure to reach agreement as to a joint communique.

At this point I interrupted him to correct his inaccurate statement.

Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which M. Hitler put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland's frontiers in exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an unfavourable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. M. von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the Chancellor only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favour of good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression that difficulties arising between us were also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich's real aims. The problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion our two States were dependent on each other.

[1] Some days prior to the date of this conversation a poster had been put up in a cafe at Danzig, bearing the inscription: "Entry forbidden to Poles and dogs." This had caused protest demonstrations by Polish students.

H1155-0142

It must not be forgotten that, by defeating Russia in the World War, Germany had been a contributory factor in the emergence of the Polish State. Obviously they could not forget the shedding of Polish blood, which they held in high honour. Subsequently, thanks to Chancellor Hitler's policy, General Schleicher's plan of German-Soviet collaboration had been smashed. That plan, which would have led to the annihilation of the Polish State, was defeated. It must also be remembered that Danzig and Pomorze had belonged to the Second Reich, and that only through Germany's breakdown had Poland obtained these territories.

At this point I remarked that it was not to be forgotten that before the Partitions these territories had belonged to Poland.

M. von Ribbentrop replied that it was difficult to appeal to purely historical conceptions, and he stressed that the ethnic factor was to-day of prime importance.

I remarked that Pomorze certainly was Polish, and alluded to the fact that in regard to the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia the Germans had used historical arguments.

M. von Ribbentrop recalled that after all Danzig was a German city, but he realized that in regard to the Danzig question Poland also was actuated by sentiment.

I corrected him by pointing out that in addition it was a vital necessity to Poland, to which M. von Ribbentrop remarked that that could be settled by way of a guarantee.

Discussing the guarantee which the Chancellor was prepared to give with respect to Poland's frontiers and Pomorze in particular, M. von Ribbentrop stressed the point that no previous German Government had been able to give such a guarantee.

In connection with Danzig, the motor road and the guarantee, M. von Ribbentrop also mentioned the question of Slovakia, indicating that conversations would be possible on this subject. He emphasized that obviously an understanding between us would have to include explicit anti-Soviet tendencies. He affirmed that Germany could never collaborate with the Soviets, and that a Polish-Soviet Understanding would inevitably lead to Bolshevism in Poland.

I stated that no Polish patriot would allow himself to be drawn towards Bolshevism. He said he realized that, but in this respect the Jewish element in Poland was a danger.

- - - - - - - -

Replying generally to M. von Ribbentrop's arguments, I pointed out that so far as our Press was concerned its tone was now quieter than that of any other country. M. von Ribbentrop retorted that he took no notice of the uproar in the British Press. That agitation was entirely without importance. He believed that the Fuehrer always followed the right policy.

Subsequently, I stressed the fact that since 1934 our public opinion had been put to considerable trials. Nevertheless it remained quiet. I recalled that we had adopted a completly understanding attitude on the question of realization of Germany's equality of rights. We had maintained the same attitude in regard to the Austrian problem. After the settlement of the Sudeten problem, the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia had come up, and had clouded the atmosphere between our two countries.

H1155-0143

I stated that now, during the settlement of the Czecho-Slovakian question, there was no understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was already hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphasized our community of race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we had given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious blow to our relations.

M. von Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that this could be discussed.

I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation between you and the Chancellor. M. von Ribbentrop remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk over this matter. He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his offers.

Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania.

M. von Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen M. Urbszys on the latter's return from Rome, and they had discussed the Memel question, which called for a solution.

- - - - - - - - -

In view of the importance of this conversation I am sending this report through Prince Lubomirski.

Arising out of the conversation, I am prompted to make the following remarks:

The fact that M. von Ribbentrop said nothing on his own initiative about Memel suggests that his conversation with me to-day, proposing a fundamental exchange of views between you and the Chancellor, is perhaps aimed at securing our neutrality during the Memel crisis.

M. von Ribbentrop's suggestion of a conversation and his emphasis on its urgency are a proof that Germany has resolved to carry out her Eastern programme quickly, and so desires to have Poland's attitude clearly defined.

In these circumstances the conversation acquires very real importance, and must be carefully considered in all its aspects.

I assume that you will be desiring to summon me to Warsaw in a day or two in regard to this matter.

H1155-0144

Exhibit USA 138 Filed Jan. 8, 1946

D. 490.

Extract from
Testimony of JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, on 20 September 1945, 1430-1615, by Col. Howard A. Brundage, JAGD, OUSCC, and Mr. D.C. Pool, Special Representative of the Secretary of State. Also present : Siegfried Ramler, Interpreter, and Pvt Clair Van Vleck, Court Reporter.

- -

Q Put your mind, please, on August '39, as the crisis approached. Do you recall when Durksen came back from London to Berlin?

A. No, I don't remember, but I suppose I was probably at the front at the moment with the Fuehrer, I su pose. I don't know whether he came back from Switzerland or what. I don't remember now.

Q You don't know?

A No; I don't recall it, no.

Q He came back, I believe, the 18th of August, directly to Berlin.

A The 18th of August?

Q Yes, or approximately. I may be a day or two off. He was not in London?

A Oh, he was not in London.

Q He was not in London when war was declared?

A Let me see. That is quite possible.

Q He returned to Berlin?

A It may be also that I don't recall his reports, that this is the reason I don't recall his reports at that time, you see.

Q I am speaking of his reports over a period of sixteen months.

A Oh, yes.

Q He was in England for sixteen months altogether?

A Yes, but I mean probably that explains why I don't recall his reports in this important period, you see.

Q What explains it?

A This important period in August.

Q No; I am asking about his reports over a period of sixteen months, during his own embassy in London. He came back to Berlin on the 18th of August, or about that time, and he asked for an interview with Hitler and, naturally, for an interview with you, since you were the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

A Yes.

Q According to my information, you did not receive him?

A I don't remember now.

H1155-0145

Q What situation could be more dramatic? Here is a Foreign Minister, who has chosen a particular ma to be Ambassador in a country with which war threatens, and war actually broke out very soon. He returns from his post approximately two weeks before the outbreak of war, asks to see the Foreign Minister, and the Foreign Minister is too busy to see him.

A I don't remember that.

Q You don't remember that?

A No. I did'nt see him.

Q Yes

A I don't remember, no. Wasn't he ill?

Q No; he was in perfectly good health.

A I don't remember that exactly.

Q Surely, you recognise that to be a very extraordinary situation. You appreciate the drama of it?

A I assure you -- this was the situation you are talking about, was it?

Q Yes. I will put it to you another way, Herr von Ribbentrop. If you had received him, surely you could not have forgotten and interview under those circumstances?

A Well, I wonder -- let me see, on the 18th -- it is very difficult now to recollect the exact dates. He came back on the 18th, you say, of August?

Q Yes. I may be one or two days off, but war broke out on the 1st of September, as I recall, so let us say a fortnight before that, a little less than a fortnight. Surely you must remember those days with great clarity?

A If I hadn't seen him, I don't remember why. You are quite sure that I didn't see him? I don't know.

Q Your question is in turn astounding. How could a Foreign Minister fail to remember whether he had seen an Ambassador under those circumstances; his own Ambassador returning from the capitol?

A What was the circumstances on the 18th?

Q Surely, you remember them, Herr von Ribbentrop. This was within two weeks of the outbreak of war.

A Yes, but there was no tense situation. There was, of course, with Poland. The situstion had been tense and perhaps was still, but there was no such tense situation with England.

Q It was not tense within two weeks of the outbreak of war?

A I don't remember whether I saw him. I must think about that. I don't know. The 18th of August, you say that was? That surprises me.

Q If the 18th of August troubles you, say the last two weeks of August. It is all the same whether it was one day or the other.

H1155-0146

A I wonder whether these circumstances weren't different. Wasn't he there on an illness or something? Hadn't he been away from London for quite a time already?

Q He came to Berlin and asked to see the Fuehrer and he asked to see you. He was not received even by you, although he repeatedly sent word to your secretaries, that he sat in Berlin, in perfectly good health, in the hope of seeing you and finding it utterly incredible that you should not receive him.

A He surely saw the Secretary of State, didn't he?

Q That is not the question. I want to know whether he saw you. My information is that he did not and you cannot remember. The mere fact that you cannot remember must be very striking to you, isn't it?

A I don't remember that, no. I must think about it. I must think about it. The Fuehrer didn't think much of Durksen, so far as I remember.

Q He didn't think much of him?

A Not very much, no, but I say I don't remember now. I can't tell you at the moment.

Q You recognise how strange it is that you can't tell me?

A I am certain if he had been there, and I couldn't have seen him, if the situation was that way, he had just come over from London, wanting to see me, I mean if I couldn't see him, perhaps I wasn't in Berlin. I don't remember now.

Q That would interpose no barrier. Germany is not a large country.

A It is sometimes difficult, you see. I don't know where I was. Possibly I told him to see the Secretary of State and make a report about that. That is possible, but I don't remember at the moment.

Q The matter interests me very much because of your insistence in other interrogations that you and The Fuehrer endeavoured until the very last moment to come to some understanding with England.

A We certainly did.

Q Then I speak to you quite frankly, because this is an important matter. I just cannot believe that when you did not take the opportunity to talk with your own ambassador, whom you had selected, when he returned from the capitol, again, Herr von Ribbentrop, I come to the unpleasant and inescapable conclusion that you are not being frank with me.

A Oh, yes, absolutely frank. No, that is not right, but you can only understand it by this way: that I can assure you that in the whole discussion with England, in all those events, the name Durksen, and the attitude of Durksen, never has played any role. This again comes very much out of the attitude of the Fuehrer towards diplomats, old diplomats, and embassies and so on. The Fuehrer was so much against most of these ambassadors, ans so on, that he hardly ever saw them at all. I couldn't even induce him to see any of them. So it is perhaps understandable in that way. I don't remember at the moment one instance where the reports of Durksen in the sixteen months, where the name of Durksen or his opinions or his views played a role, I must say, in all the Führer's decisions which he made during all that time.

H1155-0147

Q I am not interested in the Fuehrer at this moment.

A Also myself.

Q I am interested in your views.

A Also of myself.

Q You were the man who selected him to go to London and had kept him there. At a moment when you were endeavouring, according to your statement, in every way to avoid war, you failed to talk to the man who was presumably best informed?

A I must say quite frankly, in my perception, so far as I remember, we never considered Durksen as a man who had, let us say, my particular confidence or the Fuehrer's particular confidence, never as such. Everybody can tell you that he was a quiet, routine diplomat we had sent there, but he was not a man, I don't think, during the sixteen months, who was ever called to give his views on anything of that sort. These things were generally done.

Q As a matter of fact, he was recalled during that time on two or three occasions, but in any case, if you send such a man to London at that time, it does not support your contention that you were seriously interested in working out an arrangement with Great Britain.

A We certainly did.

Q Again, either way you put it, it destroys your contention that you wished, at almost any cost, to make an adjustment with England.

A During the last fortnight we still did, I mean during the last fortnight, up until the war broke out, we did in the last week very much. This was also done, not through Durksen, for instance, this was done then through Henderson. For instance, Henderson then went to London, but Durksen played no role in these questions.

Q You made a very poor choice of Ambassador in a critical situation. Either way you were guilty of dereliction.

A When we sent Durksen there, I remember we considered for a long time who to send. Then we came to Durksen as a quiet and routine ambassador, who would look after matters as well as he could. That was because we had nobody else. That was more or less the idea then.

No. 147.

FINAL Report from the former Polish Ambassador in Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, October 10, 1939.

In consequence of the German aggression against Poland, which was begun without declaration of war on September 1, 1939, at 4.45 a.m. (the hour at which the Germans started to bombard Westerplatte), I left Berlin with the personnel of the Embassy on September 2, and travelled to Poland through Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. Being obliged to leave Poland owing to the Soviet invasion, and now residing in France, I consider it my duty to present my final report on the termination of my mission in Berlin.

My mission to Germany began in September 1933. I fulfilled it first in the capacity of Minister Plenipotentiary and then, from October 1934, as Ambassador.

H1155-0148

\+ + + +

Polish-German relations were based upon the Declaration of January 26, 1934, in which the Governments of both States under-took for a period of at least ten years to refrain from resort to force to settle any differences which might arise between them.

In the course of the negotiations which I conducted with the German Government, and which ended in the Delcaration of January 26, 1934 it was expressly specified that existing international obligations of the two States would not be infringed by that Declaration, and this found expression in the text itself. This attitude of Poland's was fully accepted by authoritative German circles.

In the same way the priniciple of independence for Polish policy, which constituted the starting-point of the conversations with Chancellor Hitler, was fully confirmed in numerous conversations during the years 1934 to 1938 with the highest Reich officials, and was recognized as the basis of mutual relations.

As you are in possession of my previous reports on Polish-German relations during my mission in Berlin, in this report I shall confine myself to a chronological outline of the last phase of these relations, beginning with October 1938.

The German action in relation to Poland, initiated on October 24, 1938, in the form of suggestions which were withdrawn after a conversation on November 19, and put forward again in January 1939, in March 1939 assumed the form of pressure, supported by the entry of German troops into Slovakia and the naval demonstration at the occupation of Memel.

The question fo the return of the Free City of Danzig to the Reich, raised by M. von Ribbentrop on October 24, was quite unexpected. Danzig questions had been the subject of several exchanges of opinion between the two Governments in previous years. A basis for understanding was provided by the declaration of the Reich Government, explicitly confirmed in the Chancellor's statements of November 5, 1937, and January 14, 1938, that the Reich respected the legal status of the Free City together with Polish rights and interests, while Poland for her part did not intervene in the life of the German population of Danzig.

While the central Reich authorities handled the Danzig situation on the basis of the above prinicples, in the territory of Danzif itself the activities of Gauleiter Foerster, a Party extremist, was the cause of numerous complications and tense situations from the moment of his arrival in the Free City. It can be said confidently that M. Foerster was the individual who contributed most to the continual misunderstandings and tension that arose between the two States. Obviously, it is difficult for me to estimate how far M. Foerster acted on his own initiative, and to what degree on the orders of the highest authorities of the Reich.

If frequently happened that after assurances in regard to Danzig questions had been given to me by members of the German Government, during the very next few days M. Foerster's activities, particularly his speeches to the Danzig

H1155-0149

Party Convention, negated what had been said in Berlin, and thus revived the atmosphere of distrust, particularly as it was known that he had close contacts with the German Chancellor.

In reply to M. von Ribbentrop's suggestions of October 24, the Polish Government handed him counter-proposals on November 19, 1938.

Subsequently these matters were raised by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Beck, in conversations with Chancellor Hitler at Berchtesgaden on January 5, 1939, with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. von Ribbentrop, in Munich on Ja uary 6, and during the latter's visit to Warsaw on January 26, 1939, the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Polish-German Declaration.

In the course of a casual exchange of views with the Chancellor at the reception to the Diplomatic Corps on March 2, he once more assured me that so long as he stood at the head of the Government of the Reich there was no need to fear that relations between the two countries would be exposed to danger.

During the period from October 1938 to March 1939 the German attitude towards us acquired certain features which in Poland began to evoke an understandable mistrust and criticism.

In connection with the problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia terroristic Ukrainian elements, acting to the detriment of Polish interests and good Polish-Ukrainian relations, were supported by German propaganda dnd Party organs (S.S. and Gestapo). Vienna became the centre of these activities, and the wireless of that city incessantly disseminated Ukrainian broadcasts hostile to Poland. In Germany Ukrainian maps and pamphlets in the German language, directed against the integrity of the Polish Republic, were distributed.

Whenever Poland intervened on the matter the Germans always replied that their pro-Ukrainian activities were directed against the Soviets and not against Poland, and that if Ukrainian terroristic elements were supported by Germany, it was because they constituted the most active element among the Ukrainian emigres.

Similarly, on the territory of Slovakia Germany began to carry on activities hostile to Poland, and this activity grew stronger as the German plan for separating Slovakia from Bohemia was gradually realized.

Finally, during this period the attitude of Party elements in relation to Poland began to deteriorate - obviously as the result of instructions from above - and revisionist ideas concerning Polish territories were openly propagated.

In November 1938 direct Polish-German relations were exposed to serious difficulties as the result of the ruthless expulsion of 15,000 Jews of Polish citizenship from Germany.

Summing up, I wish to state that the above period brought with it a deterioration in Polish-German relations unprecedented since the conclusion of the Declaration of 1934, and great efforts had to be made by Poland in order to avoid still greater friction.

The crisis in Polish-German relations began in the first half of March 1939.

Acting by surprise, and without any contact with the Polish Government, the Germans created a new situation on the Polish frontier, annexing Bohemia and Moravia, extending a protectorate over Slovakia, building fortifications and establishing garrisons in Western Slovakia, and, finally, establishing a naval base at Memel.

H1155-0150

In the course of these German activities, which developed at lightning speed, I tried in vain from March 11 to 13 to obtain an interview with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State. On the evening of March 13 I chanced to meet General von Keitel, and informed him that - despite German activities so immediately affecting Poland -- fo r three days I had been unable to make contact with the German Government. General von Keitel promised to intervene with M. von Ribbentrop the next day on the matter, but this brought no result.

The German assumption of a protectorate over Slovakia was a step explicitly directed against the security of Poland, and the fact that it was carried out in conditions of complete secrecy from the Polish Government was in contradiction to the prinisples on which the execution of the 1934 Declaration was based. The military operations against Poland in the southern sector in September completely confirmed this.

It was in this atmosphere of tension between the two countries that I had a conversation on March 21 with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his invitation.

Without going into the details ofthat interview, I wish only to recall that the tone of M. von Ribbentrop's exposition departed considerably from that in which matters affecting the two Governments had been previously discussed, and was in the nature of definite pressure. He put forward the German claims, and urged that the Polish Government should take the swiftest possible decision. In this conversation M. von Ribbentrop made no reference whatever to the ultimatum in regard to Memel, which he had presented the previous day to the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I inquired about his meeting with M. Urbsys, he confined himself to a few explanatory remarks of a purely general character.

The news of the entry of German troops into Memel, and of the Chancellor's demonstrative voyage at the head of the German Gleet along our coast, was as great a surprise to Polish public opinion as the German entry into Slovakia had been.

Despite the prevailing atmosphere, which certainly was not conducive to negotiations, the Polish Government did not hold aloof from further discussions with the German Government. On March 26 I handed M. von Ribbentrop our counter proposals, in the form of a written note, in respect to Danzig and the motor road. Although M. von Ribbentrop's personal reaction to it was of a negative character, he stated that he would communicate a reply only after the matter had been referred to the Chancellor. The reply in question was not transmitted to me, and only on the occasion of his speech to the Reichstag on April 28 did Chancellor Hitler impart it publicly.

As is known, the Polish Government, not wishing to increase the tension, and desirous of leaving the way open for further conversations, maintained discretion as to the subject of the exchanges of opinion which had taken place in March. By his declaration to the Reichstag on April 28 and his unilateral denunciation of the Declaration of January 26, 1934, which forbade resort to force in mutual relations between the two States, Chancellor Hitler annulled the policy inaugurated between Poland and Germany in 1933.

In his conversation with me on March 26, M. von Ribbentrop spoke strongly against the military steps Poland had taken. Coming from the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs after the German Army's occupation of Prague, the entry into Slovakia, and the naval demonstration off the Polish coast, this objection sounded strange, to say the least.

H1155-0151

In the face of Germany's obvious steps, of a military character, towards encirclement of Poland to north and south, steps about which, moreover, Poland was left completely uninformed by Berlin, it is difficult ot imagine how the responsible Polish authorities could have been expected not to take certain precautionary measures. Germany's explanation that Poland, by forming an alliance with Great Britain, had joined the so-called 'encirclement front' against Germany, and so had violated the Declaration of January 26, 1934, is, in the light of the situation brought a out by German action, entirely groundless. This without reference to the legal aspect of the problem, which was thoroughly covered in the Polish Government's memorandum to the Reich Government on May 5.

The 1934 Declaration was concluded for a term of ten years. For this period both States renounced resort to force in their mutual relations. The application of force can be direct, that is to say, through a direct attack by the particular State. But it can equally well be applied by indirect methods, which sometimes are even more dangerous, because they are less apparent to the world. The tactics employed by Chancellor Hitler's Government usually relied on the second method.

At the time of the March incidents we had to deal with a definite instance of pressure brought to bear on Poland through her military encirclement.

I should remark that in another conversation which I had with M. von Ribbentrop on March 27, 1939, I made the suggestion that public opinion in both countries might be appeased by the publication of a few reassuring words from the two Governments. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs rejected this suggestion.

After Chancellor Hitler's speech on April 28 I left for Warsaw, and went back to Berlin in the second half of May.

On my return I took steps to ascertain whether there was any desire on The German side for conversations with us. I was given to understand that authoritative German circles did not consider the moment suitable for discussions and that a certain period of time must elapse to allow the atmosphere to clear.

The whole of German diplomacy was taking the line of opposition to Great Britain. The German Press was chiefly attacking Great Britain, endeavouring to represent the attitude Poland had taken towards the German demands as resulting from the Anglo-Polish Agreement.

Grave signs of Germany's aggressive intentions became more and more apparent. Rearmament proceeded at an unprecedented pace, and the General State administration was entirely subordinated to military requirements.

From April onward contraband in arms developed on a large scale in the territory of Danzig, being carried on by land, sea and air. Simultaneously it was observed that fortifications were being clandestinely built. It became apparent that, contrary to international agreements, the Free City, in understanding with the Reich, was heading for complete militarization.

In spite ofDanzig's continual violation of binding agreements, the Polish Government, anxious to avoid a conflict with the Reich, displayed until the end the utmost restraint.

From April onward a considerable aggravation of the situation occurred in the sphere of national minorities. The reason for this has to be sought in The German aim to exterminate the Polish element in the Reich, which was to be achieved through the totalitarian legislation and the Party machinery, and by placing the practical control of the entire life of the Polish minority in Germany in the hands of the Gestapo.

On the other hand, the German propaganda machine launched a violent campaign in defence of the allegedly oppressed German minority in Poland. In this connection I desire to recall that National-Socialism has created a special doctrine for Germans living abroad, subordinating them to the interests of Reich foreign policy. This became the subject of numerous conflicts with various countries, even in South Africa.

H1155-0152

This National-Socialist activity in Poland increased in strength from April onward, when the German Government decided - as was confirmed by the numerous cases reported during the first days of the war - to exploit the German minority for diversionist, political and even military aims.

During the period of my mission in Berlin I frequently drew the attention of authoritative German circles to the need for minorities, in the interests of good Polish-German relations, to confine their activities to the cultural and educational sphere. The subjugation of the German minority to Reich policy hostile to Poland was, of course, bound to provoke an understandable reaction on our part.

As in the case of the Sudetens, German propaganda exaggerated everylittle incident among the German minority in Poland, and in the final phase the Press was daily publishing completely fictitious stories.

Any measures against espionage, treason or sabotage were represented as persecution of the cultural life of the German minority. For lack of other material, the same incidents were written up in various ways, to be republished as new acts of terrorism.

I have many proofs that a large part of public opinion in Germany finally ceased to give credence to this exaggerated propaganda.

In spite of the prevailing tension between Poland and Germany, members of the Embassy maintained normal contact on current matters with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. During my frequent absences from Berlin the Charge d'Affaires, Prince Lubomirski, often saw the Under-Secretary of State, M. Woermann, and other high officials in order to discuss various matters, and he took every opportunity of indicating our desire for action to moderate the tone of the Press in both countries. This, however, produced no response from the head of the Press Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

By the end of July the clandestine mobilization in Danzig was proceeding at an extraordinarily intensive pace.

At the beginning of August occurred the well-known incidnet of the Free City's attempt to rid itself of the Polish Customs control.

On August 9 the State Secretary, M. von Weizsacker, asked the Polish Charge d'Affaires, Prince Lubomirski, to call on him, and made an oral statement on the Danzig Customs inspectors' incidnet. This step was tantamount to German Government interference in relations between Poland and the Free City. The State Secretary avoided giving any explanation of this action.

The Polish Government gave its reply, also in oral form, to the German Charge d'Affaires in Warsaw the next day.

From the beginning of August frontier incidents staged by the Germans increased in number, not only in the Danzig sector, but along the entire Polish-German frontier. The tone of the German Press became more and more aggressive. The entire propaganda machine was directed against Poland and her integrity.

On August 21 came the announcement of M. von Ribbentrop's imminent departure for Moscow to conclude a Soviet-German Pact of Non-Aggression. The Soviet-German negotiations had been shrouded in the deepest secrecy, and rumours of them were received only from certain indirect sources. Down to the last moment the Soviet Embassy in Berlin flatly denied the existence of any political negotiations, intimating that only economic matters were being discussed.

This step on the part of the German Government constituted a complete reversal of their international policy. Under the slogan "The fight against Bolshevism" Chancellor Hitler had engaged in the Spanish Civil War, and had created the so-called Anti-Comintern Bloc. During the whole of my six-year stay in Berlin the German Chancellor, as well as all his collaborators, continually declared that the foundation of Hitler-German policy was exclusion of Soviet Russia from Europe and the struggle against Communism.

H1155-0153

M. von Ribbentrop more than once told me of his view that Poland should join the Anti-Comintern Pact and that Russia must be pushed still farther east.

By signing the Pact with Moscow Chancellor Hitler threw over his own principles, thus demonstrating that behind his actions was only an opportunism of the moment.

On August 24 at five p.m. I was recieved by Field-Marshal Goering, with whom I talked for over an hour. The conversation was of a friendly character; it was more a personal than official exchange of opinion, and M. Goering laid particular emphasis on this circumstance, I recall the more important points of the conversation:

M. Goering expressed regret that the policy of Polish-German understanding lay in ruins and, seeking the causes, declared that but for the Anglo-Polish Alliance the crisis would not have developed on such a scale, in spite of the difficulties over Danzig.

He gave it unequivocally to be understood that he anticipated war with Poland.

He admitted that by concluding a pact with Russia the Reich had made a complete volte-face, and explained that in her international relations Germany must choose between England and Russia.

For my part, I pointed out that Poland followed a consistent policy in relation to both Germany and Russia.

I observed that Moscow desired to provoke war in Europe, which Goering did not deny.

I said I was at the Chancellor's disposition if that would assist in finding a way out of the situation. M. Goering assured me he would inform the Chancellor accordingly.

The British Government, and later the French Government, began their efforts at mediation with the Reich Government on August 22.

I shall not go into details of these negotiations here, as during that period there was a direct exchange of views between Warsaw, Paris and London. I desire only to point out that I was in continual touch with the French Ambassador, M. Coulondre, and the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson. Both these ambassadors spared no effort and did their utmost to save the peace and bring about direct negotiations between Poland and Germany to clear up the situation.

I cannot omit mention here of the moderating influence of the Italian Ambassador, M. Attolico, who during the years we spent together in Berlin worked unremittingly in the cause of peace.

On August 23 Sir Nevile Henderson presented M. Hitler with a letter in M. Chamberlain's own hand. He recieved a negative reply.

From August 25 onward, German action against Poland assumed a character verging on aggression. The troops concentrations on the Polish frontier, observed for several days past, steadily increased in dimensions. It was significant that on that daytelephonic communication between Germany and the West was cut off. Frontier provocations grew more and more frequent and grave. On that same day Prince Lubomirski handed a note pf protest to the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs in connection with these incidents. The Consulate at Marienwerder reported the severing of telephone lines. The Consul submitted a protest to the president of the region, and personally intervened with him in respect to the deportation from Marienwerder of the teaching staff of the Polish High School. On his return the Consul was confronted with the police, who had forced their way into the Consulate building and had taken possession of it.

H1155-0154

The Chancellor asked the British Ambassador to call on him, and put forward a proposal for an understanding with Great Britain. The next day the British Ambassador flew to London. The Chancellor also received the French Ambassador.

On August 26 I visited the Under Secretary of State, M. Woermann, and handed him a note protesting against the previous day's violation of the Polish frontier on the East Prussian sector by a patrol of ten German soldiers. During this incident a German corporal was shot dead on Polish territory, some 300 metres from the frontier. The Germans left a machine-gun behind.

Then I submitted a note protesting against incidents which had occurred on August 24 on the Silesian sector, during which Polish frontier patrols had been shot at by Germans.

On that same day news was received that M. Foerster had been appointed head of the Free City of Danzig.

And on the same day the French Ambassador handed M. Hitler a letter from M. Daladier.

On August 27 the issue of food-ration cards was announced in Germany and arrangements were made for controlling sales of ready-made clothing. Military and air attaches were informed that they must not leave the district of Berlin without special permission from the German War Office. There followed an extensive calling up of older categories of reservists.

M. Hitler handed the French Ambassador a letter for M. Daladier.

On August 28 the Germans published the notes exchanged between M. Daladier and M. Hitler, in which the latter for the first time officially demanded the union not only of Danzig but also of Pomorze with the Reich. Late in the evening the British Ambassador, who had returned from London, presented the British Government's reply.

On August 29 the German Chancellor informed Sir Nevile Henderson that he would expect a Polish representative with full powers on August 30, and that the German demands concerned the return of Danzig and Pomorze to Germany as well as protection of the German minority in Poland. The German Government made their participation in an international guarantee to Poland dependent on the Soviet Government's attitude.

On August 31, at 2 a.m. I saw Sir Nevile Henderson, when he informed me of his conversation with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. I learned that M. von Ribbentrop had prepared certain demands in the sphere of Polish-German relations. The Britsih Ambassador could not give me any details, as M. von Ribbentrop had read ou the German demands very rapidly and had refused to provide him with a copy of the text.

Sir Nevile Henderson pointed out how threatening was the situation, and advised the establishment of direct Polish-German contact. We discussed the most effectual means of achieving this. I told the British Ambassador that I would immediately report to my Government.

To this end, in addition to telegrams, early in the morning I sent Prince Lubomirski to Warsaw. As Germany had suspended all regular means of communication with Poland, Prince Lubomirski motored to Poznan and thence flew to Warsaw, arriving before noon.

H1155-0155

Soon after 12 o'clock I recieved telegraphic instructions from Warsaw to hand the Minister for Foreign Affairs a declaration of the Polish Government's favourable attitude to any proposal for direct negotiations.

At 1 p.m. I asked for an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of presenting my Government's communication.

At 3 p.m. the State Secretary, M. von Weizsacker, telephoned to inquire whether I sought an interview with the Foreign Minister in the capacity of a fully empowered delegate or in some other capacity. I replied that I was asking for an interview as Ambassador, to present a declaration from my Government.

At 6.15 p.m. I was requested to call on M. von Ribbentrop immediately. He received me in the presence of Minister Schmidt.

Having communicated my Government's declaration, I presented it in writing:

"Last night the Polish Government were informed by the British Government of an exchange of views with the Reich Government as to a possibility of direct negotiations between the Polish and the German Governments.

"The Polish Government are favourably considering the British Government's suggestion, and will make them a formal reply on the subject during the next few hours."

I added that I had been trying to present this declaration since 1 p.m.

M. von Ribbentrop asked me whether I had come in the capacity of delegate with full powers, to which I replied that for the time being I had only been instructed to submit the above declaration for the German Government's information.

M. von Ribbentrop asked whether I was acquainted with the latest Anglo-German conversations, to which I answered that I had received indirect information regarding them, since these matters had been handled directly between Warsaw and London.

At the end of our conversation M. von Ribbentrop stated that he had thought I would come as a fully empowered delegate, and that he would inform the Chancellor of the Polish Government's declaration.

On my return to the Embassy I found myself unable to communicate with Warsaw, as the Germans had cut the telephone lines. This prevented my getting in touch with my Government by the quickest means. On August 26 the German authorites had severed direct railway communication with Poland. Telephonic communications had similarly been rendered impossible or impeded since the same date.

I informed the French and British Ambassadors of the nature of my conversation with M. von Ribbentrop. I learned of the invitation extended by the State Secretary to both Ambassadors and the American Charge d'Affaires, to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs between 9 and 10 p.m. There they were informed that as a Polish plenipotentiary had not arrived, it was considered that the German proposals contained in sixteen points had been rejected by Poland. I desire to state emphatically that the German demands, contained in sixteen points, have never been handed or communicated to me by the German Government.

The German wireless had broadcast a similar communique at 9 o'clock, publishing the German proposals as comprised in the sixteen points, while the Press issued special editions. Not until the German proposals were published in the Press did I learn of their exact nature.

At about 11 p.m. Prince Lubomirski arrived by car from Warsaw. During the same night the German wireless stations broadcast false information of aggressive action taken by Polish military detachments on the German frontier. The same night I had yet another conversation with the French and the British Ambassadors.

H1155-0156

In the early hours of September 1 I learned from the wireless that German armed forces had invaded Poland, and that the German air force had bombed a number of Polish town.

In the morning I received a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that in the interests of my personal safety I was requested not to leave the Embassy building. At about 1 p.m. Prince Lubomirski called in my name on the Director of the Protocol, Baron Doernberg, and asked for my passports.

Arrangements for our departure were discussed. I suggested the route via Hungary, whereas the Ministry for Foreign Affairs considered that for technical reasons departure to Denmark would be more desirable. It was arranged with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the personnel of the Berlin Consulate would leave simultaneously with that of the Embassy, while the personnel of other Polish consulates would leave separately and by different routes.

I collected the Embassy personnel in the Embassy building.

In accordance with arrangements made between the Polish and Swedish Governments for the protection of the property and citizens of the State of Poland in Germany, in the event of war, I exchanged notes with the Swedish minister, M. Richert, handing over this charge to him. M. Richert and his staff accorded us every attention.

I handed the keys of the Embassy building and those of the Berlin Consulate General to the Councillor of the Swedish Legation, M. de Post, who was present at our departure.

In the evening of September 1 I received a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, requesting me to communicate to the Polish Government the German Government's declaration of its intention to refrain from bombarding open towns, provided a similar undertaking was given by the Polish Government. I replied immediately with an unofficial note to say that, owing to the absence of communications, I was not able to transmit the contents of the German note to my Government. Shortly afterwards the Ministry for Foreign Affairs telephoned to say that they were prepared to establish telephonic communication with Warsaw via Denamr, to which I expressed my assent. Thus the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw were informed of the German note.

On September 2, the sixth anniversary of my arrival in Berlin, with the members of the Embassy and the Consulate General in Berlin I left in a special train which departed from the Charlottenburg Station at 8.30 a.m. for Denmark. A representative of the Protocol accompanied us to the frontier.

Every courtesy was shown us during the journey.

The halt at the Danish frontier station of St. Peter lasted all the day of September 3, pending agreement as to the date when the members of the German Embassy in Warsaw were to cross the Lithuanian frontier. We crossed the Danish frontier during the night of September 4-5.

Immediately before my departure from Germany I was notified by the representative of the Protocol that, as two members of the German Embassy had been detained in Poland, he was obliged to hold the Assistant Military Attache, Captain Bialy, and Embassy Attache M. Szubert, in Germany. I commended them by telephone to the special care of the Swedish Minister in Berlin. On the following day the matter of the detention was settled, and MM. Bialy and Szubert duly arrived in Denmark.

In Denmark we were given a most hospitable and cordial reception.

H1155-0157

No. 4603 - TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN

THE GERMAN REICH AND THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK.

SIGNED AT BERLIN, MAY 31st 1939.

His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland and the Chancellor of the German Reich,

Being firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to confirm this resolve by means of a Treaty and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland:

M. Herluf Zahle, Chamberlain, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Berlin;

The Chancellor of the German Reich:

M. Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article 1.

The Kingdom of Denmark and the German Reich shall in no case resort to war or to any other use of force one against the other.

Should action of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 be taken by a third Power against one of the Contracting Parties, the other Contracting Party shall not support such action in any way.

Article 2.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged as soon as possible in Berlin.

The Treaty shall come into force on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a period of ten years from that date. Should the Treaty not be denounced by one of the Contracting Parties at least one year before the expiry of that period, its validity shall be extended for a fresh period of ten years. The same shall apply to subsequent periods.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of both Parties have signed the present Treaty.

Done in original duplicate, in Danish and German.

BERLIN, May 31st, 1939.

HERLUF ZAHLE.

JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP.

H1155-0158

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE.

On the signature, this day, of the Dano-German Treaty, the agreement existing between the two Parties on the following point has been put on record:

The Contracting Party which is not participating in the conflict shall not be deemed to be giving support, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Treaty, if the attitude of that Party is in harmony with the general rules of neutrality. Therefore the fact of a normal exchange of goods and transit of goods continuing between the Contracting Party not involved in the conflict and the third Power shall not be regarded as constituting illicit support.

BERLIN, May 31st, 1939.

HERLUF ZAHLE.

JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP.

H1155-0159

Exhibit GB 139
Filed Jan. 8, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 957-PS

COPY.

24. 2. 1940.

Reich-Minister von Ribbentrop,
Berlin.

Foreign Office.

Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrop,

Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed report to Privy Councillor von Gründherr who will address you on this subject. We agreed the other day that 2 - 300,000 RM would be made immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns out that Privy Councillor Gründherr states that the second instalment (Rate) can be made available only after 8 days. But as it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request you to make it possible that this second instalment is given to him at once. With a longer absence of Reichsamtsleiter P.M.Scheidt also the connection with your representatives would be broken up, which just now, under certain circumstances, could be very unfavourable.

Therefore I trust that it is in everybody's interest, if P.M.Scheidt goes back immediately.

Heil Hitler!

/s/ Rosenberg.

H1155-0160

Exhibit GB 140
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 004-PS

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

C O P Y

The Political Preparation of the Norway Action

(The enclosures mentioned in the report have been omitted from this paper since they are only relative to specifics matters. The complete report including appendices has been submitted to the Deputy of the Führer by Reichsleiter Rosenberg on 17 June 1940)

The Office of Foreign Relations (Aussenpolitisches Amt) of the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) has had contact with VIDKUN QUISLING, leader of the NASJONAL SAMLING in Norway, for years. The director of the "Office North" (Amt Norden) of the office of Foreign Relations - later victim of a fatal accident - paid him (Quisling) a personal visit on one of his trips to Scandinavia.

When in 1939 the general political situation was beginning to grow critical Quisling gave the Office of Foreign Relations an estimate of the situation and his opinion about the possible intentions of Great Britain with relation to Scandinavia in case of conflict (Great Britain's) with the German Reich. Prior to the convention of the NORDIC ASSOCIATION (Nordische Gesellschaft) in Luebeck, Quisling was received by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG in Berlin. He (Quisling) pointed out the decisive geopolitical importance of Norway in the Scandinavian region and the advantagesgained by the Power in control of the Norwegian coast in case of conflict between the German Reich and Great Britain. He further explained the extraordinarily clever, democratic and particularly anglo-saxon propaganda which had been accepted favourably by almost the entire nation, also because of Norway's economic dependence on the seas and therefore on England. Since he did not believe that the small nations would remain neutral in case of conflict - as had been the case in the World War of 1914 - but was convinced that they would become involved in one way or the other he requested support for his party and press in Norway, basing his request on the "pangermanic" ideology. REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG also requested Director (Amtsleiter) Scheidt to arrange a meeting between QUISLING and his Deputy HAGELIN with State Secretary (Staatssekretaer) KOERNER, bearing in mind that this matter might be of particular interest to GENERAL FIELD MARSHALL GOERING with regard to air strategy. This meeting with the State Secretary KOERNER did take place. At the same time Staff Director (Stabsleiter) SCHICKEDANZ, directed by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG, submitted the attached memorandum to Reich Minister and Chief of the Chancellery (Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei) LAMMERS for the information of the Führer by the end of June 1939 (Enclosure No 1).

After the Luebeck convention Director (Amtsleiter) SCHEIDT took a vocation trip to Norway to further pursue this matter. His observations are found in the attached report (Enclosure No. 2). Even during his presence in Germany Quisling had requested a short, pertinent training programme for reliable party functionaries especially selected by him. This request was granted by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG.

H1155-0161

In August 1939 a 14 day course was held at the School of the Office for Foreign Relations of the NSDAP (Aussenpolitisches Schulungshaus der NSDAP) in Berlin for 25 followers of the NASJONAL SAMLING who had been selected by QUISLING.

In September Burgermeister Dr. WINKLER revealed that he had been charged with the financial aspects of QUISLING'S request by GENERAL FIELD MARSHAL GOERING through State Secretary KOERNER. The outbreak of war and the beginning of the Polish campaign delayed the decisions (Enclosure No 3). A further reminder of REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG to GENERAL FIELD MARSHAL GOERING in the course of a talk about the importance of Norway in connection with the matters set forth originally by QUISLING had no practical results.

At the same time political tension increased in Norway as Russian activity made itself felt in the Baltic regions. Of this QUISLING kept the office (APA) informed through his deputies in Germany. The outbreak of the Russo-Finnish war at the end of November helped to further increase the anti-German currents in all Scandinavia and played into the hands of the anglo-saxon propaganda which was now building up to full strength. Greater Germany was represented as a secret ally of Soviet Russia and as the real culprit in Finland's misfortune. At the same time the Western Powers promised Finland military support which could only be supplied via Norway and Sweden. The possibility of a plan by Great Britain to occupy Norway and possibly Sweden to effectively close the blockade against Greater Germany and further to gain convenient air bases against Germany began to take shape under the pretence of altruistic help to Finland. Its aim was to involve also the Nordic Nations in a conflict against Greater Germany. QUISLING informed the office(APA) about these new possibilities shaping on the political scene, acting through his deputy in Germany.

As the activities of the Allies became more and more noticeable in Norway QUISLING again came to Germany to voice his fears. He was received by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG in the early part of December and he again presented his ideas. Firmly convinced that in the long run a genuinely neutral position in the great conflict would become impossible for the small nations and and in his firm faith in the victory of Greater Germany in this conflict which also an ideological one, QUISLING considered it his duty - supported as he was by a small but determined minority - to tie Norway's fate to that of Greater Germany as the new centre of strength of a nordic-germanic life community. We knew that his courageous group was the only pro-German Party. His deputy in Germany, HAGELIN, had also arranged for a talk between QUISLING and GRAND ADMIRAL RAEDER which took place about this time. During a report to the Führer REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG again mentioned Norway. He particularly pointed out her importance in the case of England deciding to occupy Norway with the tacit consent of the Norwegian Government, for the purpose of strengthening the blockade and under the pretence of help for Finland. GRAND ADMIRAL RAEDER, too, upon his request, was called to the Führer in connection with his talks with QUISLING. As a result of these steps QUISLING was received by the Führer for personal instructions on the 16th. of December and again on the 18th. of December. During this interview the Führer emphasised repeatedly that the most preferable attitude of Norway as well as all of Scandinavia would be one of complete neutrality. He had no intentions to enlarge the theatres of war to draw other nations into the conflict. If, however, the enemy were preparing an enlargement of the zones of war with the aim to further throttle and threaten the Greater German Reich then, of course, he would be obliged to arm against such steps. Then the Führer promised QUISLING financial support for his movement based on the pan-germanic ideology and for the prupose of combatting the increasing enemy propaganda. The military matters of the questions were now transferred to a special military staff which assigned special missions to QUISLING and heard his opinions (Encl. No 29).

H1155-0162

The political treatment was to be handled by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG, expenses were to be carried by the Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Amt) and Reichminister for Foreign Affairs (Reichsminister vom Aussen-politischen Amt) was to be kept informed at all times. Maintenace of liaison with QUISLING was assigned to Director (Amtsleiter) SCHEIDT who, as matters developed further, was attached to the Naval Attache in Oslo, Commander (Korvettenkapitaen) SCHREIBER. Strictest secrecy was ordered for the entire matter.

Then, in January, during a conference between REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG and Foreign Minister von RIBBENTROP it was decided to appropriate to QUISLING an initial sum of 200,000 Goldmark. This money was to be taken to Oslo, in two instalments, by the liaison agent SCHEIDT where it was to be handed to QUISLING. In the Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Amt) Privy Councillor (Geheimrat) VON GRUNDHERR was the only one to be told of this arrangement. (Encl. No 3).

As shown in the attached documentary memoranda QUISLING'S reports transmitted by his deputy in Germany HAGENLIN concerning the possibility of active intervention of the Western Powers in Norway with consent of the Norwegian Government became more and more alarming. These reports continuously supplemented with more and more accurate confirmations by Quisling's confidants were in certain contrast with the opinions of the German Legation in Oslo. The Legation believed in the neutral intentions of the Norwegian Government of that time, the NYGARDSVOLD . and was further convinced that the Government would take arms in defence of its neutrality policy. The Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Amt) held the same opinion as is shown in the attached documentary memorandum dated January 8 which is the result of a talk between Director (Amtsleiter) SCHEIDT and Privy Councillor (Geheimrat) VON GRUNDHERR (Encl. 8). It is of special interest that HAGELIN, Quisling's Deputy in Germany, whose intimate connection with QUISLING was not known in Norway succeeded in getting a foothold in the circles of the NYGARDSVOLD Government. Thus he heard the uncoloured opinions of the members of the Government who conducted themselves like a secret Norwegian-Anglophile society.

In the documentary memorandum of January 13 he relates the opinions expressed to him by two Norwegian Ministers. The gist of the opinions was that Germany had already lost the war and that Norway - if only because of its large Merchant Marine - could not do other than favour England in her politics, in war even more so than in peace. And further that the entire nations agreed with this policy (Encl. 9). During the night of February 16 to 17 the English raided the "Altmark" in the Joessingsfjord. The reaction of the Norwegian Government to the Altmark-affair seemed to indicate that certain secret arrangements had been made between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. This was further emphasised in Director SCHEIDT's consolidated report covering January 20th to February 20th (Encl No 11) after he had received HAGELIN's report. HAGELIN had overheard the conversation between two members of the Storting during which one member said to the other that the actions of the two commanders of the Norwegian torpedo boats had been a "prearranged affair". The same report also refers to the English demands for air bases in Norway and for freedom of trade in the Norwegian waters. It goes on to say that although the Norwegian Government refused those demands it was agreed that violations by the English would be answered with paper protests only. Such reports, and confirmations thereto were time and again supplied through QUISLING. In complete contrast to those opinions the German Legation, even after the Altmark Affair, relied fully upon the good will of the Norwegians. The Ambassador cited the signing of the Norwegian-German trade agreement as weighing heavily in favour of his point of view.

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He already considered the Norwegian Government NYGAARDSVOLD somewhat dependent on the Greater German Reich (Encl. Nos 11 and 12). All these reports were currently submitted to the Führer by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG. QUISLING always emphasised that more than 90% of the country was behind England and that he only represented a minority which, however, was chosen by virtue of its intuition to take charge later on as representatives of a NEW Norwegian nation.

Apart from financial support which was forthcoming from the Reich in currency, QUISLING had also been promised a shipment of material for immediate use in Norway such as coal and sugar. Additional help was promised. The shipments were to be conducted under cover of a new Trade Company to be established in Germany or through especially selected existing firms while HAGELIN was to act as consignee in Norway. HAGELIN had already conferred with the respective Ministers of the Nygardsvold Government as for instance the Minister of Supply and Commerce (Versorgungs-und Handelsminister) and had been assured permission for the import of coal. At the same time the coal transports were to serve possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch QUISLING's political action in Oslo with German help. It was QUISLING's plan to send a number of selected, particularly reliable men to Germany for a brief military training course in a completely isolated camp. They were then to be detailed as area and language specialists to German Special Troops who were to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accomplish a political action. Thus QUISLING planned to get hold of his leading opponents in Norway including the King, to prevent all military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately following this political action and upon an official request of QUISLING to the Government of the German Reich the military occupation of Norway was to take place. All military preparations were to be completed previously. Though this plan contained the great advantage of surprise it also contained a great number of dangers which could possibly cause its failure. For this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment while, at the same time, it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegian were concerned.

In February, after a conference with GENERAL FIELD MARSHAL GOERING, REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG informed the Secretary in the Office of the Four Year Plan (Ministerialdirektor im Vierjahresplan) WOHLTHAT only of the intention to prepare coal shipments to Norway to the named confidant HAGELIN. Further details were discussed in a conference between Secretary WOHLTHAT, Staff Director SCHICKEDANZ and HAGELIN. Since WOHLTHAT received no further instructions from the GENERAL FIELD MARSHAL, Foreign Minister von RIBBENTROP - after a consultation with REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG - consented to expedite these shipments through his office. Based on a report of REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG to the Führer it was also arranged to pay QUISLING ten thousand English pounds per month for three months commencing on the 15th of March, to support his work. This money was to be paid through the liaison agent SCHELDT.

Meanwhile HAGELIN, through his connection in Norway as trusted agent of the Norwegian Navy, had been commissioned with the purchase of German AA guns (Flaks) through the German Navy Ministry. Through this connection he gained more and more insight into the actual ideas and intentions of the Norwegian Nygardsvold Government and into the Allied preparations which had already started in Norway. While in Germany on the 20th. of March to attend conferences regarding the delivery of the German AA guns, he made a detailed report about the increasing activities of the Allies in Norway, tolerated by the Nygardsvold Government. According to this reports the Allies were already checking the Norwegian coastal towns for landing and transport possibilities. He also stated that the French Commandant MENNAIRE who was charged with this reconnaissance had a confidential talk with Colonel SUNLO, Commandant of Narvik, who is a follower of QUISLING; during the course of the talk he told him of the Allied intentions to land motorised troops in Stavanger, Drontheim and possibly also at Kirkenes and to occupy the airport at Sola (Encl. no 14.)

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At the same time HAGELIN increased his oral and written warnings regarding the confidential agreements between the Allied and the Norwegian Governments stipulating that in case of an Allied occupation of coastal towns the Norwegian Government would not go beyond paper protest, as was the case in the Altmark Affair. And again, in his report of March 26 (Encl. Nos. 15 and 16) he pointed out that the speech of the Norwegian Foreign Minister KOHT dealing with Norwegian neutrality and containing some protests was not being taken seriously either in London by the English nor in Norway by the Norwegians. It was well known that the Government had no intentions to take a stand against England. However, to keep up appearances towards Germany up to the last minute the Norwegian Government intended to issue an order to fire. This was to demonstrate that everything within their power had been done. There was a continuous series of conferences between the King, the Commanding Admiral, the Crown Prince and the newly appointed Minister of War LJUNDBERG who had been placed in office at the special request of England as early as January. A person close to the King as well as the commanding Admiral explained to HAGELIN that the above mentioned actions by England were quite unavoidable since she knew that she could only win the war if she were in control of the Norwegian ports. Furthermore England feared a German counterblow which was not to be allowed to materialize. The Norwegian Government was also notified by London that Germany intended to mine the waters between Jutland and the Norwegian coast. Based on a message from England this plan was revealed on or about March 15 during a secret session of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting by Foreign Minister KOHT. As a matter of fact, during the course of the military preparations for the occupation of Norway this plan had been adopted by the German military authorities and to this day it is a mystery how this plan got to London. In view of all this news QUISLING could no longer back his earlier advice to continue watching the development of the situation in Norway. He now had to point out that any further delay would mean a grave risk. The above was probably the most decisive report ever to be summitted here by HAGELIN. REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG immediately transmitted it to the Führer (Encl No 15).

While still in Berlin HAGELIN was requested by Colonel SCHMUNDT to make speedy arrangements for a conference between QUISLING and a Colonel of the General Staff, at some neutral location. This conference was held in Copenhagen in the beginning of April.

In confirmation of all this information coming from QUISLING and his confidants and in contrast to the opinion held up to the end by German Legation in Oslo and by the Foreign Office, the Allies, on April 8th. initiated their first major blow as an introduction to their intended occupation of Norway. During the night from the 7th to the 8th. of Aprilthey mined the Norwegian coast and made public announcement of this act. Norway's reaction, consistant with the reports always received by the Office of Foreign Relations (Aussenpolitisches Amt) of the NSDAP, was nothing more than protests on paper growing weaker by the hour. Then, after proper preparations and by command of the Führer Greater Germany undertook the counterblow in the morning of April 9th. and occupied the most important Norwegian airfields and seaports.

Reports about the further political developments in Norway proper are found in the appended documentary memorandum (Encl. Nos 18 to 30)

After the success of the occupational operations in Norway seemed assured the Führer called for REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG for a short talk before lunch, on April 25th. He oriented him (Rosenberg) about the developments of the military action in Norway where the English Auxiliary Corps had just suffered a decisive defeat combined with the capture of important documents and plans.

most daring decision which was now approaching successful completion on the continuous warnings of QUISLING as reported to him by REICHSLEITER ROSENBERG. And that it actually happened in the DRONTHEIM-FJORD that behind the stern of the last German Troop Transport there appeared the bow of the first English destroyer which convoyed the Allied Troop Transport Fleet. This destroyer was wiped out by the German Navy.

Berlin, June 15th. 1940

H1155-0165

H1155-0166

Exhibit GB 141
Filed Jan. 9, 1946 D 629

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

THE CHIEF

OF THE HIGHER COMMAND OF THE WEHRMACHT

WFA/Dept. I No. 22126 /40 g.k. (IV)

Berlin W 35,
Tirpitzufer 72-76,

3rd April, 1940

2 copies
2nd copy

To the
Reichs Minister for Foreign Affairs

Dear Herr von Ribbentrop,

The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht has therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at your disposal for the political preparation of this operation is on the contrary very much shorter. I believe myself therefore to be acting in accordance with your own ideas in transmitting to you herewith, not only those wishes of the Wehrmacht which would have to be fulfilled by the Governments in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm for purely military reasons, but also if I include a series of requests, which certainly concern the Wehrmacht only indirectly, but which are however of the greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task.

I would request, in order to bring about complete agreement of action, that personal contact between the German Plenipotentiaries and the military Commanders appointed for Oslo and Copenhagen should be established as soon as possible. The entire direction of the military operation is in the hands of Inf. General v. Falkenhorst, Commander of group XXI. Under him, the occupation of Denmark will be directed by the High Command for special operations XXXI, C. in C. Air Force Kaupisch.

In accordance with the Führer's specific instructions, may I furthermore request, that the number of persons participating in the preparations be restricted to the utmost. Apart from the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Wehrmacht, other higher Reich authorities and similar offices are not in principle participating. The necessary instructions to the Higher Reich Authorities will only be given on the day of occupation itself by the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

Heil Hitler,

Yours faithfully,

K. 3/4

H1155-0167

Exhibit GB 142
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1871-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Minutes of the conference between the Führer and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister at Obersalzberg on 12 August 1939.

At the beginning of the conference the Führer with the aid of maps explained to Count Ciano the present situation of Germany from the military standpoint. He emphasized particularly the strength of the German fortifications in the west. There are three break-through points in the west at which the French had in former times always attempted to break through for geographical and strategic reasons, which have now been protected with particular care, so that a break-through seems impossible here as well. Moreover, fortifications have also been built along the Luxemburg and Belgian borders up to the Dutch border, so that a violation of Belgian neutrality would no longer give France any military advantages, but would only involve the danger that Belgium would join the German side in order to defend her neutrality and under pressure from the Flemish part of the population. The only remaining possibility of attack is therefore theoretically through the Netherlands. But they too would, in the opinion of the Führer, defend their neutrality energetically because they would know that if they should participate in a general conflict they would lose their East Asiatic colonies, which are almost undefended, to Japan. Moreover, the Netherlands are completely unsuitable as an assembly area for a large army because of the numerous rivers and the possibility of flooding large parts of the land which lies below sea level. In case of a breach of Dutch neutrality Germany would of course move into the country immediately and would have the possibility of reaching the Meuse in a few hours because of its proximity to the German border. Besides, the Rhine which is 1 to 1½ km wide in Holland offers natural protection against attacks from this direction.

The third possibility of attacking Germany is a blockade by the British Navy. But it must be kept in mind that the ships used for the blockade would be attacked from the air from Germany, since all of England is within the radius of attack of the German air force, because of the long range of the latest German bombers. There are no further possibilities of attack on Germany. The Nordic countries would no doubt remain neutral and are safe from air attack from any side, since there is hardly any question of occupying such large areas as Norway and Sweden. In the same way Switzerland would certainly defend her neutrality to the last against any invader.

Germany has likewise built strong fortifications in the East. The Führer showed Count Ciano the various fortification systems of East Prussia (Königsberg, Heilsberg triangle, border fortifications). On the rest of the German frontier (Grenzmark, Silesia) strong fortifications are also being built, which have been developed, particularly on the Polish border opposite Berlin, into an impregnable system of lines lying one behind the other. Of course the captial is exposed to air attacks, since it lies only 150 km from the Polish border, particularly since because of its size (28 km north to south and 45 km east to west) the city could be bombed from a very great altitude (8 to 9,000 meters) without the possibility of attacking certain targets but with the certainty that the bombs would hit somewhere within the city.

Proceeding to the military situation of the western powers and Poland the Führer again pointed out England's vulnerability from the air. Although some progress has been made in aircraft production, the anti-aircraft defense is still quite backward. It is known that England decided on a certain type of anti-aircraft gun only last fall, and we have enough experience on the basis of our own 7 years of rearmament to know that mass production is possible only a long time after the choice of a prototype, so that effective anti-aircraft defense can be expected in England only after 1 to 2 years. Moreover, London and other great cities and industrial centers have the same disadvantage which characterizes Berlin's position in regard to Polish air attacks: from high altitude, out of range of the present English AA guns which are left from the war, bombing can be carried out in absolute safety, which would be successful in any case in the general target area.

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At the present time England has no increase in sea power to record. The first units of the ships under construction cannot be put in service for some time. As for the land army, 60,000 men have been called up since the introduction of compulsory military service. If England keeps the necessary troops at home, she will be in a position to put at the disposal of France only two infantry divisions and one armored division. Furthermore she can transfer a few groups of bombers to France but hardly any groups of fighters, since the German air fleet would attack England immediately upon the outbreak of war, and the English fighter planes would be urgently needed for the protection of their own country.

In regard to France's situation -- the Führer said that in a general conflict after the expected conquest, within a short time, of Poland, Germany would be in a position to assemble 100 divisions at the Westwall, which would force France to assemble all available forces from the colonies, from the Italian border, and elsewhere at the Maginot line for the life and death struggle which would then begin. Moreover, it is his opinion that the French cannot overrun the Italian fortifications any more than the Westwall.

At this point Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt.

The Polish Army varies greatly in its value. Besides several crack divisions there are a number of inferior units. Poland is very weak in AA and anti-tank defense. At present France and England cannot supply her. If, however, Poland is supported economically for a considerable period of time by the West, she could acquire these weapons, and Germany's superiority would be reduced. The fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow are opposed by the indifferent peasant population of other districts. Besides, the composition of the population of the Polish state must be considered: out of 34 million inhabitants 1½ million are German, about 4 million are Jews, and an estimated 9 million Ukrainians, so that there are considerably few fewer real Poles than the total population, and even these, as mentioned before, have to be differently evaluated in regard to fighting power. Under these circumstances, Poland would be conquered by Germany in a very short time.

As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude that in case of conflict she will in any event be on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, quick liquidation at this moment would only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the western democracies. If a hostile Poland should remain on Germany's eastern frontier, not only the 11 East Prussian Divisions, but also further contingents would be tied up in Pomerania and Silesia, which would not be the case in the event of previous liquidation. Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done, if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, who is just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice versa. Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul he (the Führer) suggested, particularly in consideration of Italy that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude toward the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis and Yugoslavia's leaving the League of Nations, Prince Paul agreed to the latter. Recently the prince regent was in London and sought reinsurance from the western powers. The same thing was repeated that happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the western democracies. Afterwards it was learned that he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria, which is in a sense a natural ally of Italy and Germany. That is why Germany has supported Bulgaria as much as possible with supplies of weapons and will continue to do so. Yugoslavia would stay neutral only as long as it would be dangerous to take the side of the western democracies openly. At the moment when there would be a turn to the worse for Germany and Italy, however, Yugoslavia would joint the other side openly, hoping thereby to give matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis. Rumania is afraid of Hungary and is militarily very weak and internally corrupt. King Carol would doubtless not give up his neutrality unless absolutely necessary.

Hungary is friendly and Slovakia is under German influence and even has German garrisons in some parts.

H1155-0169

Returning to the question of Danzig, the Führer explained to Count Ciano that it is impossible to yield on this point. He has agreed with Italy to withdraw the Germans from South Tyrol, but for that very reason he must carefully avoid everything that could give the impression that a precedent has been created by the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, which could be applied to other regions, too. Besides, his justification to the German people of the withdrawl of these Germans from Italy is the German policy, which is in general, directed toward the east and the north-east. The east and the north-east--i.e., the Baltic countries--have always been Germany's uncontested sphere of interest, just as the Mediterranean is Italy's own sphere. Germany needs the grain and wood-producing countries of these eastern regions for economic reasons as well. Danzig is not only a case of material interests, however, although this city is the biggest Baltic port. The turn-over amounts to 40% of the tonnage of Hamburg.

Danzig, the Nordic Nürnberg, is an old German city, which awakens sentimental feelings in every German, and just this psychological element forces the Führer to respect public opinion. To make the situation easier to understand for an Italian, Count Ciano should imagine that Trieste is in the hands of Yugoslavia and a strong Italian minority on Yugoslavian territory is being treated with brutal force. It can hardly be supposed that Italy would look on calmly for very long.

Count Ciano replied to the Führer's explanations by first pointing out the great surprise among the Italians at the abolsutely unexpected seriousness of the situation. Neither in the Milan conversations nor in the talks on the occasion of his visit to Berlin was any indication given by the Germans that the situation with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, the Reich foreign minister had declared that in his opinion the question of Danzig will be settled in the course of time. On the basis of this state of affairs, the Duce decided, true to his conviction that a conflict with the western democracies is unavoidable, to make his preparations for that eventuality and made his plans for a certain period of time of 2 to 3 years. If a conflict is unavoidable now, Italy would of course be on Germany's side, as the Duce re-emphasized just before Count Ciano's departure, but for various reasons, enumerated in detail, Italy would welcome a postponement of the general conflict.

Count Ciano then explained, with the aid of a map, the Italian position at the outbreak of a general conflict. Italy believes, he said, that a conflict with Poland would not be restricted to that country, but would grow into a general European war.

The Führer remarked that opinions differ on that point. He personally is firmly convinced that the western democracies will in the end shy away from precipitating a general war.

Count Ciano replied that he hoped the Führer was right, but he did not believe it. In any case, one should adapt one's reflections to the worst possibility, i.e., to general conflict. Since the Abyssinian conflict Italy has actually been constantly living in a state of war and therefore urgently needs a breathing spell. Count Ciano proved with the aid of figures how great Italy's material effort had been, especially in the Spanish conflict. Italy's stock of raw materials is now exhausted. She needs time to restock her warehouses.

She must also transfer her war industries, all of which are in an exposed location, to the south, in order to be better able to defend them. In the same way the Italian artillery, particularly the AA defense, is greatly in need of modernization. The long coast line and other exposed points are not sufficiently defended.

The strength of the fleet is also extremely unfavorable. At the moment Italy can put against the combined English and French 11 to 12 battleships only 2 of its own, while in a few years a total of 8 battleships will be available.

At this point the Führer remarked that of course England and France will have additional battleships of 35,000 and 40,000 tons.

Count Ciano pointed out the long Italian coastline, which is hard to defend, and the numerous bases at the disposal of the English and French fleets, giving particular attention to the Greek ports.

The Italian colonies are especially vulnerable at present. Lybia is hard to attack from Egypt, it is true, while from Lybia there is the possibility of advancing to Marsah Matru. The situation in regard to Tunisia is quite different. The proposition of the Italian and French Arab population is 1 to 20, while the strength of white troops is 1 to 5 to Italy's disadvantage. Besides, the Italian fortifications on the French frontier are quite inadequate. Only recently new armored bunkers were delivered.

Though Abyssinia is almost pacified, with the exception of certain regions along the border of the English territory, where the English create difficulties among the poulation with their money and propaganda, this pacification is only on the surface. It would be sufficient, in a general conflict for a few English airplanes to drop leaflets over Abyssinia , saying that the world had risen against Italy and that the Negus would return, to make the revolt of the Abyssinians flare up again. Besides, Abyssinia would be cut off completely from the motherland in case of a conflict, and the fate of the 200,000 Italians in Abyssinia would be very uncertain. In a few years there would be an army of 4 to 500,000 men in Abyssinia, and if a conflict should break out then it would be possible to attack the Sudan, Kenya, and French Somaliland successfully.

The islands of the Dodecanese would be in difficulties because of the attitude of Turkey. Of course Leros and Rhodes could defend themselves for years.

Albania is a completely undeveloped country and would make an effective base for operations against the Balkans only after several years. First roads have to be built and the natural resources (iron, copper, chromium, and petroleum) have to be exploited, and then one could consider, as the Führer had indicated, advancing successfully on Saloniki and in other directions of the Balkans, as along the five fingers of an outstretched hand.

Italy has plans of economic autarchy which cannot be realized for several years and which would then put Italy in a position to withstand even a prolonged war without difficulties. Another reason for the Duce's desire to postpone the conflict is the Italians abroad, who were to be brought back to Italy according to plan. One million Italians live in France, of whom about 700,000 are definitely lost for Italy. The other 300,000, however, would be used by France as hostages in case of a conflict, as could be seen from some measures taken by France in September of last year.

Besides, the Duce personally attaches great importance to the orderly execution of the world's fair in 1942, for which Italy made big preparations and from which she hopes for good results in the economic field, especially as regards the inflow of foreign currency.

Besides these considerations, which are based on Italy's position, there are others of a general political nature which recommend postponement of a general conflict. The Duce is convinced that the encirclement system of the western democracies would doubtless work at the present time. But after a certain length of time the points of friction and the seeds of disunity would come to the fore among the partners of the encirclement front, and the front would gradually disintegrate.

Moreover, the Duce is convinced that the present enthusiasm in England and France will not last very long. Soon, particularly in France, the union sacree will once more be replaced by party discord, on condition that the Axis keeps quiet for a time. At the present time it is only due to the Axis that internal differences have been buried in the respective countries.

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H1155-0171

Japan's position would also be much stronger after the termination of the China conflict, which is to be expected in two years, while Roosevelt's position in America would be seriously weakened after a period of calm in the field of foreign politics, so that he could not be elected president for a third time, which would certainly be the case if a conflict should break out soon.

Spain, which has just acquired government friendly to the Axis (Serano Suner, Beigbeder), needs peace after the civil war, but would stand at the side of the Axis in 2 to 3 years as a power not to be neglected. Thus, for example, within 2 years Spain would build 4 battleships of 35,000 tons each, the plans for which have just been taken to Spain by an Italian General. The construction is to take place in El Ferrol.

For these reasons the Duce wishes strongly (le Duce insiste) that the Axis powers should make a gesture which would emphasize anew the will for peace of Italy and Germany. This could be done by the publication of a communique which Count Ciano had given to the Reich foreign minister on the previous day and which he now presented again in the following English (and French version):

(communique in English--see original)

Count Ciano said in connection with this tentative communique that the Duce had at first contemplated a proposal for a conference, but, conscious of the Führer's misgivings, he now makes another suggestion in a milder form and is very much interested in its acceptance.

The Führer declared concerning the conference plan that in future meetings of the powers it will not be possible to exclude Russia. In the German-Russian conversations the Russians made it plain, with reference to Munich and other occasions from which they had been excluded, that they would not tolerate this any more. Besides the 4 main powers, Poland and Spain would also have to be included in such a conference, besides Russia. This means, however, that Italy, Germany, and Spain would oppose England, France, Russia, and Poland, which certainly is an unfavorable position.

Count Ciano replied that the Duce is of the opinion that the one who wins at a conference is the one who is ready to let the conference fail if necessary and to accept war as a possible result. Moreover, the Duce took the Führer's misgivings into consideration and modified his proposal. He sees in an Italian and German peace gesture, as suggested in this proposal, the advantage that the western powers, which are internally not at all ready for war--but would surely start it at the present moment, if they were, so to speak, forced to the wall by the Axis and saw no other way out, according to the conviction of the Duce, based on very reliable information from the democracies. (Translator's note: This sentence is incomplete--possibly something was omitted in copying) The suggested gesture of Germany and Italy represents a face-saving way out for the western powers, which they will certainly use, for there are wide circles which warn against war and which would be backed up by a peace gesture. This means, however, that Poland, which would doubtless be abandoned by the western powers, would be isolated after a time and would have to agree to reasonable solutions of the existing difficulties.

The Führer replied that there is no time to be lost in the solution of the Polish problem. The further we get into fall the harder military operations in the east of Europe will be. The air force could hardly be employed at all after the middle of September in those regions because of the weather conditions, while the motorized forces would also be unusable because of the condition of the roads, which are rapidly turned to mud by the rains which set in in the fall. From September to May Poland is one big swamp and absolutely unsuitable for any military operations. Thus Poland could simply occupy Danzig in October--and she probably intends to do so--without Germany's being able to do anything against it; for it is out of the question to shell and destroy Danzig.

Count Ciano asked by what time the question of Danzig will have to be settled, in the Führer's opinion. The Führer replied that this question will have to be settled one way or the other by the end of August. The Führer replied to Ciano's question as to how the Führer imagined the solution, that Poland will have to give up Danzig politically, whereby her economic interests will of course be preserved, and that she will have to contribute by her general attitude to a release of the tension. It is doubtful whether Poland will be willing to do so; for hitherto she had rejected the German proposals. The Führer personally made these proposals to Beck on the occasion of his visit to Obersalzberg. They were very favorable for Poland. In exchange for the political return of Danzig to Germany, with complete preservation of Polish economic interests and the establishment of a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany conceded a border guarantee, a 25-year friendship pact, and Polish participation in influence on Slovakia. At that time Beck acknowledged the proposal with the remark that he wanted to examine it. The sharp refusal was only the consequence of English intervention. Poland's aims can, moreover, be seen clearly in her press. All of East Prussia should be occupied, they want to advance to Berlin, etc. In the long run it is unbearable for a big power to tolerate such a hostile neighbor at a distance of only 150 km from its capital. The Führer is therefore determined to use the opportunity of the next political provocation, in the form of an ultimatum, brutal mistreatment of Germans, an attempt to starve out Danzig, or something similar, to attack Poland with a 48 hours and to solve the problem in this way. This would mean a considerable strengthening of the Axis, just as an Italian liquidation of Yugoslavia would mean a considerable increase of power for the Axis.

Count Ciano asked when such an undertaking against Poland is to be expected, since Italy must of course prepare for all eventualities. The Führer replied that under the prevailing circumstances an attack on Poland is to be expected at any moment.

A telegram from Moscow and one from Tokyo were handed to the Führer during this exchange of opinions. The conference was interrupted for a short time, and then Count Ciano was informed of the contents of the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the sending of a German political mediator to Moscow. The Reich foreign minister added that the Russians were completely informed about Germany's intentions against Poland. He himself had informed the Russian charge d'affaires, by order of the Führer.

The Führer remarked that in his opinion Russia would not be willing to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the western powers. Stalin's position is endangered as much by a victorious Russian army as by a defeated Russian army. Russia is, at the most, interested in enlarging her access to the Baltic a little. Germany has no objection to that. Besides, Russia would hardly take the part of Poland, whom she hates from the bottom of her heart. The sending of the English-French military mission to Moscow has only the purpose of averting the catastrophic state of political negotiations.

After further discussion of the communique proposed by Count Ciano, the Führer said that he wanted to think over for a day, this proposal as well as Count Ciano's explanation of the general situation, and he therefore suggested that the discussion be resumed the next day.

Salzburg 12 August 1939
signed Schmidt.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1871-PS

I, C. Virginia Von Schon, X-046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. 1871-PS.

C. VIRGINIA VON SCHON
X-046318

H1155-0172

Exhibit GB 143
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

H1155-0173

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1842-PS

NOTES

on the discussion of the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop with the Duce in the presence of Count Ciano as well as the ambassadors von Mackensen and Alfrieri, in Rome on the 19th September 1940.

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All the same, Germany had won air superiority, and was bombing England, and particularly London, by day and by night, whilst the British were at most sending a few planes over Germany at night, in order to drop bombs there at random. During the day no British plane dared to fly over German territory. Germany, however, was carrying out strong reprisal attacks by day as well as by night. On one occasion the German Luftwaffe had been ready for a large scale attack as early as August. But this attack had to be called off because of bad weather. A really large scale attack had not taken place since, because the Fuehrer wanted to accept the responsibility for this only when it was certain, that such an attack would mean the beginning of England's destruction. Although Germany had merely carried out reprisal bombings from the air, their results for England had already been extraordinarily serious. With a continuation of these attacks London would be in ruins within a short time. The British armament factories had been seriously affected, and important ports, such as Portland, had been entirely crippled. Moreover, all aerodromes from the South Coast to London had been made unusable.

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With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister stressed, that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone, and in which Italy could be certain of Germany's sympathetic assistance. But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts (Norway etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.

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The Reich Foreign Minister further announced a statement by the Fuehrer regarding the military part of the Spanish problem, i.e. the conquest of Gibraltar. The Spaniards wanted to conquer Gibraltar by themselves. But so as to prevent any failure, Germany would provide Spain with special troops equipped with special weapons, and a few staffels of planes. The Fuehrer had carefully examined the Gibraltar problem from the military point of view, and had come to the conclusion, that the conquest of the rock was absolutely possible, but only then, if the Spaniards were to be given assistance.

The Reich Foreign Minister then showed the Duce the German map regarding the Spanish territorial demands, and this was duly noted by the Italian gentlemen. A question which was put to the Duce by the Reich Foreign Minister, showed, that the Spanish ambitions did not clash with Italy's in any way. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister announced Serrano Suner's intention, also to make a visit to Rome.

On his return to Berlin, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) intended to sign a secret protocol with Serrano Suner, dealing with Spain's entry into the war, as well as the supplying of Spain with the aforementioned materials, recognising the Spanish ambitions, and providing an attack against Gibraltar as a declaration of war. The protocol would also state, that Spain's entry into the war would be left to the judgment of that country. It had been verbally provided, that Spain would come into the war as soon as Franco had completed his preparations, and particularly after the German special weapons and troops as well as planes had arrived at their destinations in Spain.

H1155-0174

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 134
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Führer HQ, 21 January 1941

WFSt No. 8/41 Top Secret

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Enclosed please find a short resumè of the speech made by the Führer during the final conference with the Duce on 20 January 41, and a summary on the results of the conference held by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

J o d l

- 2 enclosures -

Distribution:

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Enclosure 1 to OKW/WFSt No. 8/41 top secret
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Result on the Conference of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with the Italian General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41

1. Important Items from the Appreciation of the Situation by General Guzzoni.

1.) Albania

The most important Italian theatre of war. Though front not sufficiently secure to make it certain that the present line can be held against Greek attacks in all circumstances, no danger of Valona or Berat being lost. 21 divs. now in Albania. Intention is to send another 3 divs. from Italy.

Intention to form a group for attack on the northern flank. Strength about 10 divs. (including 3 divs. still to be brought from Italy and 4 Alpine divs.). Will not be ready for attack

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before another 2½ months, since transport facilities do not make it possible to ship the 3 divs. or the personnel and equipment required for the reinforcement of the remaining divs. any faster. Intention to attack with this group in direction Korica, from there, some units to carry out a flanking movement to Erseke in order to cause the collapse of the northern part of the Greek front, the main body to continue the attack in the direction of Florina as soon as supplies are safeguarded beyond Korica (only 1 road available). Abandoned intention of making an attack with a limited objective along the coast in the near future.

2.) Libya

Intention for continuation of campaign:
Holding of Tobruk as long as possible. Defence of the Derna - Eastern edge of the Djebel line, using the armoured unit stationed at Mekili for offensive action. Sending of reinforcements from Tripoli to Cyrenaica, in order to strengthen the defence planned there, in case the situation in Cyrenaica continues to develop favourably, thus making if possible to hold the western part of Cyrenaica.
If Cyrenaica cannot be held, defence of Tripoli.
Italians believe that Tobruk can hold out for some time and that the British will not advance upon Benghazi - Agedabia before the fall of Tobruk.
The following reinforcements are earmarked for Libya:-
Bringing the 3 divs. stationed in Tripoli up to full strength, transferring one armoured div. and one infantry div. (motorized) from Italy to Tripoli. Completion of these transports about 20 February 41.

3.) East Africa

Situation difficult in the case of British attack, which is expected in the near future. Defence to the utmost intended. It is desirable to divert British forces from Libya to East Africa, even though it may render the situation in East Africa more difficult.

4.) Dodekanese

Expected attack on Dodekanese has not hitherto taken place. Supplies in hand for about 3 months. Forces in Dodekanese weak (handwritten marginal note:- these ought to be considerably increased), nevertheless a certain offensive power in the case of a German attack upon Greece from Bulgarian territory (especially against British transports from Egypt into the Aegaean).

II. Views on the Italian appreciation of the situation

1.) Albania

Very unlikely that the Italians will be able to muster the forces requited for an attack within the time provided. A support of a German attack from Bulgaria against Greece must therefore be discounted. (Handwritten marginal note:- The German attack will however bring strong relief to the Albanian front)

2.) Libya

Whether or not Cyrenaica can be held cannot yet be determined. Unless the situation is basically changed, a loss also of Tripoli need not be feared, all the more since from May onwards large - scale operations will no more be possible, owing to the heat (handwritten marginal notes:- the loss of Morzuk (S) is evidently considered trifling. Conditio sine qua non:- no complications out of Tunis).

3.) East Africa

Duration of resistance in the case of a British attack cannot be estimated.

4.) Dodekanese

No resistance of any significance is to be expected in the case of attack. Offensive action of the Italian Forces stationed there against British transports to Greece cannot be counted on (handwritten marginal note:- ought to be built up in order to form an important complementary operation during the occupation of Greece.)

III. Employment of German units in Libya and Albania

1.) Libya

Italians very warmly welcome the dispatch of the 5th. light div. (motorized) composed as suggested. Shipment to Tripoli can begin approximately between 15 and 20 February; it will however be possible to carry out transports of equipment before that date.

H1155-0176

2.) Albania

Dispatch of a German unit is described by Italians as desirable, but not necessary. Dispatch of a corps impossible, as transport facilities inadequate. For reasons of transport, dispatch of only one mountain div. with light equipment could be considered. Decision not urgent at the moment. Italian attack - unless strong Greek forces are moved from the Albanian front to the Bulgarian frontier - impossible in any case before the beginning of April, therefore German unit need not be sent before March. Consequently new decision whether a unit is to be sent, at the beginning of March. Preparations for making a unit available will however continue.

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Enclosure 2 to OKW/WFSt. No. 8/41 top secret
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6 copies
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Speech by the Führer
on 20 January 1941

1.) On 20 January at 1100 hrs., a report is made to the Führer by the Chiefs of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and of the Armed Forces Operational Staff in the presence of General von Rintelen on the result of the military discussions with General Guzzoni and General Gandin.

II.) At 1200 hours, the Führer developed before a wider circle his thoughts and views on the situation.

Those present:-

on the German side	on the Italian side
The Minister for Foreign Affairs	the Duce
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces	Count Ciano
Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff	General Guzzoni
General von Rintelen	General Marras
Ambassador Schmidt	General Gandin
An interpreter from the Foreign Office	
Colonel Schmundt	
Freg. Kapt. von Puttkamer	

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Contents of the Führer's Speech in Concise Form:-

Finland of great importance to us owing to the nickel findings unique in Europe. Russians promise to supply us with the quantity of nickel required, but only as long as they pleased. Therefore Finland must not be interfered with any more.

Demarche of the Russians on account of our massing of troops in Roumania has taken place and will be duly rejected. Russians always become insolent at a time when they cannot be harmed (winter).

The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose:-

a) an operation against Greece
b) protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey
c) safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.

Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.

Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.

H1155-0177

For this reason - as well as owing to the difficulties of tra which came to light during yesterday's military discussions - it is not advisable at present to dispatch a German unit to Albania. If it rema stationary behind the front, psychologically undesirable reactions would result: Italians in heavy fighting - Germans look on from behind the fr

However if the German unit is employed, the war in the southeast, will be prematurely started.

As far as can be foreseen, Turkey will remain neutral; it would be very unpleasant if she declared her solidarity with Britain and put her fields at Britain's disposal (handwritten marginal note:- Constantinople Constanza: 350 km).

General situation in the East can be judged correctly only from the situation in the West. The attack against the British Isles is our ultimate aim.

In this respect, we are in the position of a man with only one rou left in his rifle; if he misses, the situation is much worse than before The landing cannot be repeated, since too much equipment would be lost in the case of a failure. Britain would then have no need to worry any more and could employ the bulk of her forces at the periphery wherever she pleases. As long as the attack has not taken place, the British must always reckon with the possibility.

A landing can only be made under certain conditions which, however, did not exist in Fall:- no three consecutive days of good weather.

Apart from that, the general task in the West is the protection of our base from Kirkenes to the Spanish frontier, at the same time always keeping a group of forces in Southern France ready to step in if Britain should gain a foothold in Portugal.

The blocking of the Sicily passage by the air force is only a poor substitute for the possession of Gibraltar. We had made such preparatio as would have ensured success. Once in possession of Gibraltar, we would be in a position to gain a foothold with strong forces in North Africa and thus put an end to Weygand's blackmail. If therefore Italy were after all to succeed in getting France to enter the war, this would be a great success and would basically change the situation in the Mediterranean within a short space of time.

I don't see great danger coming from America even if she should enter the war. The much greater danger is the gigantic block of Russia. Though we have very favourable political and economic agreements with Russia, I prefer to rely on powerful means at my disposal. Very considerable parts of these are therefore tied down on the Russian frontier, thus preventing me from supplying the armament industry with sufficient manpower to bring the armament of the air force and navy to the highest possible pitch.

As long as Stalin lives, there is probably no danger; he is intelligent and careful. But should he cease to be there, the Jews, who at prese only occupy second and third-rank positions might move up again into the first rank.

It therefore behoves us to be careful. The Russians are continually trying to work out new demands which they read into the agreements. That is why they do not like explicit and precise formulas in these.

It is therefore necessary to keep a constant eye on the Russian factor and to keep on guard, by means of strength and clever diplomacy. Formerly Russia would have been no danger at all: for on land she cannot imperil us in the least, but now in the era of the air force the Roumanian oilfields can be turned into an expanse of smoking debris from Russia and from the Mediterranean, and the life of the axis depends on those oilfields.

In any case we must not dispatch valuable units to places where they will remain inactive. Therefore we shall send to Libya not an armoured but an anti-tank unit, which can be transported more quickly and can still be employed before the hot period sets in. For employed it shall be:- we do not want to act like the British did in France. The tanks and the anti-tank guns in this unit penetrate any British tank which is in action there.

The troops are experienced, have confidence in their weapons and are self-reliant that is very important in the fight against tanks. We have given the name "tank-hunters" to the anti-tank gunners also for psychological reasons. They are to seek out the enemy tank and battle it like the huntsman his quarry.

H1155-0178

General statements on the factors which are decisive for success in modern warfare. In the course of these. reference to the importance of training in up-to-date methods of warfare. which requires much time and effort and a highly efficient body of non-commissioned officers.

Importance of the air force and of the armored warfare. The training of an armoured unit is beset with difficulties it is least possible to form an armoured unit by improvisation. Even the conversion of a fully trained armoured unit to other weapons takes months.

We have not achieved our great successes with armoured troops by working with heavy tanks. We prefer medium tanks. The French had very much heavier tanks than we had.

Our greatest asset were our panzer-generals who have developed completely new tactics and have directed their units very cleverly and with an offensive spirit.

General reference to the importance of mines in land warfare.
Examples:- mining of our west wall.
Blockade by mines which were laid by the 16th army in the flank of our attack against France.
By means of mines, a field of attack can be completely messed up.

Question of the Führer about mines at Tobruk and whether further mines could not be brought in by U-boats.

Tanks lose all offensive spirit as soon as they encounter minefields. Great heroism by the engineer is required to remove or clear minefields.

Views on the war in the air and the comparison of German to British air raids.

It is necessary to have at one's disposal a mighty anti-aircraft weapon with a great ammunition supply for a moment may come when the war will be conducted almost exclusively by the air force and the navy.

Against heavily armed ships. only the dive-bomber is successful.

Führer dwells on the excellent impression he has gained of General Antonescu. He really is a personality.

The Duce is of the opinion that his relations to the Legion are not good.

Führer goes into generalizations on the subject of revolutions. of which only the Fascist and the National Socialist ones have had an immediately constructive effect. In Roumania the predestined man was murdered before the outbreak and the first-rank leaders of the legion with him. Thus it came about that the leading may grew out of the Army, who started off the revolution and removed the king. He is inspired by glowing fanaticism, is ready for any battle for his country and will wage it with, without, or if necessary even against the Legion.

One man must be the Führer, a head of State and beside him a leader of a movement are not possible. It would be best if Antonescu became simultaneously the leader of the Legion.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C134

10 Nov 45

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C 134

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 33812169

H1155-0179

TRANSLATION OF DUCOMENT 1834 - PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Circular RAM No. 56/R of 2/3. 41
subj: conference RAM/ Oshima in Fuschl 23. 11. 41.

65 214

FOREIGN OFFICE
RAM NO. 56/R

Berlin, 2 March 1941
Strictly secret.

Personal.

In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the new Japanese ambassador OSHIMA in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. This expossition is of fundamental significance for orientation concerning the general political situation, as it impends for Germany at the outset of Spring 1941.

signed:

Ribbentrop.

To: the German Embassy in Ankara
Madrid
Moscow
Rome (Quir.)
Rome (Vat;)

The German Legation in Athens
Belgrad
Bern
Budapest
Bukarest
Helsinki
Lisbon
Pressburg
Sofia
Stockholm
each particularly -

65215

H1155-0180

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834 - PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CONTINUED

Confidential

Memorandum.

The enclosures are State secrets in the sense of § 88 R. St. G. B. in the meaning of the law of 24 April 1934 (RGBL. I S 341 ff).
Concerning the handling of sealed material compase decree of 21 March and 30 September 1940- MBD 29 g Ang. II and III-.
Single copies of written reports to the Foreign Office are to be forwarded in a strong double envelope, the outer one sealed. The outer envelope must have the inscription "To the Foreign Office, attention of chief bureau hand, Hofrat Schimpke, or representative in office," and the inner envelope must carry the address of the signer of the order authorizing the report, or, in case this is the State Secretary, the Ministerial Dirigent, it must have the signature of the Referatsleiter, and following this must stand:,

"To the Foreign Office, attention of -------
or represenative."

On both envelopes of the written messages will be noted the date and number thereof without indication of the Secret contents. In the message index will be given date and the number of the messages, also without indication of the secret contents, and in the space "Statement of Contents" will be given the recipient in the Foreign Office named on the inside envelope (compase also decree of 26 February 1940 - Pers. 1402g -)

If the possibility of forwarding sealed material in the prescribed way does not exist, the secret cipher process is to be used.

Enclosure
To RAM No. 56/R

Strictly secret!

Extract

from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.

Following particularly sincere mutual greetings the RAM Reich Foreign Minister declared that ambassador Oshima had won out against the many doubters in Japan with the politics he had carried on with Germany. By Germany's victory in the west these politics had been fully justified. He (the RAM,) regrets that the alliance between Germany and Japan, on which he had been working with the ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing is, however, that one is together now.

Entering into the general political situation the Reich Foreign Minister declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction. A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even though it was to have been doubted from the beginning whether the king would exert himself. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding as 100 to 1. The war - inciter chique in England then also won the upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England war was unavoidable. Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia - a necessity for avoiding a two - front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan.

H1155-0181

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS 1834-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CONTINUED

The treaty was however in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which as assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the German-Japanese relationship. Now the German-Japanese alliance has been made. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side after conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?

These are no military problems on the continent any longer which could be dangerous for Germany. Germany would not tolerate it in any circumstances that England should get a foothold. Wherever the English might make this attempt, in the Mediterranean, in Greece or possibly in Portuga;, they would immediately be thrown out. The war as such is already won to-day for the Axis, it is a matter now of proving to England that it can undertake nothing more against the Axis and that its hope of crushing the Axis powers, based on the blockade, hunger, or unrest in the Axis countries or occupied territories, is vain. England had to be forced to admit that she possessed no prospects for victory any more and would have to sue for peace.

Germany is observing developments in France sharply, the Reichforeign-minister continued. Germany has no interest in an occupation of the whole country, particularly in view of French Africa, that it should not fall into the hands of de Gaulle. Aside from that France is neither a political nor a military problem any longer. Her power is broken for all time and would remain so.

As for the garrisoning of other countries occupied by German troops - Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Poland, this is a purely police function which Germany was exercising and tied down few forces. In the present state of technical weapons (Stukas, tanks) it is possible to control the largest land areas with comparatively small units of troops. The hopes of England for disturbances in the occupied territories are without avail. Besides complete peace exists there. In Germany there is no lack of food, it is supplied for years. Also in the occupied lands there is sufficient food. In the case of raw material supply certain insufficiences occasionally do exist, for practical purposes, however, nothing could happen to us. This is being taken care of by the Four - year Plan which is being making Germany more independent daily, and in addition by the tremendous economic area which Germany controls.

Militarily, the Reich Foreign Minister continued, the Fuehrer had created a number of new formations during the winter. In the Spring, 240 divisions, including 186 first-class attack divisions are available. The Fuehrer is determined not to permit any more English troops on Greek territories, Rumania, Hungary, and Slovakia have already joined the three-power pact; tomorrow we could sign with Bulgaria. The time of joining is however determined by military necessity. Bulgaria has recently signed a treaty with Turkey, upon our instigation. This Turkish - Bulgarian declaration signifies a clear separation of Turkey from the warlike developments in the Balkans and from England. Neither Turkey nor Russia would undertake anything in case of German intervention in Greece. Should the tasks however become active against expectations, sufficient troops are prepared to destroy them utterly.

Yugoslav statesmen have recently been on a visit to Germany in order to announce their willingness to live at peace with us and Italy. We were calmly awaiting developments. Yugoslavia would sooner or later have to come over into our camp, whether by joining the three-power pact or by other arrangements. The Prince Regent Paul appears to hesitate yet, but he also would have to bow to the national reason. With the Greeks came down a peg or whether the action against them would have to be carried out, the English had to get out of Greece.

Italy, the Reich Foreign Minister continued, had suffered reverses. Greece had unfortunately been attacked without our knowledge. The Duce had believed he had to do this because Greece had placed bases at the disposal of England. The action was badly prepared militarily. Five Italian divisions stood against twelve Greek divisions in bad weather. The Italian soldier is good but badly equipped and poorly led. Today the front in Greece is stable, no danger exists any longer. German troops are not committed there. As to the situation of Italy in North Africa the fact is that Graziani had attacked too late. The Italians were consequently surprised at Sidi Bassani. The victory march of General Wavell was to be explained by the tank-(fear) of the Italians, who have not been trained enough for tank-warfare.

To support the Italians we have now sent a unit to Lybia under the leadership of a capable general, in order to hold certain positions as a bridgehead and also later to disable the English. Furthermore the Italian people stands firmly behind the Duce; there is no reason for worry. Where we can we are helping Italy in regard to supplies of raw material. Ultimately the events in North Africa have no influence on the final victory which was sure to us.

With Spain, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, we are standing on good and intimate terms. It would join the three-power pact sooner or later, but could not yet decide on an open step because of difficulties in its food supply. In itself a quick decision by Spain would have permitted the Gibraltar problem to be attacked as soon as possible and thereby speed the final victory.

With reference to Russia it should be said that Stalin is a cool and shrewd politician who would avoid undertaking something against us, this above all in view of our military strength. It is clear that Bolshevism continues to show the tendency of planting its shoots in other countries.

Should Germany lose the war the Soviet star would rise over Europe. We observe the situation in the East attentively and with supreme calm. A German-Russian conflict, however, would result in a gigantic German victory and signify the end of the Soviet regime.

As for the war against England, we had poor weather for our bombers during the fall and winter who were not sufficiently trained for combat to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy damage was done which had a strongly retarding effect on English war production, etc. The bombing would continue in increasing measure so that we hope to destroy very much more than America is in a condition to replace. We now have air supremacy over the whole continent. When we shall win air supremacy over England depends on further developments.

At sea the commitment of the U-boat weapon has thus far been comparatively slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination airforce - U-boat weapon we would deal terrible blows on England. The loss of tonnage is already now making considerable difficulties for the English food supply. Meat and fat are already scarce. It is now a matter of reducing imports by sinkings to a definite level which lays below the absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared, its execution however depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions.

Concerning America, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be noticed that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However, we have an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all. The broad spaces of the oceans lying between us and America make this impossible. In East Asia, America would hardly dare to send its fleet beyond Hawaii, as it would at once be threatened with destruction by the Japanese fleet. In the atlantic ocean there is a lack of commitment possibilities with the

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834 PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CONTINUED.

H1155-0183

exception of England. Landing in Europe is impossible but Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the fleet and land troops are lacking. It adds up for practical purposes to the creation of American air bases in England. In an air war we are located in a strategocally advantageous position with respect to England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of the European coat while England had to spread out in departmental fashion in its attacks on Europe and thereby split up. In an air duel - Europe vs. England. Germany would always be superior. We believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of the war by skilfully co-ordinated politics of the allied powers.

The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would hit it. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English - American air force at any time. The number of pilots being at our disposal is unlimited, the same is true for our airplane production possibilities. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (not to talk of the American) and we are on the way to even enlarge this lead. On order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too will be greatly reinforced. Since the army has been supplied way beyond its requirements, enormous reserves have been stood (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material); production can now concentrat on submarines, airplanes and anticraft guns.

Every eventuality has been foreseen; the war has been won to-day militarily, economically and politically. We have the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer is vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the co-operation with Japan is of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key position in the Far East, Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it can acquire only through war. There are three reasons speaking for quick action:

1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the centre of the British Empire (threatening of India, cruiser-war, etc.). The effect upon the moral of the British people would be very serious and this would help toward a quick ending of the war.

2) A surprising intervention by Japan would be apt to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and which would hesitate greatly to expose its navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It is very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.

3) Would it seem to be in the interest of Japan also to secure for itself, still during the war, in consideration of the coming new world vides, the position it wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that she would do everything to carry through this policy.

The Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan's entry into the war, this would mean that Americoa had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the three-power pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his believe to the effect that a temporary rising of the British moral caused by America's entry into the war would be destroyed by Japan's entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their navy in spite, of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent

the biggest chance for the countries of the three-power pacts to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explains that closest co-operation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly as far as news service and press were concerned. The co-operation with the Italians is already perfect, the same is true for the co-operation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia.

The press, radio, etc, of these countries are already to synchronized wi each other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of close contact must be made with Japan. The ambassador welcomed this and intends to set up programme with our men determining how our Japanese propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.

Ambassador Oshima explained that when the three-power pact was concluded various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then that the Emperor intervened with an edict.

It must be stated, however, that, impressed by the German victory in the West, the Japanese people are now entirely for the three-power pact.

Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the influence of the events, the hard feeling against America has arisen considerably.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to the recent statement of the Japanese Ambassador in USA America concerning Japan's attitude in case of America's entry into the war, and mentioned hereto that he considers best to talk plain language to the USA.

Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly due to the desire to keep America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if the U.S.A. realize that they are confronting firm determination, will they hold back. The people in the U.S.A. do not like National Socialism, however they are not idling to sacrifice their sons and therefore are against an entr into the war. The American people feel instinctively that they are drawn into the war for no reason by Roosevelt and the Jewish manipulators. Therefo our politics with the USA should be distinct and strong, but, of course, not aggressive. In the USA one must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan have no hard feelings for the American people, that, however, should the USA have any aggressive intentions, they would confront a strong front of determined people, a front at that, which includes the whole world. One woul therefore have to work in close co-operation against the attempts of mis-representation by the British propaganda. As far as speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark made by Matsuokas concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This remark has been greatly exploited by the enemy propaganda.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs continued by saying that it was Japan's friendship which enabled Germany to arm after the antikominternpact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan was able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent does now, after the conclusion of the three-power pact, bring great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, is eliminated in the Far East (Indochina).

H1155-0184

England too is considerably weakened, and closes to Singapore. Thus, Germany has already contributed largely to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we could have to carr the main burden of the final battle in the future too. If Germany should ever be weakened Japan would find itself confronted by a world - coalition.

We are sitting in the same boat. The fate of both is being determined now for centuries to come. The same is true for Italy. The interests of th three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.

Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and emphasize the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would result for th parties of the three-power pact after the war by the new shaping of order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require generous solution.

Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regar to this the Reich Foreign Minister alluded to fundamental principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest the European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, a the East-Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreement directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofo while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with independent countries lying within the Japanese orbit of power, such as Chin Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, one should fundamentally grant each-other preferences with regard to third parties. The ambassador expressed agreement with this thought.

The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, o the basis of new affronts by the USA, to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this, after signing of the three-power pact one should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the USA concerning the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of th signatory powers should be evaluated correspondingly in propaganda. The question, moreover, was in no way acute at the time.

Oshima asked whether one had talked with the Russians about joining the three-power pact. Reich Foreign Minister affirmed this. Molotov had presente the stated proposal to Stalin and thereafter declared fundamental willingness under certain conditions. To these conditions belonged the Russian interest in Finland, the desire for closer relations with Bulgaria, and the Straits problem. We had declared ourselves willing to come out for a revision of the MONTREUX statute, but expressed the conjecture that the Turks would hardly be willing to meet halfway the Russian wishes. The Axis guarantee far-reachi for Rumania had not had any appeal for the Russians. Finally, however, they to put up with it in Moscow in view of the strong economic interests which we have in the Balkans, particularly in Rumania oil. Besides political talks with Russia were still in sheperce. When Balkan affairs had developed further they could be resumed in this matter. The great trade treaty with Russia contained in terms of value more than 2½ billion reichsmarks.

Upon the question of the Reich Foreign Minister concerning the relations of Japan to Russia ambassador Oshima replied that Molotov was ready to agree upon a pact on the condition that the north-Sakhalin concessions would be given back to Russia. The relation in general are good. The Russians were giving comparatively little to Chiang-kai-chek, and only against payment.

H1155-0185

H1155-0186

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834 PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CONTINUED.

With reference to China, ambassador Oshima explained, there are two view points in Japan. One wanted to strengthen Wang - ching - wei, the other wanted to read an understanding with Chiang - kai - chek. Negotiations with the latter have been broken off of late. The life of Japanese politics is however, as observed, not uniform. Reich Foreign Minister advises to hold back from a new attempt at reaching an understanding with Chiang - kai - chek until the German armies had again gone into action and to reach as extensive a consolidation of relationships as possible with Chiang - kai - chek under the impression of the success of German arms. One should not receive a refusal, and Germany did not wish to shoot off her powder too early for an eventual mediation. Moreover Germany is prepared to assist Japan in the manner desired of her. If the occasion should arise, also by strengthening the position of Wang - ching - wei.

H1155-0187

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. 2450-PS.
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER

Munich Edition, Wednesday 26 March 1941, No. 85, Volume 54.

Muenchener Ausgabe, Mittwoch 26 Maerz 1941. 85, Ausg. 54.

(Page 1, heading)

"Yugoslavia also in the Tri-Partite Pact
Mister Churchill again has lost a battle"

X X X X X X X X

(Page 2, Heading in centre of page)

"The Protocol on the Entry of Yugoslavia."

X X X X X X X X

(Page 2. Column 2. Line 42 to Line 60)

"Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.

At the same time, when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the governments of the Axis powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following identical notes :

'Mr. Prime Minister :

'In the name of the German Government and at its behest, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of the following :

'On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry to-day into the Tri-Partite Pact, the German Government confirms its determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.'

X X X X X X X X

(Page 2, Column 2. Lines 64 to 83)

'Mr. Prime Minister :

'With reference to the conversations, that occurred in connection with the Yugoslavian entry into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the honour to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung), that in the agreement between the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government, the governments of the Axis powers during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through Yugoslavian national territory.

H1155-0188

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF
DOCUMENT NO. 1746-PS.

PART II
(partial translation)

Conference of Hitler and the German High Command
on the situation in Yugoslavia. Dated March 27.1941.

PAGE 1 - PAGE 4, LINE 13:

W F St

Berlin, March 27, 1941

Top Secret

1st copy W F St
2nd copy L
3rd copy W Kr G

Only for general officers

To be transmitted by
officers only.

Discussion about the situation in Yugoslavia

Present:

(stamp)
OKW/W F St
Dept L (I M I)
29 March 1941
No 44391/41 top secret
(illegible)

(several pencil marks and initials)

Führer
Reich Marshal
Chief OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Chief W F St
Major General Bodenschatz
Colonel Schmundt
Commander von Puttkamer
Lieutenant-Colonel Scherff
Major von Below
Major Christian

Later on the following persons were added:

Supreme commander of the army (Ob.d.H.)
Chief of the General staff of the army (Chef Gen St d H)
Colonel Hensinger
Lieutenant-Colonel Sieverth
Reich Foreign Minister
Ambassador Hewel
Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Waldan
Colonel Schmidt
Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Rintelen.

BDC-OKW-1631
(remark in pencil at right lower corner of first page)

The Führer.

describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita-action and even more in regard to the Barbarossa-undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-German. These governments never sit securely in the saddle, because of the nationality problem and the officers caste (Kamarilla), which is always inclined to start a coup d'etat. In the present time, the country had only one strong man, namely Stojoldinowitsch, and Regent Prince (Prinzregent) Paul had him thrown over, to his own disadvantage.

The present moment is for political and military reasons favourable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country's attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the government would have happened during the Barbarossa-action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious.

The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new Government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Roumania's main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day, a message will still be addressed to the Duce.

Politically, it is especially important that the new blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lighning like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favourable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states: the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.

This plan assumes the we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time.

In this connection, the beginning of the Barbarossa operation will have to be postponed up to 4 weeks.

The military operations are to be carried out in the following way:

1). Begin of the operation Marita as early as possible with the limited aim to capture Greek-Thracia and the basin ofSaoloniki and to win the high terrain of Edessa; for that purpose march (Ausholen) across Yugoslav territory.

2). Push from neighborhood South of Sofia in direction Skoplje in order to relieve the flank of the Italian front in Albania.

3). Push with stronger forces from the area around Sofia in direction towards Nis, then towards Belgrade, in cooperation with

4). Stronger German forces penetrating from the area around Graz and Klagenfurt in direction South East with the aim to destroy the Yugoslavian army.

PAGE 5, LINE 3 - 9:

5). The main task of the airforce is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian airforce ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrad in attacks by waves; besides, the air force has to support the advabce of the army.

For this purpose, it is possible to make use of the Hungarian ground installations.

PAGE 6, LINE 7 - 12.

The Fuehrer orders the immediate starting of all operations. He expects the plans of the different parts of the armed forces during the evening of March 27th. General von Rintelen is orderedto receive the message and verbal orders from the Fuehrer during the night of March 27th.

(illegible pencil initial)

H1155-0189

H1155-0190

PART V
(full translation)

SUBJECT: Tentative plan for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia. Dated, March 28, 1941.

The Chief of the leading staff of the Armed Forces (Wehrmachtsfuhrungsstab) of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Only for general officers

To be transmitted by officers only

Berlin, March 28, 1941.

(in pencil)
(Handed over to Gen. von Rintelen on March 28, 1941 at 4 p.m.)

KW/W F St
Stamp
(Several pencil marks)

Tentative Plan

for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia.

(several pencil marks)

1. In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory.

2. For this purpose, the following units are being formed:

a) One assault group South of Sofia for the advance in direction Skoplje and South, in order to occupy the Southern part of Yugoslavia as basis for the combined attack against Greece and to remove the danger for the rear of the Italian frontin Albania.

b) One assault group which will be deployed around Graz and under certain circumstances also in Southwest Hungary, in order to penetrate into Yugoslavia later in the direction Belgrad and Westward.

c) Probably an Hungarian attack group reinforced by German forces which will be committed in the general direction towards the Danube on both sides of Belgrad.

3. If the weather situation permits, the operation against Greece will start on April 2nd or 3rd. In this operation, the right flank will move across Yugoslavian territory. In the beginning, its aim will be limited to the occupation of the basis of Saloniki and the high terrain of Edessa.

4. Therefore, the following tasks result for the participation of the Italian armed forces:

a) Flank protection for the German attack group Graz by advancing towards the line Split-Yajele, with forces as strong as possible.

b) Shifting to the defense on the Greek-Albanian front and deployment of an attack group, in order to join with the German forces committed around Skoplje and South.

c) Elimination of the Yugoslav naval forces.

d) Later on, resumption of the attacks against the Greek front in Albania.

H1155-0191

For the inner-political integration of the Yugoslav national territory it is especially desirable to favor the Croat independence movements in every respect and to treat the Croats as friends of the Axis. It will therefore be opportune to avoid any air attacks against Croat territory, as long as it is not a question of commitment against enemy troops fighting there.

5. The following chronological schedule of the German operations may be expected:

a) Attack against Greece: April 2nd-3rd.
b) Attack from the area South of Sofia on April 3rd or April 4th
c) Attack from the area around Graz and East of it: April 12th.

(illegible initial)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. 1746-PS

19 November 1945.

I, WALTER R. SELIGSON, 1st. Lt., Ord., O-1558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpts from Document No. 1746-PS.

WALTER R. SELIGSON
1st. Lt., Ord.,
O-1558904.

Exhibit GB 144 filed Jan. 9, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1195-PS

COPY.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
W.F.St./Abt.L (IV/Qu)
Nr. 00630/41 Top Secret.

Führer's H.Q., 12.4.1941.

Reference: OKW/L (IV/Qu) Nr.4434/41 Top Secret of 3 April 1941.

Provisional Directions for the Partition of Yugoslavia

The Führer has issued the following directions for the partition of Yugoslavia:

1.) Former territory of Steiermark and Krain.

The territory of the former Steiermark enlarged towards the South by a strip of about 90 Kilometer breadth and 10-15 Kilometer depth will go to Gau Steiermark.

The Northern part of Krain, with a border line which runs in the south only as far as the river Sava but north of Leibach according to attached map OKH/GEN Qu, will belong to Kärnten.

The territory occupied by German troops will be handed over district by district by the Army High Command to the Gauleiters concerned as soon as the pacification of the country permits.

The handing over of the territory occupied by the Italians will beprepared by letter from the Führer to the Duce and carried out according to a more detailed direction of the Foreign Office. Until that time no measures whatever are to be taken from the German end. (Telegram OKH-Gen Qu/Abt. Kr. Verw. A. Ob. Kdo. 2 I Nr.801/41 g. Kdos, is hereby dealt with).

2.) The territory beyond the river Mur (Übermur-Gebeit):

The territory beyond the river Mur goes as a whole to Hungary conforming with the historic boundary. A later transfer of the German population in the north-eastern part of this territory has been taken into consideration. The handing over of this territory to the Hungarians will be regulated by the Army High Command.

3.) Banat:

The territory from the point where the river Orava cuts the Hungarian national boundary to the entry of the river Tisa in the Danube goes to Hungary.

The territory east of the river Tisa will be at first under German protection as will the territory south of the Danube and east of the penerol line: mouth of the river Morava - Danube - Pozarevac - Petrovac - Boljavac - Kugarevac - Kalina. This territory comprises the Boz copper territory and the adjoining coal district in the south-east. The above line is to be considered as the basis (Anhalt) and provisional demarcation line. At first Military Government under the Army High Command is to be established.

4.) Southern Serbia.

The territory inhabited by Bulgarian Macedonians, in conformity with the etnographical boundary goes to Bulgaria.

Preliminary delimitation from the military view point will be carried out by the Army High Command which will prepare the handing over to Bulgaria.

3820.

H1155-0192

H1155-0193

5.) Former Serbia (Alt-Serbian):

The territory of former Serbia will be placed under German military administration of the Army High Command.

6.) Croatia:

Croatia becomes an independent state within its etnographica; boundaries. There will be no interference on the part of Germany with its home policy.

7.) Remaining territories including Bosnia (Bosnien) and Montenegro:

The political shaping of these territories will be left to Italy. Here also the restoration of an independent state of Montenegro can be considered.

II. The drawing up of boundaries:

1.) If the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down in the above part I it will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office, the plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and the Reich-Minister of the Interior.

The Operational Staff of the Armed Forces (L IV/Qu) is the authority which will prepare the drawing up of the boundaries for the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

2.) The Army High Command will forward as soon as possible to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces W.F.St., its military requirements in this regard - where not already laid down by the Führer - and with the exception of the territory under protection south of the Danube.

3.) The OKW/Branch Economy and Armament (OKW/Wi Rü Amt) will forward as soon as possible to the Operational Staff (Section L) its demands regarding the boundaries of the territory under protection south of the Danube (Part I. para 3).

4.) As far as the Italians are concerned, tactical boundaries between the armies are valid for the present.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

/s/ Keitel.

3821.

Exhibit #5 145
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

TC 25

Enclosure No.2 to despatch No.1511 dated October 20, 1939, from the American Embassy, Berlin, Germany.

Source: Reichgesetzblatt II, No.38, of September 30, 1939.

H1155-0194

TRANSLATION

Announcement relating to the
German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty

September 25, 1939.

On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression treaty was signed in Moscow by representatives of the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty is published herewith.

The exchange of the documents of ratification took place in Berlin on September 24, 1939. The treaty became effective on August 23, 1939 in accordance with its Article VII.

Berlin, September 25, 1939.

The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
by Baron von Weizsäcker

Non-Aggression Treaty
between Germany and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Government of the German Reich

and

The Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics

directed by the wish to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and proceeding upon the basic provisions of the Treaty of Neutrality concluded between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in April 1926, have reached the following agreement:

Article 1

The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one another, whether individually or jointly with other powers.

Article 2

In case one of the contracting parties should become the object of war-like acts on the part of a third power, the other contracting party will not support that third power in any form.

Article 3

The Governments of the two contracting parties will in future remain in contact with each other through continuous consultation in order to inform each other concerning questions affecting their mutual interests.

H1155-0195

Article 4

Neither of the two contracting parties will participate in any grouping of powers which is indirectly or directly aimed against the other party.

Article 5

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two parties would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by means of friendly exchanges of views or if necessary by arbitration commissions.

Article 6

The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years with the provision that unless one of the contracting parties denounces it one year before the end of this period the duration of the validity of this treaty is to be regarded as automatically prolonged for another five years.

Article 7

The present treaty is to be ratified within the shortest possible time. The documents of ratification are to be exchanged in Berlin. The treaty becomes effective immediately upon signature.

Drawn up in duplicate texts in the German and Russian languages.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich

von Ribbentrop

As Plenipotentiary for the Government of the U.S.S.R.

s.Molotov

(1716)

Report
on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Questions

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Immediately after the notification of individual Supreme Reich offices regarding the Fuehrer's decree of 20. 4. 41 a conference with the chief of the OKW (armed forces high command) took place. After presentation of the various political aims in the proposed Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of the OKW explained that a deferment (Ok-stellung) would be too complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried out best by direct cancellation (Abkommandierung) by command of the chief of the OKW Generalfeldmarschall Keitel. Then issued an appropriate command which established the basis for the coming requirements: He named as deputy and liaison officer General Jodl and Maj. Gen. Warlimont. The negotiations which then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern Territory were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in collaboration with officials of my office. A conferencetook place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no way deal with any representatives of the people of the East - European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the military intelligence required it, and then to name persons to me who could count as political personalities over and above the military intelligence in order to arrange for their eventual employment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed in accordance with my indications.

Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme commander of the Army, respectively to the chief quartermaster and to the army groups for questions relative to political configuration and requests of the OKH. In the meantime this has been done.

Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of Economy (Reichswirtschaftsminister) Funk, who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic intentions of the Economic Operational Staff (Wirtschaftsführungsstab) East. In this connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State Secretary (Staatssekretär) Koerner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director Ricke, General Schubert and others. Far-reaching agreement was reached in the easter questions as regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few problems regarding the relationship of the proposed Reich ministry toward the four-year plan are still open and will be subject, after submission, to a decision of the Fuehrer. In principle I declared that I in no way intended to found an economic department in my office, economics would rather be handled substantially and practically by the Reichsmarschall and the persons appointed by him, however the two responsible department heads, namely Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial economics and Ministerial Director Ricke for food economics, would be placed in my office as permanent liaison men, to coordinate here political aims with the economic necessities, in a department which would have to unite yet other personsfor such coordinating work, depending on later and for work (political leadership of labor unions, construction etc.)

H1155-0196

After notification of the Reich foreign minister, the latter appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my office. For the requested representation in the political department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Scibbrandt) the foreign ministry released General Counsel Dr. Brautigam, who is known to me for for many years, speaks Russian, and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations wich if necessary will be placed before the Führer are under way with the foreign office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its representatives to the future Reich commissioners.

The propaganda ministry appointed State Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, etc. would be made in my office; a great number of substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the papers prepared by the propaganda ministry would be modified here if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda will undisputedly be subject to the Reich ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda. For the sake of closer cooperation the propaganda ministry assigns yet another person directly to my department "Enlightenment and Presse" (Aufklärung und Presse) and in addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these activities have been going on for some time, and without attracting attention to my office in any way, this agreement on contents and terminology takes place continually every day.

Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister Ohnesorge concerning future transmission of communication and setting up of all technical necessities in future occupied territories; with Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with Reichsminister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of numerous necessary officials for the commissariats. According to the present estimate there will be four Reichs Kommissariats, as approved by the Führer. I shall propose to the Führer for political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of General Commissariats (24) Main Commissariats (about 80) and Regional (Gebiet) Commissariats (over 900). A General Commissariat would correspond to a former Generalgovernment, a Main Commissariat to a Main-Government. A Regional Commissariat contains 3 or 4 Districts (Kreise). In view of the huge spaces that is the minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil government and/or administration. A portion of the officials has already been requested on the basis of the above named command of the Chief of the OKW.

In the same manner conferences have taken place with the Reich Physicians Leader (Reichsärzteführer) Dr. Conti, the Inspector of the Army Veterinary Service, and all specialists belonging thereto. The difficulties of medical and veterinary supply were thoroughly discussed and the measures were provided, in order to insure well-prepared employment of the forces mentioned after the end of the operations. A conference with Reichsminister Dr. Todt resulted in the assignment first of all of 4 higher leaders of the Construction Service, whereupon Dr. Todt proposed to unite administratively under one leadership the whole Construction Service.

Discussions took place with Reich Leader Amann and his chief of staff Rienhardt regarding the publication of four German newspapers in the Reich Commissariats to start with. Furthermore a number of newspapers in the prospective native tongues were considered. According to the latest information the technical forces, for this work are already at the border and may be committed at any time to determine whether the prerequisites for printing shops are present.

Discussions are also under way with Corpsleader (Korpsfuehrer) Huehnlein and with the Reich youth leadership to assure a necessary and suitable mobilization. Intensive talks also took place with the Chief of Staff (Stabschef) of the SA. He was asked to make available a number of the most reliable SA leaders for this gigantic territory, which he agreed to do. The personnel suggestions together with other suggestions will be submitted to the Fuehrer. The same agreement has been reached with the Reich organizational leader (Reichsorganisationsleiter), who has instructed the commander of Krossinsee, Gohdes, to carry out the swelling channelling of requested persons, to admit them into Krossinsee for schooling and instruction on the whole problem and prepare them in the best manner for commitment. On the orders of Dr. Ley party member Herrenbach was then employed in order to take over already now the leadership of Russian labor unions in conjunction with the Wehrmacht. That appeared as an eminently important problem, particularly also in connection with the economic leadership, because the labor unions undoubtedly have been a powerful support of the Soviets and especially have the commitment of the German Labor Front appeared necessary under certain conditions.

Monthly discussions regarding the relationship of the Police to the new order in the East have taken place. Certain proposed changes thereto have been suggested by the Reichsfuehrer SS and on his order by Gruppenfuehrer (SS Lt Gen) Heydrich which do not appear supportable to me for the complete authority of the German Reich government in the East. Also the documents of this problem will have to be laid before the Fuehrer for decision.

Aside from these negotiations I received the responsible deputies of the entire propaganda, namely Ministerial Director Fritsche, Ambassador Schmidt, Reich Superintendent of Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr. Grothe OKW, and others. Without going into details of political objectives I instructed the above-named persons in confidence about the necessary attitude, with the request to tone down the whole terminology of the press, without issuing any statements.

The works for substantial coverage of the Eastern question prepared long ago appeared in my office, which I turned over to the propaganda deputies. I enclose a few samples thereof. These pamphlets, which may later be turned over to the press for development, deal with the whole structure and organization of the USSR, the economic possibilities of the East, Agriculture, the peoples of the Soviet Union, the work of the Komintern since 1889, the Jews in the Soviet Union since 1933, Statistical results of the poll taken among the Germans in Russia, the history of the Ukraine, of the Caucasus, of Turkestan, Extensive works are in preparation for the foundation of local administration: German law in the Ukraine, German art in the Ukraine influence of the German language on the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainians from the viewpoint of the Germans. In addition a number of articles are being prepared in Russian language which have the purpose of enlightening the people of the Soviet Union about true conditions in Germany. These articles are also suitable as the basis for newspaper articles in the newly occupied territories. Finally, after extensive work, an ethnological map of the East based on the most recent statistical reports has been printed in great number and made available to all offices. This map can be used as the basis of eventual fixing of boundaries in the north as well as in the south, and offers points of departure for fixing the boundaries of the future Reich Commissariats.

As a result of these conferences, conducted for the most part by myself, continuous consultation and organizational preparation is under way through my office and through those of the liaison men delegated from the other offices of the Party and

the State.

I may say that al the work, inasmuch as it is at-all possible under present condition, is in full swing. Aside from the General- and Chief commissariats more than 300 Regional Commissariats are planned, which must all be manned by political leaders, representatives of the department and officials of the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The work in the East differs basically from the conditions in the West. Whereas we can count on every technical installation and a cultured population here in the big cities, that is not the case in the East. There literally everything will have to be prepared and taken along, additionally for the gigantic spaces - not only an auto park but a great number of typewriters, office material, above all medical supplies and much more down to the bed sheets. It does not appear possible to accomplish such a project suddenly in 14 days, therefor all these arrangements had to be set in full motion already now on my responsibility on the basis of the Fuehrer's decree.

The structure of my office itself is temporarily organized as follows in carrying out the Fuehrer's order. I have requested Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Dr. Meyer as my permanent representative. He has negotiated personally and thoroughly, through the whole time with all pertinent offices, in order to develop all aspects down to the details. A political department has been founded for the execution of the substantical work, under my co-worker of many years Dr Seibbrandt (deputy General Consul Dr. Brautigam); who prepares the various books and pamphlets for information. A great number of propaganda leaflets have been composed by him which will then have be scattered over the Russian front in huge numbers by the armed forces. Also for a specific time other leaflets are ready which are addressed directly to the individual races. I do not care to decide on this date for myself, and will lay these originals before the Fuehrer at the first opportunity with the request to check the contents and determine the time of the eventually approved appeals. The political department is also undertaking a thorough investigation of all those, with the exception of Russians, who eventually can be used as advisors for the administration of the various nationalities. Continuous discussions about this subject are under way with representatives of the OKW, the propaganda ministry, etc. Secondly a department of economic - political cooperation has been founded under direction of Oberbereichsleiter Mollatke. A department of »Law, Finance, and Administration« has been taken over by Regierungspraesident Dr. Dr. A department for Culture and Science is as yet unoccupied since the development of this question does not appear urgent. Also the department »Enlightenment and Press«. It is occupied by Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz, deputy Job Zimmermann. Integrated here are co-workers who command the Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages. The wishes of the Reich Press Chief (Reichspressechef) for setting up one press chief for each Reichskommissar are under discussion in order to decide them in that sense if possible.

Thus I hope that when, after preliminary conclusion of the military action the Fuehrer has the possibility for a report from me, I shall be able to report to the Fuehrer for reaching preparations, up to those points of special and personal nature which the Fuehrer alone can decide.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. I039-PS 9. November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/SGT. 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document I039-PS

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/SGT. 33779426

H1155-0200

Exhibit #3 146
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

SEC-24-G/C-77

TRANSLATION

TOP SECRET

Fuehrer HQ, 18 May 1941

High Command of the Armed Forces
"WFSt" Dep.L (I Op) No. 44747/41 CC.Ch.M.

Top Secret
By officer only.

To: Navy High Command, Naval Warfare Direction
Air Force High Command, General Staff L.

The Foreign Office has prepared for the use in "Barbarossa" the attached draft of a Declaration of Operational Zones.

The Foreign Office, however, reserves its decision as to the date (when the Declaration will be issued) as well as discussion of particulars.

The Chief of the High Command
By Order
signed von Falkenstein

(Note: The enclosure is a draft for a declaration concerning operational zones in the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic, and the Black Sea.)

Exhibit USA 147 Filed Jan. 9, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2508-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART II, PAGE 29

German-Japanese Agreement
Against the Communist Internationale

Ubkommen gegen die Kommunistische Internationale.

The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist Internationale known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist Internationale in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menance to the peace of the world; desirous of co-operating in the defense against Communist subversive activities; have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The high contracting states agree to inform one another of the activities of the Communist Internationale, to consult each other on the necessary preventive measures and to carry them through in close collaboration.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is threatened by the subversive activities of the Communist Internationale to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of this agreement or to take part in the present agreement.

Article 3

The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. It comes into force on the day of signature and shall remain effective for a period of five years. Before the expiration of this period the High Contracting Parties will come to an understanding over the future form of their co-operation.

In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly and properly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Berlin on November 25, 1936--that is 25th of November of the 11th year of Showa Period.

(signed) Von Ribbentrop, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the German Reich.
(signed) Vicomte Kintomo Mushakoji, Imperial Japanese Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador.

Supplementary Protocol

On the occasion of the signing today of the agreement against the Communist Internationale the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows:

(a) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will work in close collaboration in matters concerning the exchange of information about the activity of

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H1155-0202

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2643-PS
OFFICE U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

"Reichsgesetzblatt", Part II, Berlin,
November 28, 1940, No. 41, P. 279.

ANNOUNCEMENT

concerning the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan on November 25, 1940

On September 27, 1940, at Berlin, the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan was signed by Representatives with full powers of the German, Italian and Japanese Governments. The Pact came into force upon signature. It is published below.

Berlin, November 25, 1940

THE REICH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

von Ribbentrop

* * *

H1155-0203

THREE-POWER PACT

BETWEEN GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN

The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan consider it as a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the world be given its own proper place. They have therefore decided to stand together and to cooperate with one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend this cooperation to such nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3

Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake

to assist

to assist one another with all political, economic and military means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Article 4

For the purpose of implementing the present pacts, joint technical commissions, the members of which are to be appointed by the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, will meet without delay.

Article 5

Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

Article 6

The present Pact shall come into force immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At the proper time before expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, if one of them so requests, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this pact and have hereunto apposed their seals.

Done in 3 original copies at Berlin, on the 27th day of September, 1940, in the XVIIIth year of the Fascist Era, corresponding to the 27th day of the 9th month of the 15th year of the Showa era.

Joachim von Ribbentrop

Ciano

(Signature of the Japanese Representative)

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H1155-0205

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 2643-PS

7 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., Inf., 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the German text of Document 2643-PS.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt., Inf.
01332102

H1155-0206

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1881-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Notes Fuen 20/41

NOTES
regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER
and the Japnnese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister
and of the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin
on the 4th of April 1941.

Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavours for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal CASPARI.

Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that the United States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he tried to convince the POPE, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.

The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.

MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, that the FUEHRER should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-minded as possible the wishes of the Japanes Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat war fare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so , that no American could land in Europe. She would

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conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American.

In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

As regards Japanese - American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight, anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignity of armed Forces. He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignments rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.

The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could ad-

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vance against Japan together with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that one the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

On his return, being questioned, he woul indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

signed: SCHMIDT.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1881-PS

4 April 1941.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1881-PS.

ERNST COHN

Aufz RAM 21/41

Notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 5 April 1941.

(pages 2 to 3:)

Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty.

In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuhrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the resignation from the League of Nations.

(pages. 9 to 11)

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only dominant power on the European Continent.

In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:

1) Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact.

2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East Asia.

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H1155-0210

Matsnoka replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long been of the opinion that every nation would be offered an opportunity only once in a thousand years. Japan was confronting such an opportunity, and she would have to assume the risk connected with it. She would have to act decisively at the right moment in order to take advantage of this unique opportunity.

Berlin, the 7th of April 1941

Sig. Schmidt

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1882-PS

C. 19 November 1945

I, Virginia Von Schon, X-046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt of Document No. 1882-PS.

C. Virginia Von Schon
X-046318

TELEGRAM
(Code)

Special Train Westfalen No. 707, 10 July 1941, 2:51 P.M.
Arrival: 10 July 1941, 4:00 P.M.

1. Code Office AA No. 634
2. Diplogerm Tokio

Telegram in code (Secret code system)
To: Ambassador personally.

* * * * * *

(Page 24953)

. . . . 4.) Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese foreign minister, first of all because the present Japanese government would really act inexcusable toward the future of its nation, if it would not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all times its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are completed.

It is, of course, also in our interest that Japan wants to secure for herself further possessions in the South, Indo-China, etc., just as every measure of Japan direct toward expansion is principally welcomed by us. I shall give you detailed instructions, within the near future, relative to the consequences which might, and no doubt will, result from the occupation of Iceland by American military forces, and the attitude which we will take toward Japan in this connection. As directive for talks we can advise you already today that the sending of American military forces to the support of England into a territory which has been officially announced by us as combat area, shows not only Roosevelt's aggressive intentions, but the fact of the intrusion of American military forces into the combat area to the support of England is in itself an aggression against Germany and Europe. After all, one cannot enter a theater of war in which two armies are fighting, and join the army of one side without the intention of shooting and without actually doing so. I do not doubt for a moment that in case of the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and America, in which case today already it may be considered as an absolutely established fact that only America will be the aggressor, Japan will fulfil her obligations, as agreed upon in the Three Power Pact. However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the Trans Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power Pact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question of England's collapse or the total destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be a matter of time. An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the British Empire which are important

H1155-0211

H1155-0212

for the Three Power Pact countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in detail on the political situation there.

RIBBENTROP

NOTE: Transmitted to Embassy in Tokio
under No. 1018
Telegram control, 10 July 1941.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2896-PS

29 November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2896-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

H1155-0213

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT 2897-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Telegram
(Secret Cipher System)

Tokyo 14 July 1941 0230 hrs.
Arrived 14 July 1941 1120 hrs.

As fast as possible!

1217 dated 13.7
for Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Answer to telegram 10, ## 108 Reichsministers for Foreign Affairs
Arrived Tokio 12 July 1941

I am trying with all means to work toward Japan's entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using arguments of personel message of Foreign Minister and telegram cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the Foreign Office, Military elements, Nationalists and friendly business men. I believe that, according to military preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby, is the disunity among activist groups which without unified command follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed situation.

Ott.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. 2897-PS

18 November. 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/Sgt, 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of excerpts from Document 2897-PS

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/Sgt
33779426

H1155-0214

Exhibit #3148
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

D 656

Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and December 8, 1941

From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
29 November, 1941
+1393 (In 3 Parts, complete)

By his request, I was supposed to have called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop during the evening of yesterday, the 28th. Suddenly, however, he requested that the time be postponed and it was not until 10:30 at night that I finally saw him.

This delay was occasioned by the fact that a long conference of the bigwigs of the government and military, from Goering down, was being held at the official residence of the Fuhrer. The war against the Soviet Union has now taken definite shape and the outcome can be unerringly foretold. Next year's campaigns were mapped at this conference, taking into consideration the points brought up at the conference of the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Europe. It is an absolute certainty that Japan's moves were also given discussion at this conference.

1. Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-U.S. negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

Ribbentrop: "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tri-Partite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan.

"As Fuhrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese- U.S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

"If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favourable results for Japan and herself."

I: "I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a stat of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?"

Ribbentrop: "Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do."

Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops, and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech as well as that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.

4070)

H1155-0215

(Part 2)

2. I made enquiries as to the future of the war against the Soviet Union.

Ribbentrop: "The Fuhrer has stated that he is now determined to crush the Soviet Union to an even greater extent than he had planned at first. He is now bent on completely wiping out that state and went on to announce that practically all of the main military objectives had been attained and that a greater part of the German troops would shortly be brought back to Germany.

"Following up those campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be launched in earnest. Next spring Germany will advance to and cross the Ural Mountains and chase Stalin deep into Siberia."

I: "Approximately when do you expect that?"

Ribbentrop: "The campaign will be launched in about May of next year, according to present schedules".

I: "According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing to gamble quite a bit in her Russian campaign. We hope that air connections between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at an early time."

Ribbentrop:" That is an item that Germany has been considering for some time. By summer of next year, I do not believe that air connection from the Ural area to Manchukuo will be an impossibility."

3. I then asked him about the campaign against England proper to which he replied that before launching landing operations against England, Germany will probably completely wipe out Britain's influence in the Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea. I got the impression that more emphasis is being placed on this area than heretofore. So, I asked whether it was Germany's intention to conclude the war without attempting to go through with a campaign against England.

Ribbentrop:" Germany has, of course, made all necessary preparations for this campaign. However, Germany is in receipt of intelligences which would seem to indicate that all is not well within England herself. For example, we hear that there is a split within the ranks of the Conservatives that Churchill's influence is on the wane; that Bevin, Chief of the Labour Party, is advocating revolutionary measures. All of these are tending to make the preservation of order there increasingly difficult.

"Of course, I am not one to implicitly believe all of this. However, I am convinced that things are getting bad in England. Under these circumstances, it may be that Germany's various other campaigns may cause England to fall even without our going through with our landing operations against England herself.

Part 3.

"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possesions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German Colonies. Italy will be given the greater
4071) share of the African Colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control

H1155-0216

European Russia."

4. In conclusion, I said: "I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy but also have all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?"

Ribbentrop:"We would like to end this war during next year. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have to be continue on into the following year.

"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuhrer is determined on that point."

In closing this conference, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. Please therefore exercise particular cauthion in handling this message.

I have shown copies of this message to the military and naval attache's Lt-Gen. (Vice Adm.?) Nomura, and Maj.-Gen. (Rear Adm.?) Abe. Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in Tokyo, too.

(In the last section of the first part of this message we wrote +++ "the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops"+++ That should have read: "the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid war".)

25556
JD-1: 6942

(D)
Navy Trans. 12-1-41-(7)

4072)

H1155-0217

Exhibit GS 149
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

4016.

INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES
SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
BETWEEN JULY 1 AND DECEMBER 8, 1941

(Secret)

From : Berlin. D.657.

To : Tokyo

December 8, 1941.

(Priority)

1437 Limited distribution

Re my ## 143(97?).[a]

At 1:00 p.m. to-day (8th) I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them.

It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information.

Army 25978 Trans. 12/9/41.

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[a] Not available.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 2911PS.
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNCEL.

SECRET STATE MATTER

Notes concerning the discussions between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Oshima at Steinort, on 9 July 1942.

He the Foreign Minister asked to see the Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described by him and a question of fateful importance arose concerning the point carrying on of the war.: If Japan felt itself sufficiently strong Military the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked Russia at this time it would lead to her (Russia) final moral collaspe, at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at the present, to eliminate once and for all the Russian Colissus in Eastern Asia.

He had discussed this question with the Fuhrer and the Fuhrer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point,to begin with: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia to be allowed to become a stalemate at the halfway mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into action that is not profitable for both sides.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 2911 PS

17.11.45.

I, WOLFGANG E, THORMANN, 33779426 M/Sgt, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2911 PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/SGT.
33779426

H1155-0218

Exhibit GB 150
Filed Jan. 9, 1946 (Mac USA 158)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2954-
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Pages F 12027 & F 12028-

TOP SECRET (Rubber Stamp) Minutes Reich Minister
for Foreign Affairs 14/43 top secret
(in ink)

MINUTES

on the discussion of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs with Ambassador OSHIMA on 6 March 1943.

Ambassador OSHIMA declared, that he received a Telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (RAM) to following: The suggestion of the German Government, to attack Russia, was the object of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger, which threatens from Russia, and completely understands the desire of its German ally, that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction, that it would be in the common interest, not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question.

The Japanese Government has the intention, to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts.

The RAM brought up the question after the explanation by the Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and American, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However it would be more correct, that all powers, allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together. It is not good, when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the German national strength. He has worries silently, that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts.

- - - - - - - - - -

(Page F 12035 Line 5 to Line 14)

The the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a maritime problem, and on all fronts - except those in China -- there are mostly very few ground forces committed. Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an army affair, and he asked himself, if the necessary forces would not be ready for that.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2954-PS

18 November 1945.

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt(jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 2954-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE,
Lt (jg), USNR, 391590.

3760.

H1155-0219

H1155-0220

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOC. No. 2929-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

notation RA Nr 23/43 top secret

NOTES.

on the conference of the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs with Ambassador OSHIMA on 18 April 1943 in FUSCHL.

TOP SECRET
++++++++++

The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favourable opportunity for Japan, If she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment.

++++++++++++

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2929-PS

18. 11. 45.

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2929-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4
37446052.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 735-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Illegible pencil note at top.

S. O. only
access only through officer

Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff
No. 771793/44 Most Secret, S. O. only

Führer Headquarters
6.6.1944
Most Secret

Exhibit #1315
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

3 Copies
1st Copy

Subject: Treatment of enemy terror aviators

Minutes of a meeting

1). Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy Chief of WFSt in Klessheim on the afternoon of 6.6, that a conference on this question had been held shortly before between the Reich Marshall, the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reichsführer SS. Contrary to the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister who wished to include every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks carried out with A/C armament, aimed directly at the civilian population and their property should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to be the rule. On the contrary, there has been no question of court martial sentence or handing over to the police.

2). Deputy Chief of WFSt stated the following:

a). First and foremost, following the lines of the generally distributed declaration made by Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels and numerous press notices written in the same vein, it is essential to announce any definitely established incident of this kind giving the names and units of the aviators, the place the incident occurred and any other relevant facts. The purpose of this would be to make clear the serious intentions of the Germans in the face of disbelieving enemy propaganda and especially to discourage effectively any further murderous action against our civilian population. Therefore the question is whether the SD knows of such a case or whether the necessary proof is available from which to construct a case like this with the required statements.

Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner replied to both in the negative.

b). Deputy Chief of the WFSt mentioned that, apart from Lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for segregating those enemy aviators, who are suspected of criminal action of this kind, until they are received into the Reception Camp for aviators at Oberursel; if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD for special treatment.

For this purpose the WFSt would cooperate with the Supreme Command of the Air Force to set out the necessary regulations for the use of the head of the camp at Oberursel.

Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner expressed his complete agreement with this view and that the SD take charge of those aviators segregated.

c). On the question of making announcements, it is settled that, for the present, agreement should be reached in every case between OKW/WFSt, OKL, and the Reichsführer SS to decide the form that the announcement should take.

H1155-0221

H1155-0222

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 735-PS
(cont.)

The participation of the Foreign office is to be assumed by the WFSt.

3). At a conference with Colonel von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Air Force) on 6.6, it was settled that the following actions were to be regarded as terror-action, justifying Lynch law.

a). Low level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population, single persons as well as crowds.

b). Shooting on our own (German) air crews in the air who have baled out.

c). Attacks with air craft armament on passenger trains in the public service.

d). Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals and hospital-trains which are clearly marked with the Red Cross.

The head of the Reception camp for aviators at Oberursel will be informed of these facts given in Section 3 above. If the facts of any case of this kind are established on examination, the prisoners are to be handed over to the SD. Colonel von Brauchitsch declared, at the end, that another report to the Reich Marshall on this subject would be superfluous.

sgd. Warlimont

Distribution:

Chief OKW via Chief WFSt	1st Copy
Deputy Chief WFSt/Ktb.	2nd Copy
Qu (rough copy)	3rd Copy

H1155-0223

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 735-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

Remarks by the Chief of OKW on the agenda dated 6.6.44 No. 771793/44

Most Secret S.O. only.

"If one allows the people to carry out Lynch law, it is difficult to enforce rules!

Min. Dir Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator on the road. I am against legal procedure! It doesn't work out!

sgd. K. " (Keitel)

Remarks by Chief of WFSt:

"To 3. This conference is insufficient. The following points must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:

1) What do we consider as murder?
Is RR in agreement with point 3b?

(marginal note) (Foreign Office) 2) How should the procedure be carried out?
A.A.?
a). by the people?
b). by the authorities?

3) How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out against other enemy aviators?

4) Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?

sgd. J. " (Jodl)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 735-PS

5 November 1945

I, ESME SHERRIFF, 2/O, W.R.N.S., 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 735-PS.

ESME SHERRIFF
2/O, W.R.N.S.
36482

Exhibit USA 152
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

H1155-0224

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 728-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DRAFT

TRANSLATION

Ambassador RITTER No. 444
SALZBURG, 20 June 1944

Copy
Secret

1.) To
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
With reference to your correspondence of 15 June 1944
Nr. AFSt/Qu. (Verw.) Nr. 771793/44 gKChefs. II. Ang.,
concerning the treatment of enemy terror-aviators.

In spite of the obvious objections, founded on international law and foreign politics, the Foreign Office is basically in agreement with the proposed measures.

In the examination of the individual cases a distinction must be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special treatment by the S.D. (Security Service)

I. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the circumstances deserving punishment, according to points 1-4 of the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the German authorities are not directly responsible, since death had occurred, before a German official became concerned with the case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such, that it will not be difficult to depict the case in an appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of lynching, it will be of primary importance correctly to handle the individual case upon publication.

II. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the S.D. (Security Service) including subsequent publication, would be tenable, only if GERMANY, on this occasion simultaneously would openly repudiate the committment of International Law, presently in force, and shall recognized by GERMANY. When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by the police, and is delivered to the Air Forces (L.M.) Reception Camp OBERURSEL, he has received, by this very fact, the legal status of a prisoner of war. The Prisoner of War Treaty of 27 July, 1929 establishes definite rules on the prosecution and sentencing of the Prisoner of War, and the Execution of the death penalty, as for example in Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only three months after the protective power has been notified of the sentence; in Article 63: a prisoner of war will be tried only by the same courts and under the same procedure as members of the German Armed Forces. These rules are so specific, that it would be futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the other hand the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion a formal repudiation of the Prisoner of War Treaty,

An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected fliers from ever attaining a legal Prisoner of War status, that is, that immediately upon seizure they be told that they are not considered Prisoners of War but criminals, that they would not be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over Prisoners of War; hence not go to a Prisoner of War Camp; but that they would be delivered to the authorities in charge of the prosecution of criminal acts and that they would be tried in a summary proceeding. If the evidence at the trial should reveal that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status of Prisoner of War by transfer to the Air Forces (L.M.) Reception Camp OBERURSEL. Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility that GERMANY will be accussed of the violation of existing treaties and maybe

H1155-0225

not even the adoption of reprisals upon German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable us clearly to define our attitude, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly having to renounce the present agreements or of the need of having to use excuses, which no one would believe, upon the publication of each individual case.

Of the acts deemed crimes listed under ##1-4 by the letter of 15 June, we note that those listed under 1 and 4 are legally unobjectionable. Those under 2 and 3 are not. The Foreign Office, however, would be willing to disregard this. Perhaps it would be preferable to combine Nos. 1, 3, and 4 to the effect that all strafing attacks on the civilian population by an aviator will be dealt with as crimes. The various facts under 1, 3 and 4 would then be significant only as especially outstanding examples. The Foreign Office sees no reason why such attacks should not be expiated, when they are directed against the civilian population in ordinary dwelling houses, in automobiles, on riverboats, etc.

The Foreign Office bases its opinion on the fact that it is altogether forbidden to German fliers to strafe the civilian population during their attacks in ENGLAND. According to information received by the Foreign Office, such an order was issued some time ago by the Supreme Commander of the Air Forces. In case of general publication, the existence of such an order could be pointed out.

III. It follows from the above, that the main weight of the action will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit: "the deterrence of enemy aviators" is actually achieved, which goal is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by enemy fliers upon the civilian populations must be stressed in a completely different propagandist manner than heretofore; if not in the publicity for home consumption, then certainly in the propaganda directed to foreign countries. The pertinent German local departments, most likely the police, would have to be informed immediately to submit a short, truthful report to a central depository in BERLIN giving particulars as to place, time, number of dead and wounded.

This central depository would at once forward these reports to the Foreign Office for exploitation. Since similar strafing attacks upon civilian populations have occurred in other countries, for example, in FRANCE, BELGIUM, CROATIA AND RUMANIA, the pertinent German departments or the governments in these countries are to be directed to collect the instances of such strafing attacks against the civilian population in the same manner and to exploit them propaganddistically in foreign countries, in collaboration with German offices.

IV. In the letter of 15 June the intention was communicated that until further notice, an understanding with the Foreign Office would have to be reached prior to any publication. The Foreign Office attaches particular value to this point and also to the fact that this understanding be reached, not only until further notice, but for the entire duration of the campaign.

By Order (signed) RITTER (crossed out)

H1155-0226

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 728-rS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 728-rS

23 November 1945

I, L. DAVENPORT, 32496537, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 728-rS.

L. DAVENPORT
32496537

Exhibit USA 153
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 740-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Ops Staff of the Armed Forces (Verw.1)
No. 006988/44 Secret.

30 June 1944
Secret
3 Copies
Copy No.1

Subject: Treatment of enemy terror-aviators

Marginal note: "We must really do something about this now. What is still necessary?"

(initialled)
(W. Warlimont)

Initialled K (Keitel) and 30/6 (30 June) in upper right hand corner.

Agenda

I. Enclosed I submit the draft of a reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, which has been passed to the Armed Forces Ops Staff (WFSt) through Ambassador RITTER.

Ambassador RITTER has advised us by telephone on 29 June that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft, but that he has ordered Envoy SONNLEITNER to present the attitude of the Foreign Office to the Führer, before the letter is sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The letter is to be forwarded to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces only after the approval by the Führer of the principles established by the Foreign Office.

II. The Reichsmarshall agrees with the precise wording of the definition of the term "terror-aviators" as given by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and with the proposed procedure.

/s/ WARLIMONT

Distribution:

Chief of Supreme Command of Armed Forces via Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops. Staff — Copy # 1
KTB (War Diary) — Copy # 2
Qu (Verw.1) — Copy # 3

(pencil note illegible)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 740-PS

2 November 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf. 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 740-PS

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
0-1335567.

H1155-0227

H1155-0228

T C 51

(C 3398/19/18)

No. 145

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax. - (Received March 18)

No. 102. Saving)
(Telegraphic) En clair. Berlin, March 16 1939.

MY telegram No. 120

Following is the text of a decree, dated 16th March, issued by Herr Hitler regulating the status of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia:-

"For ten centuries the Bohemian-Moravian lands belonged to the living space of the German people. Force and lack of understanding arbitrarily tore them from their old historical surroundings and finally created a source of permanent unrest by incorporating them within the artificial edifice of Czecho-Slovakia. From year to year the danger that a new, appalling menace to European peace would emanate, as had happened once before in the past, from this living space, increased. For the Czecho-Slovak State, and those in power there, had not succeeded in properly organizing the existence side by side of the national groups arbitrarily united within its boundaries and had thereby failed to awaken the interest of all concerned in the maintenance of their common State. It has thereby proved its inmost incapacity to exist and has for this reason now also fallen into actual dissolution.

"The German Reich, however, cannot tolerate permanent disturbances in these territories that are so all-important to its own peace and security and also so important to the general well-being and universal peace. Sooner or later the Reich, as the Power most interested and affected, by history and geographical position, would have to suffer the most serious consequences. Self-preservation, therefore, requires that the German Reich should be determined to intervene decisively in favour of the restoration of a basis for a reasonable Central European order and should take the requisite measures. For it has already proved in the course of its historical past of a thousand years that it alone, thanks to its greatness and to the qualities of the German people, can be called upon to solve these tasks.

"Filled with the earnest desire to serve the true interests of the peoples domiciled in this living space, to guarantee the individual national life of the German and of the Czech peoples, to benefit peace and the social welfare of all, I therefore decree the following, in the name of the German Reich, as the basis for the future existence in common of the inhabitants of these territories:-

1192)

H1155-0229

"Article 1.

"1. The territories which formed part of the former Czecho-Slovak Republic and which were occupied by German troops in March 1939 belong henceforth to the territory of the German Reich and come under the latter's protection as the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia."

"2. In so far as the defence of the Reich demands, the Leader and Chancellor shall take measures differing from the above in respect of individual parts of these areas.

"Article II.

"Inhabitants of the protectorate of German race shall become German nationals and German citizens in accordance with the provisions of the Reich Citizenship Law of the 15th September, 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Ts 1146). The provisions with regard to safeguarding German blood and German honour shall therefore also apply to them. They shall be subject to German jurisdiction.

"2. The remaining inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia shall be nationals of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

"Article III.

"1. The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is autonomous and self-administering.

"2. It shall exercise its sovereign rights within the scope of the protectorate in consonance with the political, military and economic importance of the Reich.

"3. These sovereign rights shall be represented by its own organs, authorities and officials.

"Article IV.

"The head of the autonomous administration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia shall enjoy the guard and honours of the head of a State. The head of the protectorate must possess, in order to exercise his functions, the confidence of the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich.

"Article V.

"1. As trustee of Reich interests the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich shall nominate a 'Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.' His seat of office will be Prague.

"2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich and as Commissioner of the Reich Government, is charged with duty of seeing to the observance of the political principles laid down by the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich.

"3. The members of the Government of the protectorate shall be confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be withdrawn.

H1155-0230

T C 51
(Cont'd)

"4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all measures taken by the Government of the protectorate and to give advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich and, in case of danger, issue ordinances required for the common interest.

"5. The promulgation of laws, ordinances and other legal announcements and the execution of administrative measures and legal judgments shall be annulled if the Reich Protector enters an objection.

"Article VI.

"1. The foreign affairs of the protectorate, especially the protection of its nationals abroad, shall be taken over by the Reich. The Reich will conduct foreign affairs in accordance with the common interest.

"2. The protectorate shall have a representative accredited to the Reich Government with the title of a 'minister'.

"Article VII.

"1. The Reich shall accord military protection to the protectorate.

"2. In the exercise of this protection the Reich shall maintain garrisons and military establishments in the protectorate.

"3. For the maintenance of internal security and order the protectorate may form its own organizations. The composition, strength, numbers and arms shall be decided by the Reich Government.

"Article VIII.

"The Reich shall control directly the transport, post and telegraph systems.

"Article IX.

"The protectorate shall belong to the customs area of the Reich and be subject to its customs sovereignty.

"Article X.

"The crown is legal tender, together with the reichsmark, until further notice.

"2. The Reich Government shall fix the ratio of one to the other.

"Article XI

"1. The Reich can issue ordinances valid for the protectorate in so far as the common interest requires.

"2. In so far as a common need exists, the Reich may take over branches of administration and create its own Reich authorities therefor as required.

"3. The Reich Government may take measures for the maintenance of security and order.

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T C 51
(Cont'd)

"Article XII

"The law at present existing in Bohemia and Moravia shall remain in force so long as it does not conflict with the principle of the assumption of protection by the German Reich.

"Article XIII

"The Reich Minister of the Interior shall issue, in agreement with the other Ministers concerned, the administrative and legal regulations for the execution and amplification of this decree.

"Hitler "Ribbentrop.
"Frick "Lammers

"Prague, March 16."

H1155-0232

Exhibit GB 154
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

D-639

Extract from REICHGESETZBLATT 1940.
Part I. Page 778.

"Decree of The Führer concerning exercise of Governmental Authority in the Netherlands." 18 May, 1940".

"Section 1. The occupied Netherlands territories shall be administered by the 'Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories'....The Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the Reich and vested with supreme civil authority."

Section 6. Doctor Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories".

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H1155-0233

Exhibit GB 155
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

Translation of Document
2921-PS.

33

Decree

of the Reich Commissar for the occupied
Dutch territories re the confiscation of property.

By virtue of para 5 of the Fuehrer's Decree of the 18th. May 1940 (R.G.Bl. I p. 778) about the exercise of the powers of government in the Netherlands. I order :

Para 1.

(1) The property of persons or associations that have assisted, or are assisting or of whom it is to be assumed that they will assist ant- German or anti-Reich efforts can be confiscated in whole or in part.

(2) The same applies to goods and rights which have served, are serving or are suitable for serving to further the efforts named in sub-para 1.

Para 2.

(1) The organs of the German Security Police can temporarily seize property, goods or rights in a preparation for their confiscation. The seizure is carried out by public proclamation or written declaration to the owner of the property, the direct possessor of the goods or the holder of the right.

(2) The organs of the German Security Police can appoint a temporary administrator of the property, goods and rights seized, either simultaneously with or after the seizure. The temporary administrator can take such measures as are customary within the framework of regular administration.

(3) By the seizure, the persons named in para 2, sub-para 1 lose the right to dispose of the thing seized without the permission of the organ which has ordered the seizure, or, where a temporary administrator has been appointed, of this temporary administration.

(4) If a book open to inspection by the public is kept about goods or right which have been seized, with the object of assisting juridicio - commercial transactions, the seizure is to be entered in this book free of charge on the demand of the organ which has ordered the seizure or, where a temporary administrator has been appointed, by this temporary administrator.

(5) Goods or a right which have been seized can not be acquired in good faith when an entry in accordance with sub-para 4 exists, or where the seizure has been publicly announced.

(6) The seizure is to be cancelled if, in the opinion of the organ which has ordered the seizure, it has become unnecessary or impracticable in view of the circumstances of the case. The cancellation of the seizure is carried out in the same way as it is ordered (para 2, sub-para 1). If an entry in conformity with sub-para 4 has been made, this is to be cancelled free of charge.

Para 3.

If goods are, at the time of their seizure, not in the custody of their owner they can not be confiscated if the owner announces his right within one month to the higher S.S. and Police Chief, or, where a temporary administrator has been appointed, to the latter, unless the owner intended, by handing over the goods to assist the efforts named in para 1.

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Para 4.

(1) Confiscation takes place by a Decree of the Reich Commissar for the occupied Dutch territories or by the authorities denoted by him; it comes into effect on its public announcement or its communication to those concerned. Para 2, sub-para 4 applies mutatis mutandis.

(2) The confiscated property etc. is to be used for purposes of public benefit in the occupied Dutch territories. The Reich Commissar will publish special regulations about this.

Para 5.

Associations of persons whose property has been confiscated will be dissolved. No winding up will take place.

Para 6.

(1) Responsibility for the debts of the owner of confiscated property and for the obligations connected with confiscated goods and rights remain in existence to the extent that they are covered by the amount of the property or by the selling value of the goods and rights. Rights to confiscated landed estate remain in force.

(2) In case of debts exceeding value, the thing confiscated is to be divided up among those who are, in accordance with sub-para 1, the legal creditors and in conformity with the existing Dutch bankruptcy laws.

Para 7.

This Decree comes into force on the day of its publication.

The Hague, 4th. July 1940.

The Reich Commissar for the occupied Dutch territories:

SEYSS-INQUART.

3861

Exhibit #3 156
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1520-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1155-0235

NOTES
about a discussion with the FUEHRER
at the Fuehrer Headquarters on the 8th May 1942.

Present at first Reich Minister Dr. Lammers.

I began with reporting to the Fuehrer about the results of the 1941/42 collection of the N.S.D.A.P. of books for the German Armed Forces resulting in more than 9 Million books, from which 46,000 libraries were formed.

Then I dealt with certain reproaches raised against the Ministry East. The article in the "information service" of the Ministry for Propaganda concerning construction and aims of the Ministry East appeared without any knowledge whatsoever on my part. I had, as a matter of principle, agreed with the Ministry for Propaganda that no publications whatsoever regarding the occupied Eastern Territories should be published without my express consent. This became essential because even Ministers talked about the "Policy of Colonization" in the East. - Then it was also said that I had declared 650 men as unfit for war service and thus deprived the armed forces of them, and that I also left 90 Officers without work as an advance command in Taganrog. I want to state that, because of the newly reinforced decree, the Ministry East has handed over 650 men; however, up to a few weeks ago only 240 men have been called away, as concerns the 90 men in Taganrog, this is not a measure taken by me but by the Economic Staff East and the armed forces armament staff, resp. Therefore, this matter was none of my affair. Furthermore, this advance commando has been dissolved.

As regards the re-settlement of the Germans from Lithuania, the Fuehrer said that he was under the impression that people who had already settled here would have to be re-settled again. I told the Fuehrer that it was not so, this was a matter concerning more than 30,000 settlers capable of resettlement who were still detained in camps and who were worn down by the prolonged camp life.

At last I referred to the new Molotov memorandum regarding supposed horrors and our economic measures, which, as a matter of fact, refers to some statements in the so-called "Green Folder" of the economic staff East of the 4-year Plan. Presumably such statements had been discovered on the body of a shot agrarian leader; a year ago I had already expressed my concern about the too-clearly expressed tendencies of those statements. A number of agrarian leaders already had been killed, also three territorial commissioners already have been killed fighting the partisans.

Thereafter I described to the Fuehrer the considerations which caused me to grant self-administration to the Baltic countries. First of all this was not proclaimed by Law, but it was only my decree to the Reich Commissioner with the corresponding directives. In praxis it meant nothing beyond a confirmation of an already existing state of affairs and the abolition of a certain uncertainty. We were very short of officials and were thus forced to be most economical with human material. However, frequently efforts were noticable to meddle with the trivialities of life which necessitates new demands and withdraws too many soldiers from the armed forces. It left the doors open for some people to escape army service. Furthermore, self-administration was connected with an increased willingness to work. After all there were enough safet clauses whereby the self-administration could not undertake anything without the sanction of the Commissioner General. In order to eliminate any possible political danger, an exception has been made with Riga. Riga has 10-12,000 officials and was to receive a German mayor who is not subordinated to the Lithuanian self-administration. Thereby a personal political policy of the Lithuanian Directorate would be

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avoided. By this measure Riga would be an experiment for annexed administration.

We also created an historical alibi and had demonstrated that we were meeting the Baltic nations more than half way. If at a later date this would not be acknowledged, we had every justification to proceed more drastically. The Fuehrer kept all decrees and regulations in order to examine them. Yet during the whole of the report he made no comments.

Afterwards the Fuehrer asked how all those economical measures were looked upon by the part of the Germans. Whereupon I replied that, of course, the entire economic management was in German hands, and that this fact had produced a deterioration of the morale. Generally speaking the monopolistic companies and the ZHO (Zentralhandelsges. Ost-Eastern Central Trade) are fundamentally necessary, only they have to be supervised. Dr. LIEBEL interjected that private profits had to be throttled in order to avoid too strong a group of profiteers. I once more referred to the question of monopolies and wished to ascertain whether the Fuehrer intended an absolute tobacco monopoly for here, whereupon he declared that he was particularly interested in the retail monopoly. The question of arranging for the producers could still be settled at a later date. I replied that the economic leaders have not yet agreed upon the question of the producers. The opinion is frequently prevalent, that the production itself need not necessarily be a direct state monopoly. I told the Fuehrer that I shall have the whole question examined once again.

Then the problem of <u>religious freedom</u> for the occupied Eastern territories was discussed. The Fuehrer consulted Reichsleiter BORMANN, who already had gathered much experience by the preparations for the Wartheland and for Austria. I explained the the situations in the East was that various large ecclesiastical groups being formed but that one should not allow such development to take place without supervision, but that one ought to direct same and that the intended decrees, respectively orders, were for the purpose of protecting us from unanticipated surprises. BORMANN entirely agreed with this attitud , he merely questioned if the Reichminister East, who also had some standing in Germany, would not produce too close a dependency by a law which might have repercussions inside the Reich. What was to be understood under "Religious freedom" was to be interpreted <u>by the Churches</u>, and he could anticipate, that such a law would produce hundreds of new letters and complaints on the part of the churches within the Reich. The Fuehrer considered a number of twists and forms which would eliminate such a danger, and after discussing its suitability the Fuehrer read the decree and gave his consent. Finally it was agreed that the whole question was not to be settled <u>by myself</u> in the form of a law, but that the Reich Commissioners take the existing religious freedom so to speak for granted and would decree the necessary executive orders. I was then to watch the development continuously and retain the executive control. It is easily possible that the leaders of the churches in the Ukraine would combine in order to elect a patriarch. I pointed out that this was already the case for all practical purposes and that a steering of the matter is necessary. The Fuehrer asked me if I really thought that all the Ukrainians were faithful adherents of the church. I replied that with the older generation and the women it was certainly the case, the youth were already somewhat unaccustomed to church. Furthermore I had transported from Kiev to Berlin the "Atheist Museum". In this the writings of the national writer of the Ukraine, SCHEWTSCHENKO, are quoted and it may be possible to publish them in the Ukrainian language in a sense which in truth was not for the church. Also Such freedom

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of expression of opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Fuehrer emphazised that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the fitting measures; he believed that he was still able to do something because of his authority which at a later date would be difficult for anybody else. He would not forget the attitude of the church during the war. I told the Fuehrer that I carried out churchpolitical lectures in a small circle in my lecture house at Dahlem, in which the whole problem was thoroughly examined, so that in the future the necessary idealogical fight would also be carried out with the necessary knowledge and on the necessary scale.

Then the treatment of the countries which were Germany's wards was discussed I pointed out that some representatives interpreted the point of view of the master race, by travelling up and down the country with the whip. It is true, formerly one used to say of the Slavs that they liked to be thrashes. But this had changed radically. Now the situation was that the public thrashing meant the same as for the Orientals "the losing of face". Even the Bolshevics mistreated the prisoners abominably behind the walls, but never in public view. A number of incidents had occurred caused by thoughtless talk. It is necessary that our foreign representatives also know how to keep silent. The Fuehrer read the draft of my decree for the Reich Commissioner Ukraine and gave his consent to it.

I then described to the Fuehrer the reception of the three delegations of farmers in grateful acknowledgement of our agrarian legislation and produced all our propaganda. such as circulars, pamphlets, posters, trahslations of German writings, etc. The difficulty here, too, was that it had taken a long time until the 18 waggons could be transported. A part had remained in the Government General. The whole action was very successful. I then submitted to the Fuehrer photographs of Ukranian men and women who were working in the Heinkel works. The fuehrer expressed his surprise at the extraordinary good looks and even beauty of the people.

I then dealt with the employment of foreign workers in the occupied Eastern territories. I had appointed a special delegate for this who had been very active to cultivate all those existing connections and to institute new ones. At first the Danish minister LARSEN had travelled the Eastland with the General-Director JUNKER who was the chief of the Danish Committee for employment in the East. This journey already had produced tangible practical results: in Port Kunda a large cement works was being rebuilt, the machinery would be delivered within a few weeks. After an initial starting time about 75,000 tons of cement will be produced annually. Further erection of cement works would be possible. The completion of peat works could now be prepared in order to benefit from it in the following year. Two experts had to be sent there, and within a few weeks one could start with the installations. The same applies to a large plaster factory, to the completion of concrete and wooden shoe factories. Since it will probably become impossible in the future to continue to provide the population with leather shoes. The factory will be capable of a daily output of 10,000 shoes. Furthermore, a number of other business plannings are also being considered. Especially the oil factory at Libau is ready to be taken over, also creameries, shipbuilding plants, etc. All those works thus promise a considerable increase in production for the coming years. Negotiations had taken place also with The Dutch, and Reich Commissioner Seyss Inquart had just now submitted a first draft regarding the employment of Dutch

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people in the region of Libau. It is planned to hand over to the Dutch people 500,000 ha of land to by cultivated under stipulation that after delivery of all that is claimed by the German administration, they are permitted to export the surplus to Holland. Some of the details and still to be settled. The Fuehrer thought one could as a matter of principle admit Dutchmen to the East, because if there were not more than 1000 people, then they would be absorbed. He did not wish large colonies. The matter was left undecided, to be thoroughly investigate, Moreover the DAF German Workers Front had bought a wharf at Varna in order to tackle the building of concrete ships.

I then reported to the Fuehrer the planning of central office for planning in the East, and I gave him the names on the committee for the general policy, economics, etc. The supreme authorities of the Reich had sent their emissaries. Naturally nothing would be done at this stage in which might somehow hamper the war production.

Then the discussion turned to Caucasia and the policy of the AA. (Foreign Ministry) towards the Eastern territories. I reported to the Fuehrer that, for some time, we had picked out the best of the prisoners by commissions of the Ministry East. The OKW had now established the Turkestan Legion through direct collaboration with us. According to my information received from the manager of chief section "Policy", the camp is in perfect condition, the Commander has learned the Turkestan languages, and the Trukestans have accepted German military terms and have an anti-Bolshewist attitude. The legions of the Caucasians would be modeled on similar lines. If one had not in the beginning on the part of the SD, called all these peoples "Asiatics", had them shot or left to their fate, there would be more troops at the disposal of the German Reich today. A new flag was created for the Turkestan legion, the half moon was done away with and in its place put bow and arrow. I showed the Fuehrer the individual symbols for the designs for flags for the Georgians, Armenians, Aserbeidschanians, Cubancossaci and Kalmucks. The Fuehrer had no objections against those designes, however, he asked my opinion about the Armenians. I stated that Armenia was the best bolt between Turkey and Aserbeidschan, and thus could stop a ranturanian movement towards the East. Generally speaking the Armenian people themselves are stationary, a people of farmers who had considerable industrial skill.

I then described to the Fuehrer our relationship with the Foreign Ministry. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed the political handling of the Eastern territories, in as far as it has not been taken over directly within our administration. I said that the Reich Foreign Minister had formed a large Eastern committee and had despite our protests convoked in increasing measure the most varied emigrants. I read to the Fuehrer a list of emigrants from Turkey, from Paris, from Switzerland, all of whom were staying at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin. Two of them, according to our information, were well-known espionage agents. I thought it extremely risky to assemble here these emigrants from all parts of the world. The Fuehrer listened in surprise, I said that we prepared years ago already for the Eastern questions. In this connection we had made possible the studies of Dr. BINZING and assigned him upon request for a certain period to the AA. (Foreign Ministry). The AA. then created for him a seperate department for planning and appointed him to be a Regierungsrat (Advisor of the Government).

It subsequently refused to return him to us. The same applies in the case of the Turkestanian KAYUM. The questions had long been discussed with him. We had merely loaned him to the AA. for the

purpose of broadcasting propaganda. Now the A.A. was sending him to Paris, in order to collect emigrants. The Fuehrer gave the strictest instructions to the Reich Minister Dr. LAMMERS, to inform the A.A. officially that it had to discontinue its activities in the East instantly. It was also to release the retained personalities to the Ministry East, and he did not wish any further inquiries. I further explained that I had talked to State Secretary v. WEIZSAECKER a few weeks ago and requested him to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that I was looking forward to speaking to him personally. WEIZSAECKER said that the two points of view differed. When Weizsaecker was asked about it after some time, he said that he did not understand from this talk that he was to arrange the meeting between Ribbentrop and myself. We have interpreted this remark that the matter was to be put off until after the congress of emigrants had been convoked in Berlin. Some days ago we were informed by a liaison man of the A.A. that they did not at all consider the attitude which I had reported to the Fuehrer in regard to the Caucasian people, as binding for them but that it was of a purely private character. The Fuehrer once more emphasized his point of view.

I then reported to the Fuehrer on the work of the preparatory reconstruction staffs. With the exception of a few personalities whom the Fuehrer preferred not to have employed or preferred to be used in Germany the Fuehrer accepted the proposed list of personalities. The tasks of Reich Minister SPEER and his relationship with me were then thoroughly discussed. The Fuehrer said that he, for example 3 had made the worst experiences in regard to the matters of railroad traffic by the fact that the Government General had its own railroad administration between the front lines and the Reich. Because of these circumstances a lot of misunderstandings and frictions were caused. The separate administrations did not function and interfered with the uniform technical direction so that very nearly catastrophic conditions resulted, if the entire administration of railroad traffic had not been transferred to the Reich Ministry of Communication. Only by these means had it become gradually possible to increase the daily number of trains from 125 to 220. For the construction of main thoroughfares and armament works it is also necessary that a central office has control, and SPEER already proved at the beginning of his officials duties that he knew how to tackle a job well. He succeeded to solve many a technical task in very short time, which normally would have taken months, and he, the Fuehrer, was most satisfied with this choice. I told the Fuehrer that I had promised my utmost support to SPEER from the very beginning and that I had accepted in principle his first drafts for an arrangement, with the only exception of two points, that is that this arrangement should remain in force beyond the duration of the war and secondly, that the departmental Chief of the O.T. (Organisation Todt), who should have a rank of about Oberregierungsrat, should be able to pass a decision against the Reich Commissioners.

The Fuehrer thereupon stated repeatedly that the Reich Ministry SPEER would be dissolved on the very day peace was declared and all his present tasks would be split up. The management of the artery roads through the East, however, had still technically to be centrally conducted. They are, therefore, tasks for the immediate war effort. Speer also neither has the intention nor the commission to start building houses now, but he must be empowered to prevent the building anywhere of large administrative palaces or similar buildings, which are not war essential. Dr. LAMMERS suggested to include by way of agreement or decree of the Fuehrer, that this decree was only for the duration of the war. I then described to the Fuehrer

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the present general situation, according to which new plenipotentiaries-in-chief endeavoured to carry out direct actions in the occupied Eastern territories, overlooking those dignitaries who were appointed by the Fuehrer himself. At the moment the problem of the employment of labor was under discussion. In those places where the commissioners-in-chief had been informed in good time and had the possibility to enlighten the populations concerned, it was possible to achieve a considerable voluntary readiness for work. In many other instances one adopted measures of enforcement immediately, without taking any consideration of the commissioner in chief, with the result that in certain towns a flight into the woods took place, in order that they would not be - to use their own phrase - deported. Those men would decidedly increase the number of partisans and thus endanger our lines of supply. Other forced laborers had left the trains going into the Reich during the night, with the result that they arrived half empty at the frontier of the Government General. They, too, would constitute a danger. As a result at places which were included in the Four Year Plan themselves, the very Four Year Plan had withdrawn workers who were partially lost, and thus the opposite result was achieved, that is a noticeable deterioration of the situation and ill feelings of the population. I already received a number of reports from the Ukraine and from Latvia which confirm this state of affairs. If now medium or lower technicians proceeded similarly without regard of the commissioners in chief, these conditions would deteriorate considerably without thereby achieving the technical effects. I point out that development. If Reich Minister SPEER would retain his authority in its old form, I would be forced to decline the responsibility for conditions in the future and, in my case, could not be subjected to criticism if the political situation would worsen very decisive by. The Fuehrer listened to the report most attentively, as was my impression, and then he said that, in any case, the arterial roads had to be secured by technical means in order to supply the frontier with guns and ammunition. The matter was then discussed once more. I pointed out what great effort it took me to restrain the supreme Reich authorities from interfering with the occupied Eastern territories; the arguments, however, were so convincing, that one realized to a large extent that the direction of the East could only be carried out centrally. If this painfully achieved position was now to be broken by such a far-reaching decree for SPEER, the tendency would revive everywhere to interfere with the occupied Eastern territories disregarding the Ministry East. The Fuehrer said that under no circumstances should that happend, and he insttucted Dr. LAMMERS, that he was to reject such demands on the Fuehrer's orders.

Dr. LAMMERS was ordered to draft a formulation of the tasks of Reich Minister SPEER in the occupied Eastern territories in relationship to myself for the duration of the war.

In the course of the discussion a number of other matters were also dealt with. The Fuehrer approved the final version regarding uniforms of the occupied territories. - I reported to him the results of the exhibition in Ghent, Bruxelles and of the work progress of the exhibition "Fight for EUROPE".-

The question of the awarding the iron cross to the Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians to a problem of the O.K.W. The Armed Forces are in favor of such awards. However, there are some political objections. The Fuehrer believes to see a danger in it, that in case of future complications the bearer of the EK (iron cross) might have to be subjected to disciplinary punishment. I explainde that soldiers of the Baltic nations - according to many utterances - looked upon an award as a guarantee for Reich citizenship. Thereby the political effect of a Germanisation and on the other hand

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1520-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

the skimming of nationalistic forces would become possible. The matter was to be examined once again.

I informed the Fuehrer of my intention to start my first official journey into the Eastland on the 14th May. The Fuehrer authorized me to extend his greetings to the appointed administrative corps.

I then reported to the Fuehrer the results of metal collection in the Eastland which produced 2,500 tons. By collecting those metals still available in the economy, the figure would be raised to 3,500 tons. The collection of wools too had reached the average of the Reich.

I handed the Fuehrer a file note regarding the development of rubber plantations, which has been fostered by the foreign policy office of the N.S.D.A.P. since 1933. Despite all the official refusals the plants were at first cultivated in Athens, later on the Reich Food Minister granted a few acres of land in Germany. Now it is cultivated in the Wartheland and in the Government General, and later on in the Ukraine where from 1943 on more than 100,000 ha willibe worked. The harvest will then provide enough to fill the gap which is still open from (synthetic rubber production.

During the report I turned the converstion toward the planning departments of the ministry. I said that after nearly one year no high official had yet been appointed because of the many discussions with the competent Reich departments. I mentioned the case of party member CRANZ who was supposed to be my immediately subordinated chief of press in the East, but whom the ministry of finance did not want to grant to me as a Ministerialdirektor. Dr. LAMMERS was of the opinion that one could not start fight away with the highest ranks. If GRANZ was now appointed Ministerialrat then he could be promoted within a year. I said that Cranz was already a year in the Ministry. Now was it a question of appointing the major Cranz, but of the journalist who had followed this profession for nearly 20 years. I said that the ministry also had to be on an equal footing in its negotiations with the Reich Commissioner. This was not an ordinary Special department ministry (Ressortministerium), but it had other, far more extended tasks. The Fuehrer agreed with this point of view and asked about how large the Reich Commissioners Offices were. After mentioning the number of rooms I added that a Reich Commissioner was in reality like a minister president, who was governing a large country. Here, too, the Fuehrer agreed, and he said that to begin with he was not much in favor to create a ministry for the East Commissions. I was surprised, because Dr. LAMMERS had made out to me that just the creation of a ministry was the wish of the Fuehrer. I told the Fuehrer that at that time I had made special propositions. I then requested Dr. LAMMERS to give me his support in this matter.

Berlin,
13th May 1942.
R/H.

Signed: R.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1520-PS

26 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, rfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and the the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1520-PS.

rfc ERNST COHN
33925738

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Exhibit #B 157
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

DOCUMENT NO. L-205

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This Telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM London.

Dated December 8, 1938.

Rec'd 6:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Under Secretary of State
Dec 9- 1938
Mr. Welles
(Stamp)

1414, December 8, 7 p.m.

(840. 48)
(Refugees/1072.)

PERSONAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM RUBLEE.

My 1403, December 7, 3 p.m.

The representative of the German Embassy assured us that we would receive further explanation of the cancellation or postponement of the Brussels meeting in the course of yesterday. He said that this telegram was being deciphered and that undoubtedly he would have further details. However, late last evening he called merely to state that it was now understood that the meeting had had to be put off in view of the sudden illness of the principal negotiator on the German side. He regretted that he could tell us no more.

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(Dec 10.38
(FP

During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger's office in Paris. We were told that the matter of refugees had been raised by Bonnet in his conversation with von Ribbentrop. The result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when pressed, had said to Bonnet that the Jews in Germany without exception were pickpockets, murderers and thieves. The property they possessed had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the population. The property which they had acquired illegally would be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report to the police as other criminals were obliged to do. The German Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was not however willing for them to take the property which

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had resulted from their illegal operations with them. There was in fact nothing that it could or would do.

From our German contact we have information that the French raised the question of refugees not only in principle but concretely in respect to the financial aspects of the question. Berenger, while attending the officers meeting, gave a hint that his Government was preparing to take this line. We attempted to dissuade him from crossing wires with our negotiation and he assured us that he would do his best to keep the discussion of refugees on a general plane but he added Chamberlain had requested Daladier to take the matter up with Ribbentrop and so it would have to be taken up. Winterton denies this.

The British assured us this morning that they did not communicate to the French the details of the financial plan which they now tell us they have prepared but which they are holding back for the present. They say that they are as mystified as we are about the French move and do not know what specific financial proposals Bonnet may have raised with Ribbentrop. With regard to the visit of Schacht to London we have no conclusive information. The British will say no more than that the visit is imminent. The Germans say they are not at liberty to discuss the matter.

(Sgd) KENNEDY.

HPD

H1155-0244

Exhibit GB 158
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3358-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Ministry for Foreign Affairs
83 - 26 19/1 Ang. II

Berlin, 31st January 1939.

Enclosed please find for your attention a circular which has been sent to the German authorities abroad on the subject of "The Jewish Question as a factor in German Foreign Policy in the year 1938."

By Order

signed Hinrichs.

To:

All Senior Reich Authorities
and NSDAP Bureau for Foreign Affairs.

to No. 611 39 secret, Foreign.

H1155-0245

Secret

Foreign

6.2.39.

No. 611 39 Secret. Foreign If.

Copy to: Abw. I (Counter Intelligence I)
W. Stab.
Chief Dept. 3.
Att. Gr. of the Army General Staff
OKM. Dept. 3. SKL
Ob.d.L. (ZA)
Ob. d.L. Dept. 5. General Staff,
Ausl. III

Pencil note:
+ Chief W. Wi.

attention is requested.

By Order

1 Enclosure

H1155-0246

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
83 - 26 19/1

Berlin, 25th January 1939.

Contents:

The Jewish Question as a factor in German Foreign Policy in the year 1938.

1) The German Jewish Policy as basis and consequence of the decisions for the foreign policy of the year 1938.

2) Aim of German Jewish Policy: Emigration.

3) Means, ways and aim of the Jewish Emigration.

4) The emigrated Jew as the best propaganda for the German Jewish Policy.

It is certainly no co-incidence that the fateful years 1938 has brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realization of the "idea of Greater Germany". Since the Jewish Policy was both the basis and consequence of the events of the year 1938. The advance made by Jewish influence and the destructive Jewish spirit in Politics, Economy and Culture paralysed the power and will of the German people to rise again more perhaps even than the power-policy opposition of the former enemy allied powers of the World War. The heading of this sickness among the people was therefore certainly one of the most important requirements for exerting the force which in the year 1938 resulted in the joining together of Greater Germany, in defiance of the world.

To:

All diplomatic and qualified consular representatives abroad.

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The necessity for a radical solution of the Jewish question arose however also as a consequence of the foreign political development, which resulted in a further 200,000 Jews in Austria in addition to the 500,000 of the Jewish Faith living in the Old Reich. The influence of Jewry on Austrian Economy which had grown to enormous proportions under the Schuschnig Regime, made immediate measures necessary, with the aim of excluding Jewry from German Economy and utilizing Jewish property in the interests of the community. The action carried out as reprisal for the murder of Legation Councillor von Rath (Gesandtschaftsrat) accelerated this process to such an extent that Jewish shops - till then with the exception of foreign businesses disappeared from the streets completely. The liquidation of the Jewish Wholesale Trade, Manufacturing Trade, and of houses and real estate in the hands of Jews, will gradually reach a point where in a conceiveable time there will no longer be any talk of Jewish property in Germany. Nevertheless it must be emphasized that this is no seizure of Jewish property without compensation, as for instance the confiscation of Church Property during the French revolution. On the contrary the dispossessed Jew receives Reich Bonds for his goods, and the interest is credited to him.

The final goal of German Jewish Policy is the emigration of all the Jews living in Reich territory. It is foreseen that already the thorough measures in the economic sphere, which have prevented the Jew from earning and made him live on his dividends, will further the desire to emigrate. Looking back on the last 5 years since the assumption of power it is however obvious that neither the Law for the Reestablishing of the Professional Character of the Civil Service nor the Nürnberg Jewish Laws with their Executive Regulations, which prevented any tendancy of Jewry being assimulated, contributed to any extent to the Emigration of German Jews. On the contrary every period of domestic political tranquility has resulted in such a stream of Jewish immigrants returning, that the Gestapo has been obliged to put Jewish immigrants with German passports into a Training Camp for political supervision.

The Jew was excluded from Politics and Culture. But until 1938 his powerful economic position in Germany was unbroken, and thereby his obstinate resolve to hold out until "better times" came. Indicative of the tactics of this "delaying" resistance is the programme of a Jewish Party recently formed in Poland, to fight against all Polish measures aimed at Jewish emigration. As long as the Jew can earn money in Germany, then in the opinion of World Jewry the Jewish bastion in Germany need not be given up.

But the Jew has underestimated the consequences and the strength of the National Socialist purpose. The powerful Jewish positions in Vienna and Prague collapsed in 1938 at the same time as the System of States in Central Europe created at Versailles to keep Germany down. Italy stood at Germany's side, with her Racial Laws in the fight against Jewry. An expert on the Jewish question, Prof. Goga took over the Government in Bukarest with a programme aimed against Jewry, without however being able to carry it out because of overwhelming international pressure from Paris and London. Jewry in Hungary and Poland was subjected to Special Laws. Everywhere the success of German foreign policy now begins to shake Jewish strongholds which have been established for hundreds of years from Munich and in far off States, like the tremours of an earthquake.

It is also understandable that World Jewry, "which has selected America as its Headquarters" regards as its own downfall the Munich Agreement, which in American opinion signifies the collapse of the Democratic Front in Europe. For the system of Parliamentary Democracy has always, as experience proves, helped the Jews to wealth and political power at the expense of the people in whose country they live, It is certainly the first time in history that Jewry must evacuate a secure position.

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This resolution was first formed in 1938. It showed itself in the efforts of the Western Democracies particularly those of the United States of America, to put the now finally determined Jewish withdrawal from Germany, in other words Jewish emigration, under international control and protection. The American President Roosevelt "who it is well known is surrounded by a whole row of exponents of Jewry among his closest confidants" called a State Conference as early as the middle of 1938 to discuss the refugee questions, which was held in Evian without any particular results. Both of the questions, the answering of which is the first essential for organized Jewish Emigration remained unanswered: firstly the question of how this emigration should be organised and financed and secondly the question: emigrate to where ?

In answer to the first question, International Jewry in particular did not appear willing to contribute. On the contrary the Conference - and later the Committee formed by it in London under the direction of Rublee an American - regarded its main task as that of forcing Germany by international pressure to release Jewish property to the greatest possible extent. In other words Germany was to pay for the emigration of her 700,000 Jews with German National property. It is at the same time to be doubted whether International Jewry ever seriously desired the mass emigration of their fellow Jews from Germany and other states at all, unless there was an equivalent of a Jewish State. The tactics hitherto employed in Jewish proposals, were in every case aimed less at mass emigration of Jews than at the transfer of Jewish property.

It goes without saying, that the transfer of even a fraction of Jewish property, would be impossible from the point of view of foreign exchange. The financing of a mass emigration of German Jews is therefore still obscure. Questions could be answered casually thus, that Germany for her part reckoned that International Jewry - particularly relatives of Jews who have emigrated - would support this emigration as vigorously as it made it possible for its destitute fellow Jews to immigrate to Germany, at a time when Germany was so weak that she could not stop the stream of Jews from the East. It should be emphasized however that according to police and taxation records, the greater proportion of Jews immigrated to Germany without means and made money in a few years or decades while the German people lost their possessions as a result of the reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles or joined the ranks of the unemployed. Consequently Germany for her part had no sympathy for the compassion, with which an ostensibly humanitarian world accuses Germany of illegally appropriating property which was taken away from the German people by Jewish business methods.

The second question, to what country should an organised Jewish emigration be directed, could similarly not be answered by the Evian Conference, as each of the countries taking part having announced that they were fundamentally concerned with the refugee problem, declared that there were not in a position to take large numbers of Jewish emigrants into their territory. After over 100,000 Jews even in 1933/34 had succeeded either legally or illegally in escaping abroad and establishing themselves in someone else's country either with the help of their Jewish relatives living abroad or circles sympathetically disposed from a humanitarian point of view, almost every State in the World has in the meantime hermetically sealed its borders against these parasitical Jewish intruders. The problem of Jewish emigration is therefore for all practical purposes at a standstill. Many States have already become so cautious, that they demand a permit made out by German authorities from Jews travelling in the ordinary way with German Passports, saying that there is nothing against them returning.

The emigration movement of only about 100,000 Jews has already sufficed to awaken the interest if not the understanding of many countries in the Jewish danger. We can estimate that the Jewish question will extend to a problem of International Politics when large numbers of Jews from Germany, Poland, Hungary and Rumania are put on the move as a result of increasing pressure from the people of the countries where they are living. Even for Germany the Jewish problem will not be solved when the last Jew has left German soil.

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It is even today an important duty of German Policy to control and when possible direct the flow of Jewish Emigration. To be sure there is no incentive to cooperate with other countries such as Poland, Hungary and Rumania, who themselves are striving for the emigration of the Jewish sections of their population in an attempt to solve this problem. From experience with this procedure interests clash, although directed towards the same goal, and retard the realization of Germany's urgent claim for German Jews to be admitted into other particular countries.

It is true that the Rumanian Government sent an official appeal to the Reich Government in the name of human ethics and justice, to join with them in an international action to solve the Jewish question. On the other hand Poland at the end of October last year issued a decree, the execution of which has made it practically impossiblefor 60,000 Jews of Polish Nationaltiy residing in Germany to return to Poland. As is well known the Reich Government had then to decide to deport to Poland 60,000 Jews of Polish Nationality who will be followed by their families, shortly before the Polish Decree came into force. The Hungarian Government it is true appreciates the German Jewish Policy in so far as they themselves have in mind the "Aryanisation" of Hungarian - Jewish businesses in Germany that is Jewish owners of firms will be replaced by Hungarians. In general however it is apparent, that the States concerned are more egotistically interested in deporting their own Jewish elements than in any international solution. Germany will therefore take the initiative herself, in order next of all to find ways, means and destination for Jewish emigration from Germany.

Palestine - which has already become the slogan of world opinion, as the land for the emigrants - cannot be considered as the + get for Jewish emigration because it is incapable of absorbing a mass influx of Jews. Under the pressure of Arab resistance, the British Mandatory Government has restricted Jewish Immigration into Palestine to the minimum. For the time being Jewish emigration to Palestine was helped to a great extent, as far as Germany was concerned, by the signing of an agreement with the representatives of Jewry in Palestine, which made it possible to transfer Jewish property in the form of additional exports (Haavara-Agreement). Apart from the fact that emigration was made possible by this method for a small number of wealthy Jews only, but not for the mass of Jews without means,+ there were fundamental consideration of foreign policy against this type of emigration: the transfer of Jewish property out of German, contributed to no small extent to the building of a Jewish State in Palestine. Germany must regard the forming of a Jewish State, as dangerous, which even in miniature would form just such an operational base as the Vatican for Political Catholicism. The realization that World Jewry will always be the irreconcilable enemy of the Third Reich, forces the decision to prevent any strengthening of the Jewish position. A Jewish State however would bring an international increase in power to World Jewry. Alfred Rosenberg expressed this idea in his speech in Detmold on 15 January this year as follows:

> "Jewry is striving today for a Jewish State in Palestine. Not to give Jews all over the world a homeland but for other reasons: World Jewry must have a minature State, from which to send extraterritorial ambassadors and representatives to all countries of the world and through these be able to further their lust for power. But more than anything else they want a Jewish Centre, a Jewish State in which they can house the Jewish swindlers from all parts of the

+ Pencil Note: Are these such people?

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world, who are hunted by the Police of other countries, issue them with new Passports and then send them to other parts of the world. It is to be desired, that those people who are friendly disposed to Jews, above all the Western Democracies who have so much space in all parts of the world at their disposal, place an area outside Palestine for the Jews, of course in order to establish a Jewish Reserve and not a Jewish State."

That is the programme expressing the foreign policy attitude of Germany towards the Jewish question. Germany is very interested in maintaining the dispersal of Jewry. The calculation, that as a consequence Boycott Groups and Anti-German Centres would be formed all over the world, disregards the following fact which is already apparent, the influx of Jews in all parts of the world invokes the opposition of the native population and thereby forms the best propaganda for the German Jewish Policy.

In North America, in South America, in France, in Holland, Scandinavia and Greece, everywhere wherever the flood of Jewish immigrants reaches, there is today already a visible increase in Anti-Semeticism. A task of the German Foreign Policy must be to further this wave of Anti-Semeticism. This will be achieved less by German Propaganda abroad, than by the Propaganda which the Jew is forced to circulate in his defence. In the end its effects will recoil on themselves. The reports from German authorities abroad, emphasize the correctness of this interpretation:

The press and official correspondants continually report Anti-Semetic Demonstrations by the population of North America. It is perhaps indicative of the domestic political development in USA, that the listening-audience of the /Radio Priest" Coughlin, who is well known to be Anti-Jewish, has grown to over 20 millions. The Embassy in Montevideo reported on 12 December last year "that the Jewish influx continues for months, week by week. It goes without saying, that Anti-Semeticism is growing" - Salonica reported on 30 November 1938: "that Forces are at work to stir up the hate against the Jews" and that at the same time Greek Freemasonry is endeavouring to stem the Anti-Semetic movement. In France the Paris Town Council (Stadtversammlung) was in April of this year to discuss a proposal, by which the naturalisation of Jews was in future to be refused. The meeting on the Jewish question ended with the speaker being beaten up - Lyon reported on 20 December last year: "The immigration of Jewish Refugees has latterly led to undesirable occurrences. The antipathy towards the new intruders based on business and competitive grounds, which is general throughout France, is unmistakeable." The aversion has grown to such an extent meantime, that a Jewish Defence has already been organised against the Anti-Semeticism in France (Report Paris dated 19 November last year). - The Embassy at the Hague reported on 30 December last year: "Under the pressure of countless Immigrants from Germany, who make themselves objectionable particularly in Amsterdam Anti-Semeticism is growing very much in Holland. And if this continues, it can easily come to pass that Dutchmen will not only appreciate Germany's action against the Jews but will also find himself wishing to do same as we" - The Embassy at Oslo reported on 8th April last year: "While only a few years ago, the streets of Oslo were hardly marred by Jews at all, latterly a great change has come about here. On the streets, in restaurants and above all in the coffee houses, Jews sit around in hideous cluster. The Norwegians are being crowded out, more and more. The Norwegian Press, which formerly did not understand the Jewish question at all, suddenly realized what it meant to have the Children of Israel invade the country like a swarm of locusts. It will be a very salutory lession, which is being meted out to the Norwegians".

These examples from reports from authorities abroad, can if desired be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the expectation, that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews from German Lebensraum which were misunderstood in many countries for lack of evidence would only be temporary

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3358-PS
(Cont'd)

and would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw with its own eyes and thus learned, what the Jewish danger was to them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant Jew is to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will react and the more desirable is this effect in the interests of German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be the future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated not by false compassion for the "United Religious Jewish minority" but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the danger which it represents to the racial composition of the nations.

By Order

Schamburg

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 3359-PS

13 December 1945

I, CATHERINE BEDFORD, 110561, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3359-PS

CATHERINE BEDFORD
110561

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Exhibit GB 159
Filed Jan. 9, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1752-PS

Secret.

Preparations already made for the International Congress.

Reichsleader Alfred Rosenberg received the order from the Führer to stage an anti-Jewish congress. The date for this congress was fixed for the 11.7. after a discussion, and after the corresponding preparations had been made.

The following preparations for the congress have been undertaken:

1.) In Germany.

2.) abroad.

1.) Preparations in Germany.

a) The financing of the congress has been taken on by the Reich Treasury of Chief, Schwarz. Further, after the Führer had decided on Cracow as the site of the congress, Reich Minister and General Governor Frank has taken over all the costs that arise within his General Government.

b) The site of the meeting.

All negotiations concerning billeting, feeding and welfare of the guests, the lecture rooms etc. have been readily settled with the offices of the General governor. (Instead of Cracow, a place that is safe from air raids, for instance Zakopane, can be selected at any time.)

c) The programme of lectures has been discussed with the appropriate offices,

1. Foreign Office

2. Propaganda Ministry

3. Head Office for internal security

and has met with general approval. The Reich Foreign Minister as well as Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels have given their assent to the programme.

d) German speakers and lecturers have been visualised, amongst others three German Ministers. The promise of these three gentlemen to attend seems certain. Some lectures are already on hand.

The final preparations, those for the cultural extra items on the programme, have been taken in hand. (See the letter from Reichsleader Rosenberg to Reichsleader Bormann concerning the appearance of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, with Furtwaengler as conductor).

Even the formation of international organisations for investigating and combatting Jewry, which have been provided for in connection with the congress, have been brought about, and scientific presidents of the organisations have been earmarked. Some individual personalities have already been approached. Amongst others we already have the rpomise of Geheimrat Professor Dr. Eugen Fischer to be president of the European organisation for the "racial-biological questions of Jewry".

e) The following have been entered as honorary members:

Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop

Reich Minister of the Interior and Reichsleader of the SS Heinrich Himmler

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Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels

Reich Minister and Governor Dr. Frank

2.) Preparations abroad

The Foreign Office has accepted the task of contacting the prominent European people, with the exception of a few of the occupied territories in Europe, via its representatives abroad.

The German representatives abroad have received several official instructions, according to which they are

a) to propose delegates to be invited,

b) nominate lecturers,

c) approach the representatives of governments with a view to their participating at the congress.

In the course of these instructions being carried out, the following have promised their participation, or membership of the congress-committee and membership of the honorary committee:

Italy:	Minister for National Enlightenment Mezzasoma	(honorary committee)
	The former Minister of State Preziosi	(congress-committee and congress lecturer)
France:	Minister for Education Abel Bonnard	(Honorary committee)
	Secretary of State Paul Marion	(congress-committee)
Hungary:	Minister for the Interior von Jarossh	(honorary committee and congress lecturer)
Holland:	The leader of the NSB, Mussert	
	(Personally invited by Reichsleader Rosenberg during the latter's stay in Holland)	
Arabia:	The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem	(honorary committee and congress lecturer)
Iraq:	Prime Minister Gailani	(honorary committee)

Norway: At the present moment a representative of Reichsleader Rosenberg has arrived here, in order personally to convey an invitation to Prime Minister Quisling to attend the congress.

Contacts have also been established with countless other countries. For the time being the promises to attend of the prominent representatives are not yet at hand. On the other hand promises have been received from delegates from Sweden, Roumania, Slovakia and illegal delegates from Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. Further the office of Obergruppenfuehrer (General in the SS) Berger has undertaken to invite renowned leaders of the Germanic volunteers in the SS to take part in the congress. Amongst others, Britons and Americans are visualised in this connection, who are also willing to speak.

The occupied eastern territory is included via the Ministry for the East. A number of promises to attend have been received from renowned personalities in this territory. Lectures have already been received from foreign speakers, amongst others from the former Minister of State Preziosi.

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3.) Reason for the importance of the Congress at the present time. The reports from outside Germany and the anti-German allied propaganda tries to make believe beyond all doubt that the whole war is being kindled by the other side more and more as a crusade, because the German nation plans to destroy the "Jewish People".

The Soviet Union: We refer to the pro-semitic Molotov - congress in Moscow.

U.S.A. We refer to permanent session of the Jewish Congress.

The last new beginning 6. 5. 1944.

England: We refer to the English failure to pay attention to their own White Paper regarding Palestine problem.

At the same time, we point out the slowly rising anti-Semitic feeling in the countries of our opponents. It seems necessary that the feeling caused by enemy propaganda that National Socialism is retreating on all fronts, be reputed by this great anti-Jewish Congress.

The invasion army is not fighting against the barbarian Germany of annihilation of Jews but it is fighting for world Jewry!

What kind of propaganda is being duly turned out on the German side?

To give up this plan or to postpone this International Congress to an indefinite date, after half of Europe has already been won for this plan would support or strengthen the propaganda conducted against us.

It must be borne in mind that not a German authority but an international assembly is responsible for the Congress and issues invitations to it.

The preparations for the Congress have so far progressed with the greatest possibilities of disguise.

An arrangement, which has been made on general lines, mentions only an International historic and scientific congress taking place in a Town in the East of the Reich.

Berlin, 15th June 1944.
Hg/We

/s/ Hans Hagemeyer,
Head of the Department.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

Filed Jan. 7, 1946
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BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK
No. 6 (ENGLISH)

JOACHIM v. RIBBENTROP

Joachim v. Ribbentrop

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